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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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JPRS-NEA-93-102

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14 October 1993

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Present, Future Relations With Phalange Analyzed

93AA0153A Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*  
in Arabic 1, 8, 15 Aug 93

[Article by Hasan al-Batal: "Up! Phalange Young Man"]

[1 Aug, p 13]

[Text] Have things turned upside-down and, therefore, the Lebanese Phalange, whose name was once jarring to the Arab ear, has come to belong to the bright side in this prevailing Arab darkness?

The Phalange was the "separatist party," or seemed to be so; or, maybe it was pushed to become the party that strongly clashed with the Palestinian resistance, which seemed—and still seems—to be the vanguard of Arab nationalism.

But now the nationalist parties have retreated and the supra-national or those called international Marxist parties have almost collapsed and the Islamic voice has prevailed. The Phalange Political Bureau issued one of the most critical and serious manifestos regarding the course of action and the many questions concerning destiny—the regional, the national, the intellectual, and the ideological destiny.

Therefore "Up! Phalange Young Man," as the beginning of the beautiful Phalange anthem says. Incidentally, author of the anthem, which is even more beautiful in Arabic, was a Phalangist or close to the party. The beginning says: We all are for homeland/for the flag at all times/our sword and pen.

The Phalange sword has withdrawn, but the pen has not. Even the Arab sword seems to have withdrawn and only the Palestinian and the Islamist remain in the field.

As for the charge of separatism from Arabism—the true and maybe exaggerated charge—of which the Phalange Party is accused—is the lesser evil. Regionalism has become the prevalent trend, the rule and not the exception or something temporary. It has become a creed of several countries, of which Kuwait and its neighbors to the east and the south, are an example. Although the Phalange sought help from the Israeli enemy in the fight against the Palestinian Arab brother, other nationalist countries sought help from the entire West and fought in its ranks against the Iraqi project which, regardless of what has been said about it, remained an Arab project. Which is reminiscent of what was being said against the Palestinian nationalist project.

It is time now to look at the manifesto of the political bureau of the Phalangist Party.

The principal working paper, one of several papers to be put to the Party at its next conference, deals with the situation in Lebanon and in its neighborhood (that is the

Arab nation), in case the current political process pursues one of two tracks: either failure to realize a settlement [in the Lebanese situation], or success in realizing a regional peace.

The first possibility: What would be the fate of the al-Taif agreement that ended the long and dirty civil war in Lebanon? Will the provisions of the agreement be sufficient and suitable to cure Lebanon, or will it no longer be so?

The Political Bureau sees the first possibility as slim, but this should not prevent us from taking precautions by some means.

The second possibility: The party that has been charged with fascism and sectarianism is almost an Arab nationalist in its concerns (only the Syrian Social Nationalist Party [SSNP] can match it in those sentiments). The Party presents an extremely worthy analysis of the possibilities of peace and its consequences, which might be extremely serious and no less serious than the consequences of the declaration of the Jewish state in Palestine in 1948.

The working paper says that the Arab-Israeli reconciliation if realized "is equal in magnitude." Just as the creation of this state caused an earthquake and even successive earthquakes in the area, reconciliation with it should at least be of the same magnitude. All that has been established on the basis of war shall collapse and vanish. Entities, regimes, and alliances and even a whole way of life have been established on the basis of the Arab-Israeli war. What will happen to those regimes, states and their armies and economies? What will happen to their armies and economies, to the land and the borders if the principal cause for their existence, namely resisting Israel's existence and fighting it with the aim of eliminating it, is gone?

In this analysis, which is right in principle, Phalange anxiety, both apparent and hidden, focuses on the fate of Lebanon and on the neighboring entities which all are the outcome of the Sykes-Picot treaty that eliminated Palestine and led to the emergence of four regional entities in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. Naturally, the ideological premise of many other Arab entities has in various degrees been based on the delineation of the Sykes-Picot map.

I believe that it is time to be fair to the Phalange Party, though not to exonerate it (who in the Fertile Crescent is indeed innocent?). Out of fairness we would say that the Phalange acquired its bad reputation when the pro-Israeli wing dominated the other wings; that is when Bashir al-Jumayyil's wing and his Lebanese "Forces" overpowered even the wing of his brother Amin al-Jumayyil, with the more liberated outlook on the Palestine problem and the national problem and the better cultured.

But the domination of the "military" over the Phalange Party did not result in the military wing's dominating the



intellectual Phalangist circle. This circle cannot be accused of separatism. It is cultured and knowledgeable in the affairs of its country, the area, and the world, which is an extension of the Lebanese cultural openness. A member of the Phalange political bureau is the brilliant "young man" Karim Paqradi, a liberal par excellence. He is knowledgeable in the Palestine problem and is even a sympathizer with it. He is also one of the leaders of the Phalange-Palestinian dialogue and the Phalange-Arab dialogue. He is probably now a maker of the new "Lebanese formula" that is based on a Shi'ite-Maronite understanding that replaced the "1943 formula" between Sunni Muslims and Christian Maronites that has disintegrated.

Clearly, the basic Phalange working paper bears Paqradi's finger prints and his intellectual circle. Incidentally, whoever reads his book *Curse of the Homeland* will find Arab liberalism at its best, mixed with apparent and hidden admiration for the Palestinian revolution, for 'Arafat, and for Saddam Husayn's Iraq. Paqradi also gives al-Asad's Syria its due in full.

We would once again point out here that the intellectual Phalange circle and the Lebanese Christians in general and the Christian Orthodox in particular, consider Israel an enemy of Lebanon and an enemy of the area and the Arabs in general. Who would ever forget Michel Shiha's prediction?

Some of colleagues recall a view expressed earlier that the "conspiracy" of the Palestinian-Phalange war aimed to block the Phalange-Palestinian dialogue. Probably this view is correct, since prior to the outbreak of the civil war the Party conference showed a marvelous sympathy toward the Palestinians and their resistance to Israel. A real dialogue was conducted before the conference and after it.

Few people are doubtful. But the PLO and its leader succeeded in 1982 in averting a Palestinian expulsion [from Lebanon] similar to that which happened in Kuwait. This was thanks to the personal ties of friendship and mutual interest with Phalangists and with Lebanese political military personalities close to the Phalange Party. In the meantime, a "small" pro-Israeli wing in the Party (Elie Hubayqah, champion of the Sabra and Shatila massacre) threw himself into the lap of Syria. [as published]

What is important is that the Phalange working paper is not a belated revival, particularly since it calls for consultation with the key figures in the state, with community and party leaders, as well as with the neighboring countries and intellectual personalities.

Have things turned upside-down or is it the conditions of the nation that did? We will know when we pursue the "peace earthquake."

[8 Aug, p 13]

[Text] However ancient the Lebanese partisan life is in Lebanon, and however numerous the parties are in this beloved country, the backbone of partisan life has been and shall indefinitely remain based on the duality of the Phalangist-Syrian axis (the Phalangist Party and the SSNP).

We would recall here that famous saying by a Lebanese leader. He said: "Camille Sham'un and Kamal Jumblatt agree in the area (al-Shuf), but disagree on the (political) logic. I believe that the one who said this was the late Rashid Karami.

The civil war was a "massacre" for the Lebanese warlords who were slain, such as Kamal Jumblatt, may God's mercy be upon him, and others who were almost slain [but a died natural death]—(Camille Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil, may God's mercy be upon them). They are all gone and the war has almost gone.

This comparison, however, does not in any way apply to the state of affairs between the Phalangist Party and the SSNP (established by the late Antoine Sa'adah). They agree neither in the area nor in logic.

There are no Phalangists outside Lebanon, but we find the SSNP partisans in all Pan-Syria [bilad al-Sham]. The first is a regional party concerned with an existing Lebanese entity, and the Party's role is to perpetuate this entity. The second is the strongest advocate of the Fertile Crescent (whose star is Cyprus. It is said that Cyprus has the best quality copper in the Canaanite-Arab area).

The two parties follow a totally different course. The first is the Lebanese "state party" based on the 1943 formula, while the other is the party of the "Syrian nation."

Furthermore, the Phalange, particularly during the era of its founder Pierre al-Jumayyil, scorns ideology and stands in favor of a "vision" that is a strange mixture of concrete and gelatinous ideas. While the SSNP is almost a model of the ideological party in the Pan-Syria (north of the al-Basrah-al-Aqabah line) since the Pan-Syrian countries are the birth place of the Arab creed in both its parts, the national (the Arab) and the regional (the Syrian), and even its "separatist" part that is best represented by the Phalange Party.

The Phalange was never able to reconcile itself to Arab nationalism, neither in its Nasirist character nor in its Ba'thist character. But its clash with the Arab character of the struggle (the Palestinian resistance) brought about the Lebanese civil war.

The tragedy is that the Palestinian resistance could have avoided the Palestinian-regional Arab clash, which first began to be political and military in an anti-clockwise movement, since the Palestinians objected to the Rogers plan and until Lebanon became our last star, our last tent.

But the Phalange Party was pushed toward that clash since its leaders saw that it is impossible for the Arab nationalist movement and the Phalangist movement to coexist in Lebanon. It is sad that the Arab situation in 1975 was extremely critical, but it was extremely fitting to be the target of the Phalange embarrassing question that asks: Why should most of the burden of the Palestinian-Israeli fighting or all of it be borne by Lebanon alone? Why do the Palestinians not accept a political-media center in Lebanon, the weakest Arab state, and exercise the right to fight from another Arab state?

These questions by themselves are correct, but were naive in the circumstances. The Phalangist did not understand that the Palestinian revolution had become a revolution in his Lebanese homeland, after it had been a fedayeen resistance in another Arab country. The simple or the hating-Phalangist did not comprehend that Lebanon, a refugee country for the Palestinians, is the only haven for the Palestinian struggle. Why? It is impossible for the Palestinians to fight an armed struggle without being armed with an independent political decision. Who was capable of solving this bitter problem? It was indeed the Palestinians, vanguards of the Arab project, but at the same time they lacked the means to protect their political decision in any of the "confrontation states," except in Lebanon.

A regional "popular Arab front" was established in Lebanon (and in the Arab Maghreb too) to participate in the Palestinian revolution. Other than that, the nature of the Arab state as a "party state" prevented interaction with "masses of the Arab nation" in those countries, except through "fedayeen control" and other similar Arab security institutes.

Thus, in the Lebanese civil war, the SSNP members fought with the resistance, while the Phalange was fighting in the opposing trench. Of course, there were Phalangists who did not fight against us, but absolutely no Phalangist fought with us like the Communist, the Shi'ite, the Sunni, the Kurd, the Orthodox Lebanese, and even the non-Phalangist Maronite did.

How does the situation appear on the eve of holding the extraordinary Phalange Party conference in September?

The Palestinians are on their way to gaining a political entity. For the first time in their lives the Phalangists are in the opposition. Before that, the situation was as follows: The Lebanese were expelled from Lebanon to some "unknown" destiny. The Phalangists who were the party of the state became the state itself. (Bashir al-Jumayyil, a Phalangist did not rule. His brother Amin al-Jumayyil, an elected Phalangist did rule.) The pro-Israeli wing in the militarist Phalange decided to carry out a terrible "score settling" with the Palestinians, and so the Sabra and Shatila massacre was perpetrated (its hero Elie Hubayqah, a former commander of the "Lebanese Forces," presently pro-Syria, and a cabinet minister). This was the end of the bloody Palestinian-Phalange

conflict, that began with Tall al-Za'tar camp. The Palestinians and their allies (the joint Palestinian-Lebanese Forces) responded by destroying al-Damur, bastion of the "Free Tigers" and the Phalangists, pillars of the "Lebanese Front."

One or two years after the bloody Palestinian-Phalange conflict came to an end, an uglier and bloodier Shi'ite-Palestinian conflict (the camp wars) broke out. The two parties were allies, but their alliance was not free of deep mutual doubts. Why? The Phalange plan for Lebanon was to continue the Maronite minority control of the country. As for the Shi'ite project, the sectarian majority, it drifted into an "abortive war" against the Palestinians. But although not all the Maronites are Phalangists and not all the Phalangists joined the war against the Palestinians, the majority of the Shi'ah did not join the war against the Palestinians, although many of them were dragged into this war.

It would be ironic if the Palestinians, inadvertently and unintentionally, contributed to what appears to be a "transfer of power" in Lebanon from the hands of the Maronite minority into the hands of the Shi'ite majority. This process was inevitable anyway. God only knows if some of the Phalangists felt sorry, since the presence of the Palestinians was beneficial for the Phalangists had they known how to deal with it. The Palestinians are a "political minority" in the nationalist Arab plan, although they are its vanguard. They are also the last Arab bastions facing the "muddy" Islamist tide. But some of the Phalangist may say or allege that they are comfortable under the Syrian umbrella more so than under a Palestinian umbrella. A state dealing with another state is different from a state dealing with a revolution. This concept could be true and could also be deceptive and will soon be uncovered.

So that the Phalange will no longer lack logical political plans—as it is preparing to conduct a critical review of the Lebanese homeland experiment since 1920, that is since the "Grand Lebanon" (the small Lebanon is the four Syrian districts)—it must deal tactfully with the problem of the Palestinian civilian presence in Lebanon. This is because "the Phalange and the internal" and "the Phalange and the external,"—that is the Phalange and Lebanon and the Phalange and the area require a Phalangist presentation of the Phalange view of the form of relations between a Lebanese entity and a Palestinian entity.

[15 Aug, p 13]

[Text] I would understand the reasons of those who believe that going back to discussing the Phalange-Palestinian issue seems untimely and not worth bringing it up. But I have a different view.

First: The party system is the backbone of democracy, and the Arab party life in general and in Pan-Syria, the home of the Arab ideology in particular, looks as if it has been hit by "leukemia." This is a serious case. What is

even more serious is that some individuals have persistently been contrasting the Palestinian idea (not to say the ideology) with the new world order and the old Arab order. They blame it for their frustrations, attributing to it significance more than it actually deserves, and differing over what it involves and does not involve.

Second: I will not say that the Phalange Party is the party of Christians in Lebanon or even the party of its Maronites (who are real Arabs and not Arabized). But whether we like it or not, it is the first, and perhaps the only, Christian party in all our Arab countries.

Third: Since it switched from being the "state party" to the "opposition party," the Phalange has caught up with the Palestinians and is matching them in the field of "awareness of the experience," while others are still in the stage of the "experiment critique," while still others are in the stage of "faking the experiment."

Fourth: The truth is that the Phalange's criticism of the Palestinian people and the PLO during the war between them and after it is considered "polite" compared with the criticism by Kuwait and possibly by some other countries. There is no comparison between the educational and cultural levels of the Phalange and those of Kuwaiti. I am afraid I have to say that there is no comparison between them in any field. It suffices that the Phalangist fought fiercely for a cause in which he believes. But comparing the Phalangist separatist concept with the "concept" of the Kuwait's policy of turning its back on Arabism, is unfair to the very idea and an insult to logic.

These are the "preambles" of the reasons.

As for the "core" of the reasons, I will discuss the ideas as they pop up.

First: Palestine and Lebanon are the two countries that are most qualified to check the sectarian disease, whether it is spreading inward or outward, because of the makeup, the experiment, the history, and the geopolitical position, as well as because of the mutual interest. The inter-Lebanese strife has shown an astonishing ability to resume harmony that we might not find in any other country.

Second: The Palestinians in Lebanon are not one of the 17 communities comprising the nation. They are Arabs and Palestinians and will remain so regardless of whether they acquired a Lebanese nationality, most of whom are Christians and some of them are Palestinian Maronite, or those who remained in the country as refugees. A Palestinian presence of this nature will facilitate Lebanon's regaining its "formula," or building a "formula," on a solid ground and a democratic base. Within 10 or 20 years the Palestinians in Lebanon will return to their homeland for personal or practical reasons, as is the case with hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who live in Arab or foreign countries.

As for the "essence" of the reasons, I would pinpoint the following:

First: After [the state of] Palestine is reestablished in Palestine, there will be two major countries in Pan-Syria, namely Syria and Israel, in terms of area, inhabitants, and dynamic economic ideas. There will be three entities—small countries: Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. The latter "bloc" is neither a counterweight nor a neutral entity between the two major Pan-Syrian countries, or by any means a buffer or the "periphery" state (such as it is said: Jordan is the periphery of Palestine, and Israel and Lebanon are the periphery of Syria).

Second: If the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation is established, then this would be a "major country," according to the standards of the Pan-Syrian countries. How will Israel's relations be with Syria (and the Syrian Lebanon)?

Unfortunately, the Syrian and Iraqi versions of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party have been and still are at odds. We will not say one word in justification or non-justification of this situation. We wonder: If the nascent Palestine is not a "copy" of any Arab regime, what are the boundaries of the Syrian, Palestinian, and Jordanian harmony? What is both hoped and desired is the realization of the unity of the Arab Pan-Syrian countries (Iraq too). Will this happen? Will the new world order accept it and be satisfied with it? Or, will the new world order accept no less than "smothering" the flames of the Palestinian concept before it crystalizes and its model is simulated, with its distinguished characteristics and democratic concept becoming the example to be followed by its Arab nation.

Going back to the Phalange Party manifesto, which the conference will discuss in September, we ask the question: Are Lebanon and the area capable of facing the peace challenge, the peace which, according to the headlines that speak of the prevailing bad situation, is to be implemented with mismatched terms.

Let us look at Egypt and its conditions nowadays. This country suffered because of the peace consequences more than Israel did. Peace deprived Egypt of playing a role and diminished its importance. It brought to the surface economic and ideological problems, presumably because of moving toward peace. Or probably as a result of switching from the state of tyranny to that of democracy, or because of the interaction between these two conditions in the present Arab-international situation.

Egypt is big enough to absorb the effects of the "peace earthquake" with the least amount of damage, although what we see in Egypt now is neither easy nor insignificant.

I believe that Lebanon, Syria, and Israel will suffer from the "peace earthquake" more than Palestine and Jordan. Israel will withdraw from some parts of Palestine, indeed from most of the land the Zionist ideology of "Eretz Israel" claims. This very state could soon find itself



without "active" enemies facing it, a state that has psychologically, intellectually, militarily, politically, and economically been brought up differently. The Arab enmity toward Israel will remain, but will find expression through other means, which will actually be less challenging and less serious.

Charles Malik, a late Lebanese foreign minister and a theoretician of the "Lebanese Front" used to be quoted as saying: The Pan-Syrian countries are four countries and five peoples. What will the situation be if they become five countries and five peoples? Or two major nationalities, Arab and Zionist?

Obviously these questions cause concern to everybody and to the Phalangists more than anybody else. Will the Phalangists accept climbing down from "Grand Lebanon" to a "small Lebanon?" Is this possible after having abandoned this choice when the Phalange domination was at its peak, when the Phalange raised the slogan saying the area of the entire Lebanon is 1,425 square km.

The Phalange Party is distinguished by the fact that it is the only party in Pan-Syria that brought up this question so that Lebanon will not be surprised by the reconciliation, as it was surprised in the past by the establishment of the "Hebrew state."

What we can say is this: With good relations between Lebanon and Syria, and then Lebanon, with the Palestinian-Jordanian entity, Lebanon can absorb the "peace earthquake" and turn it into a pleasant surprise for Lebanon, Palestine, and for the rest of the area.

It has been observed that the Phalange Political Bureau paid no attention to Israel's difficulties with the state of "peace." It is a very good thing for the Phalange Party to put its questions to everybody. This way it will end the era of isolation and join the procession of common national destiny so it will get closer to the ideas of the SSNP.

## IRAQ

### Consequences of 'Mother of Catastrophes' Reviewed

93LA0163A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 2, 3 Aug 93

[Article in two installments by 'Irfan Nizam-al-Din: "Between 2 August 1990 and 2 August 1993; Three Years Since 'Mother of Catastrophes'; Has Time Come to Recover, Compromise, Overcome Crisis, and Heal Rift?"]

[2 Aug p 13]

[Text] The earthquake that hit all layers of the Arab edifice and loosened its roots is three years old now. Every day, more facts are revealed and more items are added to the list of damages and losses suffered by the Arab nation from top to bottom. In their entirety, these damages and losses constitute a bunch of catastrophes or

the "mother-of-catastrophes," to compare it to what was called three years ago today the "mother-of-battles." The tyrannical Israeli attacks we have seen perpetrated against Lebanon lately are a living example of the condition to which our nation has slipped.

What has changed in the nation's character and entity three years after the "mother-of-catastrophes?" How were the Arabs on 2 August 1990 and how are they today, 2 August 1993?

Despite all impurities, negatives, and criticism, the Arabs lived in a state of reasonable solidarity and cooperation. Their disputes amounted to no more than words and speeches, and to some cases of disgruntlement and estrangement. But when things became serious, it was possible to develop a unified position, at least on major pan-Arab issues, on human and economic conditions, and on normal relations. It is true that Arab relations did not rise to the level of the nation's aspirations and ambitions for unity, solidarity, and integration. However, those relations observed certain red lines and maintained a minimum degree of solidarity. Within the framework of the "minimum limit" lines, Arab summits were convened, and they adopted reasonable resolutions and positions reflecting a common viewpoint. The latest such summit was the Baghdad summit, which was convened less than two months before the foolish decision to hurl the Iraqi forces into the furnace of the sin of occupying Kuwait.

Within the bounds of this "minimum limit," there were [in the pre-Gulf War period] good beginnings to unite the ranks, heal the rift, and reconcile some Arab countries. The period also witnessed a good, realistic, and rational tendency urging the creation of regional units and blocs capable of keeping pace with the spirit of the age and of coexisting with the new world order, which discounts the weak and the small from its calculations and which acknowledges only the big and the strong. In addition to the GCC, which had made long strides toward cooperation and toward establishing a unified regional Gulf entity, two other important regional blocs were created, and they could have played an important Arab and international role and gained a political and economic weight that could not be dismissed lightly. In the Arab East, there was the Arab Cooperation Council, which included Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan. In the Arab Maghreb, there is the Maghreb Union, which includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.

These beginnings could have strengthened the bonds of Arab solidarity, as well as coordination among these various councils and blocs within the framework of the Arab League, especially since Syria and Lebanon had been moving toward special relations and Sudan was planning to either join the Arab Cooperation Council or create a similar cooperation council with Somalia and Djibouti, and perhaps Eritrea.

Also within this framework, strategic balance between the Arabs and Israel was on its way to becoming a reality, despite the Soviet Union's collapse and the lack of a "strategic ally," even a superficial one, in the arena. Syria was carrying on with the process of developing and strengthening its military power. The efforts for Arab reconciliation with Egypt had added a new dimension to the Arab political action and had foiled the Zionist scheme to isolate the biggest Arab human, political, and military force. The ceaseless support given by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the GCC states to the frontline states had filled the gaps and secured an immense political and financial dimension for Arab steadfastness against Israel.

The PLO was getting vast financial and political support from the Gulf states and all Arab countries, without exception, helped the PLO stand fast, meet its obligations to Palestinians at home and abroad, and confirm its presence as the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. This is what had made the PLO eligible at the Arab and international levels to proclaim the independent state of Palestine, with the venerable Jerusalem as its capital, and to receive the recognition of most countries of the world.

As for Iraq, it secured a political, military, and material dimension for the Palestinian cause. The Zionists had a thousand apprehensions about Iraq, considering that it was the second defense line to which the nation could turn if any Arab country was subjected to Zionist aggression. Iraq could also change the course of any war or battle because it could throw its military and human capabilities into the Arab fronts within hours, not to mention the immense combat experience and capabilities it had gained during its war with Iran.

Iraq, with its special relations with all Arab countries and with eastern and western countries, was eligible to become the backbone of steadfastness and joint action and of support for the Palestinian cause, not to mention the role it could have played, not just at the Arab level but within the entire region, in the strategic balance with Israel first and then with the neighboring countries, especially Iran and Turkey.

Iraq emerged triumphant from its war with Iran, even though the winner in this mad eight-year war was also a loser. But Iraq was able to stem the Persian tide, or what was later characterized as the export of revolution under a religious cover. Iraq was also able to maintain its intrinsic strength and its strong army. It enhanced its scientific capabilities and employed its economy in order to become able to confront all difficulties and to rely on its intrinsic resources, thanks to its vast oil, water, and human resources and to the boundless support it had received from its sisters, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf states, and Egypt.

Until the morning of 2 August 1990, Kuwait was a peaceful, stable, and prosperous country with abundant

resources and investments that had enabled it to establish a fund for future generations, with estimated assets of \$100 billion. This wealth was used to create a better future; to aid Iraq with more than \$10 billion in order to help it shoulder burdens of the war with Iran; and to support various Arab world development projects. Moreover, Kuwait was committed to supporting Arab and Palestinian steadfastness in accordance with the Khartoum summit resolutions.

On top of all of this, Kuwait hosted hundreds of thousands of Arab citizens who worked in its various developmental and administrative projects and who pumped millions of dollars to their countries and families every month.

Those guests included more than 400,000 Palestinians who lived as if they were in their first, not second, country. They lived and worked under friendly conditions and were given priority and precedence in every department, company, and establishment. Some of them accumulated wealth and created their own companies; some saved and built their future, either in Kuwait, in Jordan, or in the occupied territories; and some pumped their savings to support their families' steadfastness and to help them live honorably under the canopy of the oppressive occupation and its harsh conditions. One should not forget their constant aid for the PLO and for Palestinian humanitarian, charitable, social, health, and educational institutions. The condition of Kuwait, which was subjected to direct aggression instead of receiving thanks and gratitude, is not much different from that of Saudi Arabia and the GCC member states who gave Iraq even more than they could afford; who did not withhold anything from Iraq or from other Arab states and organizations; and who provided the Palestinian cause with all kinds of incalculable, boundless, and unrestrained aid and support. They viewed the PLO as their pampered son who had to be fortified, tended, nurtured, and helped to stand on his own feet and protected from all dangers, regardless of the results and consequences. These countries also opened their arms, doors, and hearts to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who were given the priority and granted exceptions and privileges which no other people got.

Prior to the ill-omened 2 August [1990], the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had completed developing its intrinsic strength, constructing its infrastructure, and establishing advanced industries and agricultural projects, which were tantamount to a challenge. It had begun to prepare to reap the fruits and harvest of seasons of abundance and to proceed toward a new phase in which it planned to devote its wealth to futuristic projects and to utilize it in productive investments that are beneficial to the Saudi people and all Arab peoples—investments whose benefits were to extend to all Muslim peoples by providing direct support for projects, by aiding development plans, by bolstering the internal structure, by offering the best facilities and services to pilgrims, by tending the holy places, and by completing expansion of



the projects launched in the venerable Mecca and luminous Medina by the custodian of the two holy places.

To put it more clearly, Arab wealth was safeguarded and preserved. Everybody benefited from its abundance and thanked God, may He be praised and exalted. All Arab resources were flowing into the river of greater ambitions and of big hopes of a better future and of rational tendencies founded on cooperation, solidarity, unity, and the creation of an intrinsic Arab strength that protects without threatening and preserves and does not squander—a strength within which the strong defends the weak and the rich helps the poor.

On the other hand, Israel saw in all this an evil omen and had a thousand apprehensions about Arab wealth, Arab strength, and Arab unity, even at its minimal limit. Israel also stood powerless in the face of the blessed intifadah and of our heroic kinsmen's ability to stand fast and to secure resources, not just for survival but for facing life's burdens and the burdens of development. Our kinsmen were able to do this as a result of the inflow of money, aid, the savings of Palestinian workers in the Gulf, and of the appropriations obtained by the PLO.

The major powers started scheming to crystallize their ambitions of controlling the sources of wealth and establishing their bridges in the region. Seeing Arab wealth accumulate, these powers drooled and started considering means and schemes to steal and drain this wealth, to control the vast Arab markets in order to turn them into consumer markets for their goods and into outlets that help these powers overcome their recession. Their purpose was also to rescue their collapsing economies; keep their plants in operation; and create employment opportunities for millions of unemployed workers, especially in weapons plants, technology and aircraft plants, and others plants. There was another important and serious element, namely the fear that Arab wealth and the vast Arab savings could influence the world economy in the future and could destabilize the major currencies or the national economies of the major powers. So these powers worked, and continue to work, fiercely to control world affairs and to impose their wills and their resolutions on all peoples in accordance with an expansionist colonialist will and of old expansionist policies who used military force as their instrument in the past. Now, economic and financial power has become their basic and essential instrument.

So, this is the map of the Arab world and of the Gulf region before the major earthquake and mother-of-catastrophes occurred on the eve of 2 August 1990 and before the Iraqi regime, led by President Saddam Husayn, implemented the decision to commit suicide and to slaughter the Arab nation the moment the Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. This was followed by the regime's subsequent intransigence and chain of mistakes and sins.

But how does this map look now that three years of tragedies, disasters, concessions, and retreats have

passed? What are the consequences and ramifications of the "mother-of-catastrophes" and in what condition is the Arab nation, which looks behind it and asks: where were we, where are we now, and what is the future?

This is what we will try to review in the second part of this article, God willing.

[3 Aug p 17]

[Text] Yesterday, I pointed out the Arab nation's condition prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. I noted how this nation had been preparing to set forth toward a better future in all fields and at all levels, even if within the framework of a minimum limit of solidarity and in light of a spark of hope on which one could build to achieve the possible. One has, however, to acknowledge that it was, and it continues to be, impossible to accomplish all aspirations and hopes for reasons that we all know. But what a difference between the past and the present! Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has altered the face of the region and has pushed it back dozens, not to say hundreds, of years.

Chronologically, three years may seem a small drop in an ocean. But in the life of Arabs, they have been an ocean that has drowned all of them; has caused them numerous ordeals, pains, and tragedies; has drained their resources and capabilities; and has created a deep chasm that nobody has been able to heal or fill. This has enabled the enemies to implement their goals, schemes, and aspirations; has weakened the Arab strategic card; and has undermined the nation's strategic balance with Israel and with other regional and international powers, a fact which has encouraged Israel to act contentiously and to defy Arabs in Lebanon and everywhere.

Whoever considers Arab conditions these days, especially what has happened in south Lebanon, feels as if a devastating earthquake has hit the region and that it has altered, replaced, destroyed, made people homeless, and left in the nation's body, rifts, and wounds that continue to bleed to this day.

Oh how drastically conditions have changed and positions upturned as a consequence of the earthquake caused by some individuals, or by the decision of a single individual! Oh how greatly have the Arabs lost as a consequence of this painful tribulation that has shaken their entity, threatened their present and future, and pushed them to the brink of despair, making them mull over the sorrows of division, fragmentation, and need, and of the pain that squeezes their hearts day after day!

A quick comparison between the past and the present provides a clear picture of the consequences, ramifications, and dangers that have engulfed the Arab nation as a result of the decision to invade Kuwait this day three years ago. When Kuwait was liberated and restored to its legitimate owners, we hoped that we had contained the damage, shut the door of the ordeal, turned over the leaf of one of the bloodiest chapters of our history, and learned the lessons of the past. But the regrettable reality

does not bode well. The rift continues to exist and the danger continues to be imminent, lurking to pounce on us one after the other and entity after entity.

The Arab nation, which had aspired to achieve minimum-limit Arab solidarity and to develop coordination, cooperation, and integration in the political, economic, and cultural areas, was hit by a rift. The nation splintered and its ranks divided, splitting into those who support, those who oppose, those who comply, and those who stand neutral. Conflicts have proliferated and estrangement has prevailed. What is more dangerous than all this is that the infection has been transmitted from top to base. Thus, the atmosphere has become poisoned and relations have worsened between the peoples, who have become divided by rancors and malice, contrary to past conflicts which did not go beyond the bounds of leaderships, regimes, and governments.

Consequently, the Arab League's capabilities have been paralyzed, whereas it had been hoped that this league would set forth strongly to become the Arabs' house and meeting place. Steps to bolster regional councils and blocs have been suspended; joint Arab action institutions have been paralyzed; projects and aid have been stopped; and capabilities have been squandered. The strategic balance between Arabs and Israel has been shifted in the enemy's favor, now that the Arabs have scattered, that their force has been dissipated, that their wealth has been squandered; and that Iraq's military and human capabilities have been destroyed by a suicidal decision made by some individuals, or one individual—destroyed because of a faulty decision whose devastating dangers and consequences could have been avoided if that decision had been withdrawn. But intransigence and obstinacy have led to these grave consequences.

Thus, Israel's word has become dominant and Israel has gained the upper hand. The Arabs have become compelled to accept a feeble peace initiative and to make painful concessions. After studying their real condition and state, the Arabs could find no alternative to making these concessions, and they became certain that they had lost numerous cards on which they had relied in their confrontation against Israel and in their steadfastness in the face of international pressures. Because of this miserable condition, the Arabs have had no option but to continue the negotiations with Israel, despite Israel's maneuvers, intransigence, and refusal to recognize UN resolutions; even though it has refused to offer any guaranty or to say that it will withdraw from the occupied territories and to grant the Palestinian people their legitimate rights; and even though it has committed aggression after aggression against innocent civilians in the occupied Arab territories and in south Lebanon.

At the same time, the regional balance has become flawed, considering that the Arab nation has lost a significant strategic advantage and that its financial and military strength has collapsed. Other forces, such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, have benefited from this collapse.

The Palestinian cause has retreated, wasting most of the gains that had been made during the struggle years, especially since the eruption of the blessed intifadah and the triumphs it scored in the political and moral fields, and particularly in the international information arena. The intifadah has exposed the facts of the brutal oppression and suppression practiced by the occupation authorities, these authorities' serious violations of human rights, and their shameful attacks on children, women, and unarmed civilians.

At the leadership level, the PLO has lost its distinguished role and has turned from a pivot around which all Arabs rally to a party in inter-Arab conflicts. Its relations and connections with important Arab countries have been severed and most of the aid that it had been receiving steadily has been suspended. Its revenues have dwindled, considering that it has lost one of its important sources of revenue, namely the funds it had been receiving from hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in Kuwait and the Gulf states.

Individually, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were subjected to a painful ordeal as a result of their departure from Kuwait and some Gulf states because of the Iraqi invasion and of the war conditions that followed it. These people lost their source of livelihood and their business places. Their children's future is subjected to danger because they have become homeless and have lost their savings. These afflicted people have also been forced to suspend their remittances, estimated at billions of dollars annually, to their kinsmen in the occupied territories' camps.

This ordeal has also reflected on the conditions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip inhabitants who relied on the remittances of their brothers, relatives, and children for their steadfastness, struggle, and fight against the oppressive occupation. The ordeal has further reflected on steadfastness of the Palestinian institutions, including health, university, and charitable institutions, all of which face the danger of full suspension and of the inability to continue performing their national and humanitarian duties.

Iraq, which had been a support for the nation and the Palestinian cause, has turned into a burden and a source of constant concern. Its vast capabilities and resources have been squandered futilely, even though many had believed that the Iraqi regime was going to burn down half of Israel; that its missiles were going to destroy the Zionist entity and liberate the pure Palestinian soil; and that its army would support any Arab army subjected to a Zionist aggression.

Iraq, which we had viewed as an element of unification, as a support for steadfastness, and as a backup force, has turned into an entity partitioned into north, south, and center. Iraq's wealth has been squandered, its dear and proud people have been subjected to fatal starvation,

and its resources have been mortgaged for a hundred years to come. Meanwhile, the invasion has pushed it dozens of years backward.

At the same time, most of Kuwait's wealth and savings have been lost. The war has cost more than \$70 billion that had been accumulated to achieve prosperity and stability and to implement development plans, not just for the Gulf peoples but also for all Arab peoples from the Gulf to the ocean.

Regionally and internationally, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has changed the character of the region and has weakened its strength and steadfastness in the face of foreign ambitions and intervention, thus mortgaging its present and future and turning this future into a winning card in the hands of the major powers, especially the United States.

So, the foreign and regional powers have reaped the gains, benefits, and wealth, and the Arabs have lost most of their influential pressuring cards. What is more serious is the loss of trust among the Arab peoples. This has caused them not to trust in the Arab system or to rely on Arab solidarity and joint action but to rely on foreign guaranties and pledges to preserve their security and independence and to prevent the recurrence of any attempt similar to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The rift that has afflicted the Arab nation has various aspects and it has left behind its ramifications of dangers and consequences. The Arabs have lost a historic opportunity to entrench their independence, bolster their unity, build their edifice of solidarity and unity, and control their own independent decision-making. What has been left is nothing but devastation, pain, tears, and grief.

Now that three years have passed since the devastating earthquake, we must pause and ask ourselves fateful questions to which we have no answers to date:

- Have we learned our lessons and examples in all areas and at all levels?
- Will we continue to stand over the ruins and shed tears, and until when will we continue to do this?
- Is there a way out of this dark tunnel, and when will our appointment with a bright dawn arrive?
- Is there hope of healing the rift, filling the gap, and mending the crack?
- Is there hope of initiating a frank and objective dialogue to determine where the fault lies, to task those responsible, and to diagnose the malady?
- Is there a cure for this painful ordeal that will lead the Arab nation away from its state of weakness, fragmentation, and division?
- Is there a savior who will dot the "i's" and cross the "t's" and who will call for a comprehensive, frank Arab discussion to attain total reconciliation?
- Do we have among us those who practice the virtue of backing down after mistakes, of acknowledging their mistakes, and of pledging not to repeat them and to ultimately punish those who are responsible for them?

- Will intellectuals, media people, and wise Arabs play a role and exert benevolent efforts to save whatever remains of the Arab nation's capabilities, wealth, and dignity before we are drowned by the deluge?

Questions, questions, and more questions. But they continue to go unanswered after three years, which have passed like a flash, but which have shaken the Arab homeland violently, turning its structures and hopes into rubble?

Three years have passed since the "mother-of-catastrophes," which was embodied in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, while we continue to run in place, and even move backward. Yet, we hear voices that defend the aggressor; justify the tyranny of the initiator; reiterate the same slogans, statements, and lies; and commit the same mistakes and sins. It is as if our nation has nobody to bring them to account and as if our peoples do not read, understand, or know the facts, which are evident to everybody.

It is an excruciating anniversary that we commemorate today in pain, suffering, and complaint—screaming: oh how terrible!

#### **Arab Nationalism, Kurdish, Shi'ite Factors Analyzed**

93AE0584A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
16 Aug 93 p 15

[Article by Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett: "The Position of Arabism in Iraq"—first paragraph is AL-HAYAH introduction]

[Text] (We here publish lengthy excerpts from five contributions presented in the symposium that the "Cultural Forum" recently held in London on "Nationalism: Growth, Theories, Forms, and Problems." The contributions, in order, are by Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (today), Sami Zubaydah, Roger Owen, Fahih 'Abd-al-Jabbar, and 'Abd-al-Halim al-Ruhaymi.)

Leaving aside for a moment the important fact that the Kurds, who in reality formed between one-fifth and one-fourth of the population, were not and never would be Arabs, and never were or would be considered as such, one can say that the three [Ottoman] vilayets that Britain joined together [to form Iraq] in no way formed a political, geographic, or economic unit. At least until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, al-Basrah was oriented toward the Gulf and India; Baghdad was an important assembly station on the land route between Syria and Iran; and al-Mawsil was oriented toward establishing closer economic relations with Anatolia and Aleppo than with Baghdad.

If we may generalize about the aspirations of those who were active before and during World War II [as published] in the movement that we shall call Arabism, it is perhaps correct to say that they wanted to free the Arab world from Ottoman hegemony or to remove their



native regions from the zone of Ottoman rule. Some, but not all of these activists thought that Britain and France were prepared to help them achieve this goal. In the wake of the 1918-20 peace settlement, which did not bring the establishment of the independent state for which these Arab individuals hoped or fought, a new form of Arabism or Arab nationalism began to appear. It was a form that in essence received support from almost all the actors on the political stage during the period between the wars and immediately after World War II. This form, which spread through channels that rapidly developed into what came to represent universal education, consisted of a popular rediscovery of the common Arab "heritage" and the claim that "the Arab nation" had existed in the past and that Iraq (or Syria, or Palestine) constituted an inseparable part of it.

In the case of Iraq (and there were similar tendencies in Egypt before the development of the Arabism position in the age of 'Abd-al-Nasir), the growth of this form accompanied the spread of the thesis that 20th-century Iraqis were direct descendants of the peoples of Mesopotamia and the Babylonians—this with the goal of promoting feelings of loyalty and pride in belonging to the new country. While these two contributory currents—Arab nationalism and Iraqi particularism—were being given wide expression in the textbooks of the time, a new feeling of patriotic and national consciousness began to penetrate among the population generally (or at least among those who had passed through the educational system). It developed gradually into the ideological common denominator toward which all the political actors tried to orient themselves.

Thus, when ideological political parties appeared, they found that they could rally a broad base of support only by merging their programs with the general concepts either of Arab independence or of Iraqi independence, depending on the needs and requirements of the period.

Here we would indicate the need to exercise a certain amount of caution, as the bearers of the aspirations of Arab nationalism and the very content of these aspirations saw important changes with the passage of time. Most of the confusion that has arisen in debates on the subject can be attributed to the elasticity and flexibility of the terms whereby different overlapping ideas and positions regarding "patriotism," "Iraqi nationalism," and "Arab nationalism" were merged into a single word, "nationalism"—a term which assumes the existence of a greater degree of cohesion and continuity in nationalist thought than actually existed. Clearly, almost no ideological link exists between the political goals of leaders like Yasin al-Hashimi in the twenties and thirties, 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif in the fifties and sixties, and Saddam Husayn.

Let us now take the case of the Sharifi officers who threw their weight on the side of Faysal and the Iraqi state after 1920. The genuineness of their patriotic, Iraqi, nationalist, or anti-Ottoman stands was scarcely susceptible to doubt or suspicion. They could also assert, at least at the

beginning of the twenties, that however far Iraq appeared from resembling any independent Arab state, it was nonetheless at least a state and was certainly more Arab in its administration than it had been under Ottoman rule. However, when the end of the twenties came, it became clear that these leaders (Nuri al-Sa'id, Ja'far al-'Askari, and their friends) had become so linked to Britain as to destroy in the minds of Iraqis any nationalist or patriotic credibility they might have had in the past. The basic current of Arab and Iraqi national consciousness moved to groups that, regardless of their other political theses, held that the sole path for Iraq was to obtain total independence from Britain.

The other obstacle to reaching a broader understanding of these developments lies in the tendency of this kind of analysis to concentrate generally on the behavior and thinking of a narrow political elite, while in reality the entire political heritage that appeared during the late thirties, the forties, and the fifties among the urban middle class and its lower and working sections was concentrated around realizing this goal. When this heritage fell under the effective influence of the Communist Party, it became subject to a desire to alleviate or eradicate poverty and realize a greater amount of social justice. As the then prevailing doctrine asserted, those reforms could not be carried out until Iraq obtained its independence from Britain. Those who believed in those principles therefore thought that the struggle for social justice could in no way be separated from the struggle for national independence.

It also needs to be stressed in this regard that although national independence was the goal of the majority of politically aware Iraqis, [only] a small minority of those who harbored these feelings were "Arab nationalists," in the limited sense of supporting the merger of Iraq with a larger Arab entity.

In Iraq this position did not enjoy the wide popularity that it received at the time in mandate Syria, for example, where the nationalist movement had been vigorously repressed and where there was no perceptible progress toward achieving independence. However, as Iraq was at least nominally independent after 1932—it had its own army, all of whose senior officers had served either in the Ottoman or Sharifi armies or in both. All of them without exception were Sunni. We shall soon return to this point. Iraqi officers as a group were therefore particularly open to these ideas, though the group's members at this stage probably imagined "Arabism" in the sense of the unity of the Fertile Crescent under Hashimite rule, rather than with its enthusiastic emotional meanings shaped by Sati' al-Husari and Sami Shawkat.

Although these ideas enjoyed a degree of popularity among members of the al-Muthanna Club, who came from a background generally similar to that of the Arab nationalist officers, who by and large were linked to them by family bonds or friendships (here we must remember that the society was still the sort in which

members of the middle and upper classes knew each other through social acquaintance), these ideas did not enjoy wide diffusion outside army ranks before the late thirties. Even after that date, the most urgent basic problem was always how to ensure the attainment of real independence from Britain. In general it would be safe to say that throughout the period until the rise of 'Abd-al-Nasir, specifically until after the Suez crisis and the 1956 tripartite attack on Egypt, the attraction of Arab nationalism in Iraq was clearly limited to sectors of urban Sunni Arabs from the middle class and its lower sections. There were two reasons for this.

In the first place, the Arab nationalist position was always a predominantly urban phenomenon, and Sunnis constituted the majority of urban residents during the forties and fifties. The second reason is that while the Arab world outside Iraq is overwhelmingly Sunni, no less than a quarter of Iraqis are Kurds and more than half of Iraqis are Shi'ites. Naturally, these two groups (Kurds and Shi'ites) thought their interests would not be most fully served by a merger of Iraq into a larger Arab federation. Thus, absolutely no important Nasirist organization was formed in Iraq. Although an Iraqi branch of the Arab Ba'th Party was formed in 1951, its popularity and attraction were limited, and the party's membership remained very small. Subsequently, the Ba'th retroactively made Arab nationalism apply to Iraq: as part of this operation history was rewritten to stretch and expand the historical role of the Arab nationalist movement and the Ba'th itself.

Thus, though we may appear reckless to shake this idea, the Arab nationalist and Arabism stand had no broad appeal in Iraq at all. The popularity of Nasirism before the 1958 revolution in Iraq had no connection with the concept of Arabism: Nasirism grew because it represented a symbol of Arab independence from the West and also because of its progressive social content.

The Iraqi Communist Party, which undoubtedly possessed a much broader base of followers than any other political organization during the fifties, supported—as did Nasir—Iraqi and Arab independence and naturally also formulated an important social and economic program. Therefore, in 1968 the Ba'th, which was a small, tightly knit conspiratorial group out to seize and retain power, intentionally mobilized these feelings, which still formed part of the intellectual nourishment of the politically aware elements in Iraq, to spread legitimacy over its rule. This forms at least part of the explanation of how a small group obviously without popularity was able to succeed: it did so on the one hand by misleading the public and obscuring its sight, and on the other hand by mobilizing and responding to popular political aspirations—in particular, of course, nationalizing the oil industry in 1972.

In short, although one hesitates to give such a description before this audience, the Ba'th, as its thinkers developed it in Syria during the forties, was a mixed Arabism stand that stressed the historical unity of "the Arab nation"

and that "the Arab nation" would be able to achieve its "eternal mission" only when an Arab world that had been artificially divided, first into vilayets by the Ottomans, and then into separate states by imperialism and Zionism, had been reunified. Most of the Ba'th's discourse consisted of vague assertions of this sort, along with references to an idealistic and romantic idea about the past. There was very little reference to how one would attain power or how one would manage that power afterward.

After 1968, these ideas were used to cast legitimacy on the Ba'th regime, which was and still is portrayed as serving the interests of the Arab nation. Those who opposed the regime or doubted its authority or legitimacy were necessarily "enemies of the Arab nation" and traitors who had condemned themselves by their own actions and deeds.

Therefore, whenever one discusses the Arab nationalist position in the Arab world as a whole, one must take into consideration the amount of change that took place in the nature of this position and how difficult it is to consider that it witnessed a continuous course beginning from about the fifties to the present day.

In general, one can distinguish three types that overlap in time and content.

One can sum up the first of these types as "nationalism from below"—that is, [the nationalism that predominated] through the period of struggle for national independence that stretched from the thirties and forties until the mid sixties.

The second is the type of Arab nationalism essentially imposed from above. It was and still is exploited primarily to legitimize dictatorial regimes in power. There subsequently ensued from this a negative affect on the mobilization of the masses, which necessitated complete suppression of the political arena by the regime.

The third is the new kind of nationalism that is difficult to distinguish from its equally anti-Western Islamic counterpart. Although this type still uses the same anti-imperialist language that goes back to the period of national liberation, it seems to be an expression of the strong feeling of frustration that many Arabs feel, whether these feelings are directed against their government or against the West, which is seen as supporting these governments. This type of "nationalism from below" was skillfully exploited by Saddam Husayn in 1990 to portray his imperialistic invasion of Kuwait as an anti-imperialist and anti-Western action. That such distortion and perversion were and still are able to receive widespread support is a frightening reflection of the disappointment and despair prevalent among many Arabs besides the Iraqis.



**Minister Of Housing, Reconstruction on Projects**

93LA0157A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
18 Jul 93 p 6

[Article by Husayn A'mran: "Minister of Housing and Reconstruction: We constructed and executed 62,000 projects at a cost of \$9 billion."]

[Text] I don't know where to begin. Shall I talk to you about the achievements of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction during the 25 years of the life of the Glorious Revolution of July?

For if we want to talk only about the achievements of the fighters of this Ministry during the period of the construction campaign, dozens of blank papers will be filled with numbers and information without our adequately giving this Ministry its due.

Some accuse me of exaggeration, and I may be biased. But, a small glance at the reality and at the actions of these fighters suffices for me to go even further than that when talking about it. For it suffices that the affiliates of the Ministry completed 966 bridges in Iraq during the Glorious Revolution which began in July [1968].

And it suffices that the affiliates of this Ministry and some of its companies bestowed honor on the President Commander-in-Chief Saddam Husayn as a result of their excellent work and their diligent action. It also suffices that the President Commander-in-Chief described these fighters by saying "they are truly heroes."

After this tribute from the Commander-in-Chief, am I not entitled to accord any adjective to these earnest, diligent people while I am writing about their distinguished acts during the 25 years of life of the extended Revolution of July?

When I sat before Mr. Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad, the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, for him to talk to me about these achievements, he placed before me dozens of files. Each file contained ample information about a certain piece of the numerous pieces that the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction is skilled in executing.

This file is on the achievements of the Ministry in the area of roads. And that one is about its accomplishments in the area of bridges. And a third is on the Ministry's accomplishments in the campaign to develop the cities. And a fourth is about its achievements in the construction campaign. And another is about the Ministry's achievements in the area of housing. And a tenth is about its accomplishments in the area of buildings and services. And...

Once again I say that I don't know where to begin. Can I talk to you about these achievements?

**The Numbers Speak For Themselves**

So—do we leave the numbers and the statistics to speak for themselves? No harm in that, especially since, when the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction saw my perplexity, he handed me an appendix of one of the files and in it I read a summary by numbers about the achievements of the Ministry throughout the 25 years of the life of the Glorious Revolution of July. Here is some of what I read:

In the area of roads, the fighters of Housing and Reconstruction completed 781 roads at a total length of 28,732 km.

In the area of bridges, they completed 966 bridges at a total length of 68,271 meters.

In the area of housing, they completed 59,470 living units, among which 14,590 are houses and 44,880 are apartments. And certainly, as the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction said, this number was supposed to increase—increase if there were no economic blockade—and if there were no circumstances of war that the fighting Iraq was going through.

In the area of buildings, the fighters of Housing and Reconstruction completed 849 buildings, varying between hospitals, schools, and various offices.

In the area of engineering consultation, the Ministry offered, through the National Center and the Idrisi Center for Engineering Consultation, its engineering and technical advice and expertise on 872 projects. As for the number of tests that the National Center of Development Laboratories performed for the period from 1976, the year of its founding, up to the middle of this year, they reached 12.630 million in number.

**The Accomplishments Before and After the Revolution**

Mr. Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad, Minister of Housing and Reconstruction says:

These numbers refer to the size of the work that the Ministry's affiliates have executed. They will become more clear for you when we effect a comparison between the size of the work in the areas of roads, bridges, and housing for the period before the Glorious Revolution of July and after it.

With regard to roads and bridges, the sum of money that were spent in these two areas for the period 1960-1968 amounted to 43.729 million dinars[ID] when the amount that was spent on roads and bridges during the life of the Glorious Revolution of July amounted to ID5,086.633 million. From this, we can get an idea of the size of the development that has occurred in the areas of roads and bridges in the time of the Revolution. That development will become more clear when we explain that during the period from 1979 until today, i.e., since the accession of the President Commander-in-Chief Saddam Husayn to the first position in the State, the

Ministry's affiliates completed 835 bridges, both stationary and floating, whose lengths totalled 52,409 meters. In addition, they completed 649 roads at a length of 13,526 km. From this, we are able to perceive the size of the support that the Ministry obtained from the President Commander-in-Chief Saddam Husayn.

Mr. Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad, Minister of Housing and Reconstruction adds:

As for the area of housing, we will get an idea about the size of development when we explain that only 362 housing units were constructed for the period from 1962-1967, when the volume of the living units that were built in Iraq during the life of the Glorious Revolution of July has reached 59,469. Among those units, 52,265 of them were constructed in the period from 1979 until now, i.e., since the accession of the President Commander-in-Chief to the first position in authority.

#### **Housing—Every Citizen's Problem**

I said to the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, before we talked in detail about the Ministry's participation in the campaigns of construction and of development of the cities and its participation in Glorious Saddam's battle against the Persians and the Mother of Battles, it is necessary that we first touch on the achievements of the Ministry with regard to the furnishing of dwellings for the citizens. For the issue of dwellings has become a problem for every citizen who dreams of security (a roof) for his family. So, what about the Ministry's participation in the realization of this dream?

As I said previously, the Minister answers that the living units that were completed in the period 1962-1967 only amounted to 362. As for the era of the July Revolution, they amounted to 59,469, both houses and apartments. If we wanted to enter into more and more detail, we would be able to say that the number of living units that were completed for the period of 1979-1983 amounted to 39,823. This reflects the range of interest of the leadership of the Revolution and the Party in the furnishing of dwellings for the citizens since, during these four years, the most important residence projects have been completed. Among them is the residence project of 28 April, where 2,300 living units were constructed.

And the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction adds:

The Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction prepared an integral study of the supply of residences based on the aims of President Commander-in-Chief Saddam Husayn for the furnishing of dwellings suitable for the citizens. The goal of this study is to furnish dwellings for every family and carry it out throughout 20 years, beginning in 1981 and ending in the year 2000. It was decided that the execution of this study would be in four stages, since the residence needs of the citizens were confirmed to be 3.380 million living units. However, the circumstances

of the Iranian aggression and, after it, the American aggression, prevented the implementation of this study!! The Ministry has an integral study of the furnishing of residences for the citizens that will begin to be executed after obtaining approvals from the responsible agencies and after the lifting of the unfair blockade on the striving people of Iraq.

#### **The Building and Construction Campaign**

I said to the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction:

We have talked about the furnishing of residences to the citizens. But what about the participation of the fighters of the Ministry in the execution of the construction campaign and the rebuilding of the new Iraq after the enemies wanted to destroy and annihilate the infrastructure of our beloved Iraq?

The technical and engineering heads in the Ministry were entrusted with the reconstruction of 114 bridges, and the execution of all of them has been completed. The only ones remaining are the Sakka Bridge and the Kut Bridge, whose construction will be completed this year, God willing. In addition to that, the Ministry is entrusted with the reconstruction of approximately 600 buildings that the bombs and missiles of the hateful American aggression hit. And, praise God, the construction of 11 hospitals was completed as well as the buildings of the Ministry of Justice and the National Leadership, 22 schools, 5 telephone exchanges, and 26 radio and television broadcasting stations and halls, in addition to the construction of more than 300 buildings belonging to various offices.

The Minister of Housing and Reconstruction adds:

The directives of the President Commander-in-Chief Saddam Husayn and the visits of his Excellency to the locations of the work had a large influence on the deepening of trust in the spirits and minds of the workers, on the calling upon their hidden energies to be used to their utmost capacity, and on the shortening of time and the realization of the wondrous achievement. The words of the President Commander-in-Chief with respect to the workers in the construction of the Bridge of the Republic suffice, when he addressed them saying, "Indeed, you are truly heroes," for these words are truly considered a great incentive for the fighters of Housing and Reconstruction, because we are doing our utmost to rebuild the new Iraq.

Indeed, the campaign of building and construction, in whose implementation the affiliates of the Ministry participated, was truly a situation of creation for Iraqi intellects in the origination of alternatives, solutions, and methods so that the wheel of building and construction could keep turning, in spite of the circumstances of the blockade on building and construction requisites in general.

### **The Campaign of Construction of the Cities**

I said to the Minister:

You said that the heads of the Ministry began with the execution of the construction campaign after the American aggression in March 1991, since a wide arena for counterattack was opened before the Ministry through which to consolidate the response of Iraqis to the aggression. And, in fact, a corporate willingness was loudly voiced in the Ministry's organizations for the execution of the construction plan through a reconstructing of the field of honor and a building by the arms and creative minds of the good people. And, praise God, the Ministry's organizations succeeded in executing most of the construction projects that they were entrusted with.

But before that, the Ministry had a large and important role in the campaign of development of the cities, especially after the guns stopped, the gunfire of the war of Iranian aggression subsided, and Iraqis closed the page of the war to begin the page of building their contemporary history and to remove the effects of the hostility on the cities, which were greatly damaged as a result of the Iranian aggression.

Can the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction talk to us about the participation of the Ministry in the campaigns of development and construction of the beloved cities of al-Basrah and al-Faw and Mosul?

Yes. The Ministry had the honor of participating in those campaigns. So, with regard to the campaign of development and construction of steadfast al-Basrah, which the President Commander-in-Chief visited seven times during its campaign of development, starting on 12 February 1989 and ending on 12 June of this year—throughout this campaign, 2,401 million square meters of streets and sidewalks were paved and covered. In addition to that, a network of rainwater canals at a length of 103,000 meters was executed, along with the construction of 5 bridges for cars, 10 bridges for pedestrians, and 35 pump stations, the maintenance of 28 old bridges and 40 bunkers, the preparation and leveling of 120,000 square meters of agricultural land, and the cultivation of 9,000 seedlings.

And the Minister adds:

Seventeen asphalt factories, whose total production of tar reached 759,000 tons, participated in the implementation of that campaign.

With regard to the campaign to rebuild Faw, the city of redemption and the gate of the great victory, the campaign started on 25 July 1989 and ended in three months. The decision was to rebuild Faw in its original location with an area of 2 by 2 kilometers to hold 20,000 citizens. It would also include the construction of 2,000 residence divisions, in addition to schools, markets, hospitals, and other service buildings. The Ministry's allotment was the construction of 23 buildings and 27 houses, in addition to the construction of a playground

that can hold 4,000 spectators, and maintenance and improvement of 252 km of roads.

With respect to the development campaign of the city of Mosul (quoting the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction), seven companies participated in its implementation and it included 20 sections [of the city]. The size of the work that the Ministry's companies executed was 6.6 million square meters of earth leveling, 3.6 million square meters of mixed gravel, 2.4 million square meters of tar, the covering of 1 million square meters of streets, and the clearing of 3 million square meters of debris. Seven thousand affiliates and 1,750 machines participated in the campaign and 25 asphalt factories supplied 1.6 million tons of asphalt!

### **Participation in the Irrigation Projects**

I said to the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction: After the Ministry's organizations accomplished most of the construction projects that were assigned to it, we heard that the fighters of Housing and Reconstruction participated in the execution of some strategic irrigation projects, like their participation in the implementation of the Saddam River, the A'zz River [name as published] and the Umm al-Ma'arik River. So what about the details of that participation?

The Minister answers saying:

Yes. The Ministry's organizations participated in the execution of these irrigation projects. For in the Saddam River, six companies participated in the implementation, four companies in the al-Qadisiyah River and the Umm al-Ma'arik and two companies in the A'zz River. And the heads of these companies, throughout their participation in the execution of these projects, were able to complete seven bridges for cars, the pounding in of 520 different poles, earthworks amounting to 24,534 million cubic meters and, in addition, 740,000 square meters of paving. One of the Ministry's companies was twice awarded the honor of carrying the God is great flag, after distinguishing itself in its work and its accomplishment of all the tasks it was charged with before the deadline set for them.

### **Engineering Consultations and Laboratory Tests**

Engineering and technical consultations are taking on a large role in the execution of projects, and because of that, it was necessary to found specialist advisory centers in the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, undertaking the task of planning and supervising the execution of the important projects. On the role of these engineering centers in the offering of their technical expertise in projects that were implemented during the life of the Glorious Revolution of July, Mr. Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad, Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, spoke, saying:

There are two advisory centers in the Ministry offering their engineering expertise to the implemented projects. They are the National Center for Engineering Consultation, which began by carrying out its operations in 1973, and offered its engineering consultations to 762 different projects, among the most important of which currently



are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministries of Instruction and Higher Education, the Triumphal Arch, the Ministry of Health, the Saddam Tower. Likewise, this Center has won several competitions. It obtained the first and second places for the designing of the Palace of Martyrs School, first place for a competition to build the Bridge of the Republic, and first place in designing the clock of Baghdad, and development of Haifa Street.

As for the Idrisi Center for engineering consultation, it began by pursuing its engineering activities in 1987 and offered its consultative services to 110 projects, the most important of which are the reconstruction of the al-Jumhuriyah bridge and the Samira'i Hospital, the al-Qadisiyah Academy on the border of Tibil and the homes for the crippled in al-Karkh and al-Rasafah. Likewise, this Center won several competitions, among which are the memorial monument for the Palace of Martyrs School, the development of the ancient city of Babil and the setting up of the campaign of construction of the city of cities, the steadfast al-Basrah.

And the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction adds:

There is also the National Center of Development Laboratories. This Center is considered to be among the largest specialist centers in the Arab homeland since the number of laboratory tests that were undertaken for the period from 1976, the year of its founding, to the middle of this year reached 12,630 million, and the Center is undertaking 406 types of laboratory tests throughout 54 field laboratories. If we wanted to know the size of the development of this Center, we could say that in the founding year, i.e., 1976, the number of tests reached 20,000, when the number of last year's tests reached 1.2 million. As for the rate of its returns, last year they reached 290 times the returns of the year of its founding! From this, we can get an idea about the size of the development of this vital center.

#### **The Lessons Derived From the Construction Campaigns**

After all these projects that the companies of the Ministry executed, and after the fighters of the Ministry undertaking the execution of important and strategic projects, and after the success of the owners of the Ministry in furnishing alternatives for a number of problems which were hindering implementation during the construction campaigns, can the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction speak to us about the most important lessons drawn during the construction campaign or during the Ministry's work throughout the 25 years of the life of the extended Revolution?

The achievements that the Ministry has realized throughout the life of the Glorious Revolution of July have participated in an effective way in the accumulation of experience and the transferring of skills which helped the construction sector to flourish in courage and confidence. For before, the heads of the Ministry were scared of executing a small arch without seeking help from foreign experts. But, currently, as a result of the accumulation of experience during the construction

campaign, I am able to say that the heads of the company are able to design and execute the most complicated bridges. And, with this accumulated expertise, we will respond to the aggression and launch a counterattack through the construction of all that the enemies destroyed. If we wanted to enter into details of the development of our work as a result of this accumulated expertise, I can say that it is concentrated in several areas, the most important of which are:

- Use of tunnel casts in the construction of residence buildings and box casts in the construction of the living units.
- Use of well-made prefabricated box supports by means of successive pushing into open areas that exceeded 40 meters. All that was during our execution of the bridges. And, in addition to that, use of supporting walls sunk into the ground instead of poles. Likewise, we used materials added to the concrete to accelerate its hardening and to obtain the required strength in 16 hours instead of 7 days.

#### **Summary**

Before I left the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, I said I wanted a final number with regard to the work of the Ministry throughout the 25 years of life of the Glorious Revolution of July.

After the Minister examined his files and papers and after the processes of collection and deduction, he answered:

The technical and engineering heads who belong to the Ministry's company and are in the fields of execution and construction of roads, bridges, and buildings, executed 62,066 projects at an estimated cost of ID8,721,420 million. From this number, we can know how much work the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction accomplished in the area of roads, bridges, and buildings throughout the 25 years of life of the Glorious Revolution of July.

#### **Transportation, Communication Developments Detailed**

93AE0566A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
16 Jul 93 p 5

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad al-Ma'ini, minister of transport and communications, by 'Abd-al-Wahid Harjan]

[Text] No doubt about it, before the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30 the transport and communications sector suffered from great neglect and backwardness. It was like the rest of the sectors of activity and life. After the Revolution, this sector enjoyed special attention and exceptional care on the basis of its importance to all the other sectors.

The point of departure for treating the state of backwardness and decline in this sector before the blessed Revolution was to start working in earnest to halt deterioration and boost the level of services offered to citizens, to begin effectively to establish support and concentrate on planning to undertake and implement huge projects, expand existing projects, modernize equipment, and develop projects comprehensively and radically. The past 25 years have truly been full of hundreds of achievements which have revitalized and developed this sector, raising it to new levels in all fields.

In order to shed some light on the achievements of the Ministry of Transport and Communications over the quarter-century of the Glorious Revolution, AL-THAWRAH interviewed Minister of Transport and Communications Mr. 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad al-Ma'ini. He spoke to us of the importance of the transport and communications sector, the state it was in before the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30, and its major accomplishments after the blessed Revolution. He said:

The importance of this sector can easily be conveyed, in the words of President Commander Saddam Husayn when he received the Arab ministers of transport on 21 October 1989: "Without the transport and communications sector, all the other sectors would wither or die. It affects every activity, and so this sector has priority over other sectors."

On that basis, the Revolution and party leaderships have accorded this sector exceptional care and great attention. A modern transport network has been established, not limited to our beloved country, but to create excellent international transport links, both on the communications and the land transport fronts, with automobiles, railways, maritime and air transport.

#### Communications and Post

The field of communications, considered in all its types a measure of a country's development and progress, before the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30 served only the interests of colonialism. This was despite the fact that telephone service was first introduced to Iraq in 1910. Its uses were limited, it was hand-operated, and only for military purposes. After a while its uses were expanded to the civilian sector.

The past 25 years of the historic Revolution of July 17-30 in 1968 have been filled with numerous projects in the field of communications. As regards exchange and network projects, crossbar switches were first used in Baghdad and a number of governorates. In 1979, large and small electronic exchanges with capacities of 4,000 to 30,000 numbers were introduced in the centers of the governorates and a number of districts in addition to the start up and operation of 100 mobile electronic exchanges in the districts and some subdistricts. The telephone networks for the exchanges were expanded to handle new capacity and secure communications within a single city through cables and

numerical correspondence, light cables, and supplying exchanges for permanent linkage for facilitating communication between cities.

The Minister added:

The General Establishment for Communications has completed, in the 25 years of the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30, a number of microwave projects linking the centers of the governorates and feeding the other cities through which the projects pass.

Services expanded after the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30 also included local and international telex service, fax, correspondence, electronic mail, and local, national, and international telegram service.

He said that telephone density had increased after the Revolution from 0.9 percent in 1968 to 6.08 percent in 1985. This number had dropped due to the stoppage of project implementation due to the criminal Persian aggression against our beloved country and the growth in population, becoming 5.36 percent in 1990.

#### Civil Aviation

Addressing developments in the field of civil aviation since the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30, the minister said:

The civil aviation sector has experienced unprecedented expansion and progress in the air transport and services sectors, particularly after the implementation of the explosive national plans, when it became mandatory for civil aviation to improve its performance and keep up with developments in the civil aviation world, with modern technology. Our dear country achieved many things in this field, such as opening Baghdad International Airport in 1970 for internal flights to al-Mawsil and al-Basrah, and the construction of Saddam International Airport, which is among the world's greatest airports, in terms of its design, service capability, and its 7.5 million passenger capacity. It was opened in 1982, and al-Basrah International Airport, with its passenger capacity to reach 2 million passengers per day by the year 2000, was opened on 20 August 1988. In addition, al-Muthanna Airport is a major airport for domestic air travel. In 1991, startup was completed on the expansion of Firnas Base to be a local airport for al-Mawsil, and in 1992 was completed at a cost of 3 million dinars[ID]. In 1990, work on the airports at Irbil and Bamirni was started, but stopped after the thirty-fold aggression [Operation Desert Storm] against our combatant country.

Our air safety staff was also consolidated after the Revolution, since most of them had been Indian and foreign experts; the Civil Aviation Institute was developed and expanded, becoming, with the Revolution, the mainstay of training and various other specialized courses in the field of aviation. New courses were created in aviation sciences,



air awareness, public relations, emergencies, personal safety, administration, and languages.

The Minister said that after the brutal thirty-fold aggression against our country and the rebuilding and reconstruction campaign, our workers in this field were able to build an aircraft laboratory for the study of civil and military navigation equipment, which cost the country large sums, in addition to the construction of an air traffic control center at al-Muthanna Airport and the manufacture of a radar tape device, which handles radar detection and the operation of the electronic device for the Saddam International Airport exchange.

### Sea and Water Transport

Turning to sea and water transport in Iraq before the Glorious Revolution and its achievements after the Revolution, Mr. 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad al-Ma'ini said:

The Iraqi Sea Transport Company was established in 1952 with a capital of ID1 million, raised in 1961 to ID5 million. The aim was to lease commercial ships and admit the agencies of marine firms.

After the Glorious Revolution of July 17 in 1968, the company enjoyed the support of the Revolution and its wise leadership. In 1969 it contracted to purchase four ships, each with a 3,600 ton capacity, and in 1974 it signed a contract with a German firm to buy four more ships, each with a 3,550 ton capacity. In 1976 it contracted for the third time to buy four more ships, each with an 8,350 ton capacity. Thus the Iraqi commercial fleet numbered 14 ships with a total capacity of 114,000 tons. Subsequently the company became the General Establishment for Marine Transport, and operated this fleet, and in 1985 it purchased the 9,000-ton capacity freezer ship *Zayn al-Qaws*. In 1988, five ships with capacities between 3,900-6,000 tons and four 1,662-ton capacity tugboats were purchased. The establishment's fleet is now 21 ships and tugboats operating organized and quasi-organized maritime routes.

The minister said that after the Revolution, the Establishment undertook to consolidate the Iraqi fleet's staff and do without foreign officers and engineers. Its staff entered the Arab Gulf Academy for Maritime Studies, and missions were sent abroad so that the Establishment's staff, both ship workers and management, could take training courses in Iraqi universities and specialized institutes to gain skills—at all levels.

[Harjan] What about the achievements in river transport?

[Al-Ma'ini] The establishment acquired 100 500-ton capacity tugboats and 67 tugboats for the river transport of goods and grains between Baghdad and al-Basrah. The Establishment built wharfs for this purpose in Baghdad, Wasit, and Maysan, bought cranes and the equipment necessary for loading and unloading, conducted a comprehensive survey of the Tigris River

between Baghdad and al-Basrah, and built a river slipway at the al-Za'franiyah wharfs.

### The Airlines Company

[Harjan] What are the developments and achievements of the Iraqi Airways Company in the quarter century of the Glorious Revolution?

[Al-Ma'ini] The company's people were able to accomplish advanced achievements in the field of air transport in the 25 years of the blessed Revolution, particularly after the historic nationalization decision, in implementing the explosive plan. The company bought a whole fleet of Boeing aircraft, 16 airplanes, for ID600 million, plus the training contract and the staff's technical preparation to pilot and maintain the aircraft in the country. That raised the number of aircraft owned by the company to 19, after three Tridents were acquired. The number of seats available daily went from 300 to 3,000. A number of offices were opened abroad, and there were 1.5 million passengers flown in 1989. Transported tons rose to 30 million. Flying hours increased. Iraqi engineers conducted in-depth tests inside the country on Iraqi, Arab, and foreign planes, and saving \$15 million annually, in addition to training Arab and foreign pilots here in Iraq. Thus the company realized revenues of \$40 million, which included \$15 million.

He added that the company signed a \$500 million contract to buy five Airbuses, which could be raised to 15 planes, and that the company had obtained a certificate of appreciation from the International Aviation Council for being a model company, because of its lack of crashes in its 46 years.

### The General Establishment for Passenger Transport

Speaking of the Establishment's fleet and operating routes after the victorious Revolution of July 17-30, Minister 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad al-Ma'ini said:

In 1968, the General Establishment for Passenger Transport had 682 buses, of which 329 were double-deckers. The need for buses grew because of the expansion of the city of Baghdad and the growth of its population and the economic changes in the country after the historic nationalization decision, rendering the fleet then operating insufficient for transporting passengers. So the Establishment acted to import hundreds of buses from all sources, boosting our transport capacity. But because of the two battles of honor and glory—the Glorious Battle of Saddam's Qasidiyah and the historic Mother of Battles—and the continuing sanctions imposed on our combatant country—the Establishment has been unable since 1981 to supply its fleet with new buses. This increased the hardship for citizens. There is now an old fleet of buses operating in Baghdad and between Baghdad and the governorates, and the buses break down frequently. So there are negative effects on the Establishment's operating capacity.

### **Iraqi Ports**

Might you give us a brief idea of the development of Iraq's ports since the Revolution?

The Minister said:

The Revolution sought the development of the Iraqi ports' planning energies by expanding new wharfs at the ports of al-Ma'qil and Umm Qasr, and the construction of an advanced and modern port at Khur al-Zubayr.

The al-Ma'qil port, built in 1919 on the Shatt al-'Arab in al-Basrah, had only three wooden wharfs. The port was never modernized before the Revolution, and its loading and unloading capacities were still what they were when it was first built—that is, about 3 million tons per year. After the blessed Revolution in 1968, 12 modern concrete wharfs with record specifications were added, plus anchorage 500 meters long for docking. The Abu-Fulus Harbor was built, composed of three modern steel wharfs equipped with all necessary equipment and cranes, three warehouses, and open areas to handle the goods, in addition to the construction of a wharf for general goods 2,500 meters long, and a 500 meter long anchorage for tugboats.

The Umm-Qasr port has grown since the Revolution, having become one of the major ports of the region after the completion of three concrete wharfs in 1963. After the Glorious Revolution, one of these wharfs was modified as a sulphur export wharf brought in from the fields of al-Mishraq, equipped with a one-kilometer-long moving automatic belt with an automatic load capacity of 15,000 tons per hour. A wharf was constructed for rigid containers, the Umm Qasr River was dug four km long and 300 m wide, with a circularity 600 m wide and 12 m deep. This river can handle 40 wharfs, including specialized wharfs and operate large ships with 40,000-ton capacities. A project completing the first 10 wharfs on the Umm Qasr River is complete, and work is ongoing to complete the civilian works related to the project; it is hoped that they will be finished this year.

The Minister said:

The Revolution implemented the Khur al-Zubayr port, considered one of the most modern ports in the Middle East, operated by electronic control. It is a commercial and industrial port developed to export nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers, and to import iron ore, and to export oil and petrochemical products.

### **Land Transport**

Addressing developments in the field of goods transport after the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30, the Minister said:

The Land Transport Company was created by a decision of the Revolutionary Command Council on 20 November 1991, and began its activities in December of the same year. Its duties were the transport of goods inside and outside the country. The company now has

212 trucks with a load capacity of up to 40 tons per truck, and 857 tankers for carrying fuel and asphalt, and 67 containers for carrying goods. By the end of last year, the company had a fleet of 244 trucks, in addition to service vehicles, specialized equipment, and car workshops.

### **Railroads**

This is what Mr. 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad al-Ma'ini said about the main achievements of the Glorious Revolution of July 17-30 in the field of railroads:

The main achievements in the area of developing and reviving the railroads are the broad-gauge Baghdad-al-Basrah-Umm Qasr railway line, as an alternative to the metric-gauge line, and the improvements and renovations on the Baghdad-al-Mawsil-Rabi'ah line. The first phase of the railway line from al-Shurah to al-Mishraq has been completed; it will transport sulphur and its products. This is an integrated project that includes numerous bridges and service buildings, the construction of two railway lines to the cement plant in Hamam al-'Alil, and of many lines to production plants and factories.

He added:

The lines currently operating to transport goods and passengers are the 594-km long Baghdad-al-Basrah-Umm-Qasr line, the 535-km long Baghdad-al-Mawsil-Rabi'ah line, the 504-km long Baghdad-al-Qa'im-'Akashat line, and the 225-km long Kirkuk-Biji-Hadithah line.

### **Minister of Trade on Reconstruction, Trade**

93LA0155A Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 17 Jul 93 p 5

[Article by Sahib Kamar: "Trade Minister Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih: 'Saddam's Care, Directives Enabled Trade Sector To Surmount the Challenge's Hardest Battles'"]

[Text] In light of the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution, trade activity occupies a special place in the implementation of comprehensive development plans by performing the tasks of providing and marketing consumer goods or by developing Iraqi exports.

### **Decisions, Accomplishments**

To examine the course of the trade sector, the role of President and Leader Saddam Husayn—may God preserve him—in supporting it, and the Trade Ministry's role in Saddam's Qadisiyah and the Mother of Battles, AL-'IRAQ met with the minister of trade, Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih. He spoke as follows:

Trade fully mirrors the country's progress, because it takes part in the movement of the economy from production up to consumption. Trade has therefore played a leading role in giving concrete form to the leadership's major decisions, both those related to raising the living

standard and those related to developmental, supply-related, political, and social programs. Despite difficulties, great achievements have been realized because of the increase of Iraq's financial resources after the nationalization of its national wealth.

In 1968, import appropriations were 145 million dinars[ID]. They continued to rise, reaching ID325 million in 1971, ID689 million in 1974, and ID5.502 billion in 1980.

These increases played a prominent role in providing for citizens' growing needs for various goods, services, and stand-by equipment. The trade sector's share of the import program was ID311 million in 1976—24.5 percent of total appropriations—and ID472 million in 1978.

During eight years of military confrontation with the Iranian regime, the Iraqi economy proved its ability to confront the harsh circumstances of war, in accordance with the directions defined by President and Leader Saddam Husayn—may God preserve him. These directions consisted of strengthening experiments and applied practices to build a developed national economy, in accordance with the special nature of our experience in socialist building.

#### Measures

The minister added: In the first days after the beginning of the Iranian aggression, the Trade Ministry took immediate measures to ensure the flow of goods and materials to citizens, expand the building of storage complexes and high-capacity storage silos, and increase central market distribution outlets and agents. This led to the creation of psychological and material confidence for citizens and fighters throughout the years of the war.

After the Syrian regime proclaimed open complicity with the Iranian enemy, by closing the border and the oil pipeline that represents 75 percent of our total crude oil export capacity, it became necessary to review the trade plan in accordance with new directions. Priority was given to importing commodities necessary to support the war effort and requirements for defending the country, providing food and industrial and agricultural production requirements, and encouraging import activity for commodities not involving foreign exchange. The year 1986 saw a sharp drop in crude oil prices and an increase in the value of the dollar, which affected Iraq's hard currency supplies.

#### Administrative Organizations

In light of these things, the Trade Ministry's administrative organizations developed. Performance capability improved, import appropriations increased, and yearly and five-year plans were implemented. Five main specialized organizations were linked to the ministry, as well as other installations that carried on

their activities in the context of the administrative organization of ministry headquarters and directly linked to the ministry.

#### Foreign Relations

The trade minister said: The glorious 17-30 July Revolution has gone through 25 years, forging ahead to shape a bright future for the unified socialist society we seek. It has done this by working to build socialist trade that serves the missions of Arab economic cooperation and integration and of widening relations with the world's various countries. The diversity of these services can be traced to the sound directives of Leader Saddam Husayn—may God preserve him—who has given this sector unlimited support. Forms of cooperation with the Arab, developing, and industrialized countries developed through the signing of bilateral and multilateral economic, trade, and technical agreements and supplementary protocols to realize common interests.

Iraq has not stinted in giving developing countries technical and material assistance—through the Arab Fund, the Arab-African Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance, and the Iraq Fund for External Development—and in participating in conferences of an economic nature. The revolution has worked to develop different productive capacities and stabilize commodity prices in order to reach the central goals of raising the living standard of those with low incomes. It has followed a policy of subsidizing certain domestically produced or imported commodities.

Importance was accorded to establishing support projects to ensure food security, by building storage capacities and providing for the country's grain silo requirements, thereby facilitating the process of obtaining and receiving grain. Also granted importance was the provision of electrical power to operate production projects.

#### Trade Sector Modernization

He added: The trade sector has experienced a state of modernization and development that President and Leader Saddam Husayn has described as a process of "slimming the state." Revolutionary Command Council Resolution 227 went into effect on 4 November 1987. The ministry has implemented the president and leader's directives to rebuild the structures of its organizations, departments, and companies. Some companies have been abolished or merged. Administrative structures and their operation have been reviewed.

The trade sector's successes took the form of a steady process of building, even while the arms of fighters continued defending the honor of their weapons and of mighty Iraq's flag. Plans and principles were followed that gave priority to the war effort and to providing the requirements for operating production capacities. In carrying out these missions, the ministry relied on the



national economy's resources and on showing skill to confront changing circumstances and maintain the spirit of victory.

A firm conviction was formed that what the Iraqi market's movement had achieved under war conditions, in the way of devoting all energies to meeting domestic demand, represented a victory for the Iraqi. The trade sector's contribution also became evident through the regulation and guidance of consumption.

The years 1980-88 witnessed changes in foreign trade. Importation amounted to ID2.571 billion in 1980. It rose to ID3.350 billion in 1981. After 1982, importation decreased as a result of the decreasing volume of oil exports, due to the halting of oil pumping through the Arabian Gulf and across Syrian territory.

When the Mother of Battles started, the directives of Leader Saddam Husayn were decisive in organizing the trade sector's moves to confront the most vicious unjust economic blockade.

#### **Ration Card**

After the unjust economic blockade was imposed, President and Leader Saddam Husayn directed the Trade Ministry to take precautions to safeguard reserves. An organizational measure was implemented to distribute food to citizens under a ration card system—the card is deemed an effective weapon for confronting economic blockade—to set up the minimums that the state would provide to maintain the lives of Iraqi, Arab, and foreign countrymen through equal subsidized quotas. The card was implemented at the beginning of September 1990.

#### **Honor of Participating**

The minister stated: The patriots at the Trade Ministry rolled up their sleeves to overcome every obstacle so that food would reach all fighters and members of the people.

The Trade Ministry's workers won themselves the honor of participating with the vanguards of struggle and reconstruction. Firmly fixed in their mind and consciousness was the call of militant leader Saddam Husayn—may God preserve him: "Down with the impossible! Long live those who struggle! God is most great!"

The ministry helped mobilize all forces to break the unjust economic blockade. It supported the national campaign to bring land into cultivation that President and Leader Saddam Husayn ordered to be organized. It provided 165,000 tons of wheat and barley seed that were distributed to farmers by the relevant agricultural agencies and cooperatives for planting. There have been increases ranging from 25 percent to 125 percent in the quantities of goods distributed to families from the initial implementation of ration cards to the present.

#### **Operations Room**

From the beginning of the blockade to the present, meetings of the operations room have not ceased at the Trade Ministry. It meets daily to discuss food and domestic market conditions and problems that impede carrying out the missions of the ministry's agencies, as well as how to remedy these problems.

The Trade Ministry has undertaken a campaign of jihad to rebuild what the enemy destroyed: 138 projects have been rebuilt, and the three remaining ones—warehouses for refrigerated and frozen goods—are under construction or repair.

Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih concluded by saying: The directives of the militant leader of our course, President Saddam Husayn, have had an effective impact on the continuance of work to serve our people in confronting the unjust economic blockade that is entering its third year.

### **SAUDI ARABIA**

#### **Bin-Jubayr Explains Shura Council Role**

93AE0571A Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 22 Aug 93 p 5

[Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Jubayr, head of Shura Council, by Muhammad al-Ghamidi; place and date not given: "Shura Gives Concrete Form to Citizen Participation in Public Affairs"—first nine paragraphs are 'UKAZ introduction]

[Text] His Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Jubayr has called the royal order naming the members of the Shura Council proof of the discrimination, foresight, and wisdom of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques [King Fahd].

In a comprehensive interview with 'UKAZ, Bin-Jubayr said that the members' experience and erudition will enrich the Council's work and achieve the goal of providing advice and counsel for the benefit of the country and citizens.

He added that the system of consultation (*shura*) is a basic principle in Islam. The Council's ordinance is based on an explicit Koranic text and thus reflects the adherence of our rightly guided leadership to the Islamic creed in theory and practice.

He indicated that the Council would have authority to voice opinion on matters about which there is no explicit provision of Islamic law. The members, he explained, would begin work as soon as they swore the oath before the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques—may God preserve him!

He said that the Council would hold a regular session at least every two weeks and could hold emergency sessions when necessary.

He explained that the Council would give concrete form to citizen participation in consultation for the public good. He expressed his hope that the Council would enjoy the favorable opinion of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and of the citizens, who have great hopes for the Council.

He said that cooperation between the Council and government agencies was necessary to provide the information and facts that would help the Council carry out its job as fully as possible.

He asked the members to adhere to the Islamic etiquette of fair debate, as enjoined by our true Islamic religion.

His Excellency discussed the duties of the deputy chairman and the general secretary, the Council's relation to the Council of Ministers, the nature of the work of committees and the number of their members, how the Council's agenda and meeting dates would be set, and all the various other questions relating to the Council. Here is the text of the interview.

#### Experience, Ability

[Al-Ghamidi] How does Your Excellency describe the choice of Shura Council members announced two evenings ago?

[Bin-Jubayr] There is no doubt that the choice by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques—may God preserve him—of outstanding citizens with experience, ability, and practice in the government sector or private business was aimed solely at providing and supporting the Council with sufficient experience in all specialties, so that it will be able to present advice based on their experience and qualifications.

I am exceedingly happy about the colleagues who were chosen. I hope that cooperation will prevail among all, so as to realize the goals of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

[Al-Ghamidi] How does Your Excellency, as chairman of the Council, see the role of the members of the Shura Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] The role of Shura Council members is defined in the statutory provisions contained in the Council ordinance and the regulations issued by royal order. There is no doubt that the members will be expected to play an active role in presenting expertise and advice to the ruler.

#### Quality the Crucial Factor

[Al-Ghamidi] Your Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Jubayr, what were the criteria by which this number of members was selected?

[Bin-Jubayr] The number was set by the Shura Council ordinance. I think these 60 members are a good number. The crucial factor is the quality of the members, not their number.

[Al-Ghamidi] How does Your Excellency see the importance of the Shura Council for Saudi Muslim society?

[Bin-Jubayr] Consultation (*shura*) is an Islamic principle that the Koran enjoins in two verses. The Council's ordinance is based on these two verses, which are mentioned in the preamble of the first section of the ordinance. There is no doubt that consultation has great importance for the country and for citizens. God has said [Koran 42:38]: "Their affairs are settled by mutual consultation." The Shura Council will offer great benefits to the country and citizens—innumerable benefits that will be embodied in the ordinances the Council approves and in the opinions and advice it voices on various subjects.

#### Difference Between Democracy and Shura

[Al-Ghamidi] Your Excellency, Mr. Chairman—there is no doubt that there is a great and clear difference between *shura* and democracy. Can we elucidate this?

[Bin-Jubayr] The difference between *shura* and democracy is great indeed. Democracy means that the people elected to the chamber of deputies or parliament have the right to issue laws: they may legalize some things that are forbidden, and forbid what God has legalized. Such is not the nature of *shura*. The Shura Council may in no way interfere with any issue decided in the Koran or Prophetic Tradition and on which a directive and determination have been issued. The Council's job is to express opinion on matters about which there is no explicit provision of Islamic law. The Council will apply its efforts and decide what is in the interest of the country and citizens without contradicting a provision of Islamic law.

Parliaments have the power to pass ordinances based only on the decision of the legislature. If they legislate something, that becomes law; if they reject something, that becomes law. The most prominent example is the issue of retribution. The Shura Council in an Islamic regime can in no way interfere with such an issue, since the obligatory nature of retribution has been settled by a text of Islamic law.

Modern parliaments, on the other hand, can abolish the death penalty, or they can reinstate it and abolish it once more. Thus we find that in parliaments the death penalty sometimes is reinstated and then abolished again.

People are chosen to parliamentary bodies by election. The voter, with his qualifications and expertise in statute law, generally lacks the ability to distinguish among qualified persons. Any candidate with a loud voice and lots of campaign publicity will win, regardless of his experience or qualifications. However, in the Islamic system, members of the Shura Council are chosen by the ruler, who will undoubtedly devote his effort to finding people who can bear such a responsibility and who have a good background, experience, information, and qualifications.



### Council To Begin Work Soon

[Al-Ghamidi] When will the Shura Council begin its duties? Where will it be headquartered?

[Bin-Jubayr] Now that the royal order naming the members has been issued, time is needed to make arrangements and prepare staff. As has already been made known, the headquarters will be in Riyadh, where very thorough preparations have already been made. The employees who will help the members are now being chosen. The Council will begin work very soon.

### First Session

[Al-Ghamidi] What about the ceremonies of the first session of the Council—God permitting!

[Bin-Jubayr] God willing, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will open the first session every year and will deliver—may God preserve him—a speech on that occasion in accordance with the Shura Council ordinance, which specifies that the king shall open the Council and deliver an annual address. The work of the Council will then begin under the leadership of the chairman in accordance with the prepared agenda. The king's speech will be followed by a speech by the Council chairman. Members may deliver a speech if they wish. Afterward, the Council's committees will be set up.

### Great Expertise

[Al-Ghamidi] Your Excellency, Mr. Chairman—you are aided in carrying out your duties by His Excellency Dr. 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif as your deputy, and His Excellency Dr. Hammud al-Badr as general secretary of the Council. How do you see the nature of your joint responsibilities?

[Bin-Jubayr] There is no doubt that Dr. 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif and Dr. Hammud al-Badr have great expertise and practical experience. Dr. Nasif is a well-known personality and has held a number of high posts at King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University and the World Islamic League. During his long period with the League, he gained experience and made friendships with many world leaders and thinkers.

Dr. Hammud al-Badr was a trustee of King Sa'ud University for two consecutive terms and is an academic professor. I hope, God willing, that understanding and cooperation will prevail among us. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques was fortunate indeed in his choice of them.

### Duties of Deputy Chairman, General Secretary

[Al-Ghamidi] What are the duties of the Council's deputy chairman and general secretary?

[Bin-Jubayr] The deputy chairman carries out the chairman's duties in the latter's absence and may chair a session during the chairman's absence. When the

chairman is present, the deputy assists him as the ordinance and rules specify. The deputy chairman also chairs the groups and committees that the chairman heads in the latter's absence.

The duties of the general secretary are related to the Council and its secretariat. He records sessions, writes down decisions, draws up and distributes the agenda, and monitors the Council's secretariat, committees, and general staff. He is not a member of the Council. The general secretary of the Council may not participate in discussions or vote. He may offer points of clarification on request by virtue of his position.

### Council's Duties

[Al-Ghamidi] Your Excellency, Mr. Chairman—what are the duties the Council is expected to carry out in the coming period in light of its system of procedure and the rules defined by the ordinance?

[Bin-Jubayr] One of the Council's duties will be to study ordinances that the ruler will issue. It will study them before they are issued. These ordinances are proposed by the government on the basis of suggestions from ministers or from any party.

Council members may propose an ordinance. It will be studied and drawn up. When the members are present, the Council may draw up its program or agenda; it may form committees; it may study ordinances and other transactions on which an expression of opinion is desired; and it may study other ordinances for which an interpretation or amendment is desired.

After the members are assigned to Council committees, matters referred to the committees will be discussed. When the committee makes a decision, the matters will be reported back to the Council.

### Studying Citizens' Concerns

[Al-Ghamidi] How do you view the subjects that will be studied in the Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] The Council will discuss everything that concerns citizens—whatever regulates their lives and facilitates their affairs. It will discuss all the subjects that touch the lives of citizens. With the expertise of its members, the Council will study these subjects in depth, due to the talents available to it. All the members are acquainted with the state of the community in which they live and the state of security and stability befitting it.

### Careful Choice

[Al-Ghamidi] Your Excellency, Mr. Chairman—the selection of Council members took place with care and thoroughness. How much time did it take?

[Bin-Jubayr] The amount of time is not important; the important thing is the result. Now that it has become

evident, it shows the foresight, wisdom, and discrimination of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

[Al-Ghamidi] When will the members of the Council begin to perform their duties?

[Bin-Jubayr] The members of the Council will begin to perform their duties as soon as they swear the oath before the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

[Al-Ghamidi] Some members of the Council already hold positions. Will they continue to perform the duties of these positions, or will they devote themselves exclusively to membership in the Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] These matters are subject to determination by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. If he thinks it necessary for Council members to devote themselves exclusively to the Council, that will take place. If he thinks they can hold membership in the Council in addition to their other work—that depends on the decision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. That is what the ordinance provides.

#### Members' Residence

[Al-Ghamidi] Will the members of the Shura Council reside in Riyadh, or will they be there only to attend meetings?

[Bin-Jubayr] That depends on the nature of the member's work. There are seven committees, and a member might need to attend on a daily or weekly basis. If the member is not serving on any committee, there will be no need for him to remain in Riyadh throughout the week. On the other hand, if the nature of the member's work demands that he serve daily on one or more committees, he would in that case need to be present on a daily basis. When the committees meet, they will determine whether their meetings will be daily, weekly, or semiweekly. It will be decided accordingly whether a member is required to be present in Riyadh or can leave. The Council itself will determine the number of committees and name their chairmen and members.

[Al-Ghamidi] Who will appoint members to the committees—the chairman or the Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] The committees will be presented, and the will of the members will then be determined regarding the choice of committee they prefer. A member may serve on more than one committee. A member who has no desire to serve on committees may attend the Council's regular meetings and participate in discussion and study.

[Al-Ghamidi] Then it is possible for a Council member not to serve on these committees?

[Bin-Jubayr] Yes, it is possible.

[Al-Ghamidi] Has the size of each committee been set?

[Bin-Jubayr] Each committee must have no fewer than five members. There may be more, depending on the nature and duties of the committee. A committee may have subcommittees.

#### Date for Announcing Committees

[Al-Ghamidi] When will announcements of the committees begin?

[Bin-Jubayr] Announcements of the committees will begin with the first session of the Shura Council; for the Council's work as a whole depends on the work of the committees, and the Council will only be able to arrive at results through these committees.

[Al-Ghamidi] What about Council sessions? Have a definite date and time been set?

[Bin-Jubayr] The Council is not periodic: it begins from the beginning of the year and goes to the end of the year. Members may take leave at any time they want, provided they do not disturb the legal quorum of Council members. The Council has no special period of session, as in some parliaments and advisory councils that work only for eight months a year; our Council does not cease. The Council will take care in granting leave to its members so as not to disturb the quorum. Leaves will be submitted to the Council chairman for approval or disapproval depending on the Council's circumstances and the members present.

#### Meeting Times

[Al-Ghamidi] What times will be scheduled for Council meetings?

[Bin-Jubayr] The rules that have been issued schedule a regular meeting every two weeks at least. The Council will set a specific day later.

#### Emergency Sessions

[Al-Ghamidi] Can emergency Council sessions be held if need requires?

[Bin-Jubayr] Yes, it can be done when there is business that needs to be taken care of quickly, so that emergency sessions have to be held. They may last several days in succession, depending on the nature of the matters assigned to the Council.

[Al-Ghamidi] What procedure will be followed when the Council finishes its agenda?

[Bin-Jubayr] The Council will submit the conclusions it has reached to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for consideration and submission to the Council of Ministers. The king—may God preserve him—will be the recourse if there is no agreement between the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council.

[Al-Ghamidi] How will the Council's agenda be decided?

[Bin-Jubayr] The agenda will be approved by the Council's general staff, which has the right to assign degrees of priority to subjects.

#### Etiquette of Debate

[Al-Ghamidi] How do you view the members' role and the conduct of discussions?

[Bin-Jubayr] Each member must carry out his duty as fully as possible. Like every Muslim, he must adhere to the etiquette of fair debate. Everyone's goal must be the national interest, apart from any flattery.

#### Sufficient Time

[Al-Ghamidi] How do you view the four-year term for Council members? Do you think it is sufficient for a member to offer all he has to offer?

[Bin-Jubayr] I think it is enough, especially as only half of the members will be replaced after four years. As a result, there will be continuity of experience even when new members arrive on directives from the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

#### Coordination With Government Agencies

[Al-Ghamidi] Will there be coordination between the Shura Council and government or other agencies to receive their comments?

[Bin-Jubayr] The nature of the Council's work depends on the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Coordination with the ministries will be necessary in order to reach results that serve the interest of the nation and its citizens. It is assumed that every government department cooperate with the Council and offer whatever information and expertise it requests to assist it in accomplishing its work and advancing it in the best possible manner. The Shura Council may ask the head of any government department to come to the Council to present whatever facts or information he possesses.

#### Promise Kept

[Al-Ghamidi] What is your opinion about the concern of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and his interest in the Council as a way of following the needs of citizens?

[Bin-Jubayr] Our country has developed greatly in all areas. This makes it necessary that there be agencies that participate with government agencies in promoting development by offering expertise, advice, and solutions for the benefit of the country and the people. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques—may God preserve him—promised to create the Council, and he has kept his promise in order to achieve the goal of promoting progress in the country.

[Al-Ghamidi] Now that the members of the Shura Council have been announced, is there anything Your Excellency would like to say?

[Bin-Jubayr] There is no doubt that when the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques created this Council, he aimed at the welfare of the country and of citizens, and that the people of the country should participate in giving counsel and sincere advice for the benefit of citizens.

The message I address to my fellow citizens is that they help us in all matters submitted to us concerning their welfare and not withhold from us their advice and comments. I hope we shall always enjoy the favorable opinion of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosque. There is no doubt that the citizens have great hopes for this Council. We hope to enjoy their favorable opinion and to offer whatever we can to benefit their religious and worldly interests.

[Box, p 5]

#### Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-'Uthman Bin-Jubayr in Outline

- Born in the Sudayr region, about 215 km from Riyadh, in 1348 [1929-30].
- His Excellency graduated from the Shari'ah College in Mecca in 1372 [1952-53]. He served as judicial attache in the Greater Mecca Court, then as judge in the Summary Court in the Holy City.
- His Excellency moved to the Complaints Office (*Diwan al-Mazalim*) as legal investigator. He moved to the Court of Distinction (*Mahkamat al-Tamyiz*), then became head of the Justice Ministry's Supreme Judicial Council, and then head of the permanent staff of the Supreme Judicial Council.
- On 14 Shawwal 1395 [20 October 1975], he was appointed by royal order to head the Complaints Office.
- In 1407 [1986-87], he was appointed minister of state and a member of the Council of Ministers.
- On 10 Shawwal 1409 [16 May 1989], he was appointed deputy minister of justice and deputy head of the Supreme Judicial Council.
- On 15 Rabi' I 1410 [16 October 1989], His Excellency was appointed minister of justice, deputy head of the Complaints Office, and deputy head of the Supreme Judicial Council.
- On 19 Rabi' I 1413 [17 September 1992], His Excellency was appointed by royal order to head the Shura Council.
- His Excellency is a member of the Council of Senior Ulema, the Higher Council on Information, the Council of the Academy of Islamic Jurisprudence, the King Faysal Charitable Foundation, and the Islamic Call Organization.
- His Excellency headed the founding conference of the Islamic Conference Organization's Academy of Islamic Jurisprudence. He took part in the delegation of Saudi ulema who met with French and Irish thinkers in Riyadh and Europe.
- His Excellency has four sons: Khalid, an ophthalmologist; Musa'id, a computer engineer; Jubayr, a graduate of the Education College; and Ibrahim, a high school student.



**Bin-Jubayr Describes Shura Council Duties, Obligations**

93AE0595A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
18 Sep 93 p 8

[Hasin al-Bunayan interviews Council Chief: "We are the Government's Partners in Making Laws and Decisions"]

[Text] Saudis have never before been as unanimous as they are in their satisfaction and confidence in the choices of the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, for the sixty members of the Saudi Consultative Council.

In the gatherings and social occasions of Saudi society these days, there is talk of nothing but the Consultative Council and the proper and expected role of the selected elite of the most qualified and capable religious scholars, technocrats, university professors, and businessmen, of whom 31 have doctoral degrees.

What has further boosted the confidence of Saudi society and strengthened its spirit of optimism is that these names are known to the citizens themselves, and they greatly depend upon the positive things that will be forthcoming from the Council dome. They will depend on them to convey their issues, concerns, and requests.

Four months ago, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT visited the Consultative Council's headquarters, and fortunately the Council speaker, the great Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Jubayr, acquainted us with some of the steps and arrangements, even the role and the hopes, the Council will assume. He allowed us a full tour of its facilities, furnishings, and the advanced technology with which its main chamber and committee meeting rooms are equipped; but he wanted us to hold back on publishing until the completion of all the Council's other founding factors, such as the issuing of the internal procedures and naming of its members.

When I telephoned Shaykh Bin-Jubayr after returning from my vacation, I reminded him of his promise, he did not hesitate to ask me to come right over the the Council headquarters, saying, "As a judge, I do not like appearance and lights, but the insistence of journalists has forced me."

He tried to find out the nature of the questions, but I told him merely that the questions would go beyond the traditional questions that some local journalists had asked him. He replied that he would give direct answers to all my questions.

To start off, I asked him:

[Al-Bunayan] Article 15 of the Consultative Council Code defines the Council's jurisdiction. Does this mean that it has no jurisdiction in foreign policy issues? There is no clear wording preventing the Council for dealing with them.

[Bin-Jubayr] The Consultative Council may, if it sees fit, take up this matter and discuss foreign policy and express its views, because the public policy of the government includes everything that concerns the country and the interests of its citizens, and the government's public policy includes foreign policy. Article 14 makes that clear. It indicates that the King or whoever is deputizing for him in the Council delivers a royal speech every year setting out the country's foreign and domestic policy. If the head of state is going to give a speech on this subject in the Consultative Council, then the evidence is there, that foreign policy may be set forth before the Consultative Council, and may be discussed, and opinions expressed about it.

[Al-Bunayan] In paragraph "D" of the Consultative Council Code, there is a reference to Council's authorization to discuss the ministries' annual reports and government interests.

Does this mean that every minister must submit an annual report of his ministry's activities to the Council? Does the Council have the right to summon and question a minister and debate with him, which is a well-known parliamentary tradition?

[Bin-Jubayr] There is nothing to prevent any minister from submitting a report in which he sets out his ministry's policy and projects, with the initiative of the minister and the personal permission of the King. As to the Council, it does have the right to summon any government official and debate him on a subject before the Council related to the agency for which he is responsible.

All that is needed is for us to inform the King of the subject before it is brought up for debate, and before the minister or official in question is summoned.

[Al-Bunayan] If the Council perceives that a minister or official did not comply, or failed to do his job, can the Council recommend the matter to the King to call this minister or official to account, or even fire him from his position?

[Bin-Jubayr] No. In the Consultative Council, it does not fall within our jurisdiction to propose or recommend the firing of any minister or government official, because it is the King who appoints ministers, and it is he who is empowered to fire them. We may submit a complete report detailing the facts of shortcomings, as well as the good points, in the work of the minister or government official, and the King then acts as he sees fit.

[Al-Bunayan] Does the report contain a proposal to the King to fire the minister or government official?

[Bin-Jubayr] No. This happens only in other parliaments, where they vote their confidence in the government. Ministers here are chosen by the King. He appoints them, and thus he is the only one with the power to fire them, just as he has the right to hire them.

If we find a fault in any government official, the workings of whose ministry the council has debated, we submit a report to the King detailing the facts of the shortcoming, and the King takes action.

[Al-Bunayan] Article 17 of the Consultative Council Code alludes to the necessity of "referring the Council's decisions to the Cabinet for its review." Don't you see that as reducing the effectiveness of the Consultative Council, distancing it from sensitive issues or criticizing ministers or the government? What do you think?

[Bin-Jubayr] In my view, the guiding principle of the Consultative Council as well as of the ruler is the public interest of the state, which has to do with the ruler, who is the King, who decides whether a decision should be enacted or not. If he decides that a law or opinion from the Consultative Council should be enacted, then it will be enacted, as a law or instructions. If he finds that [the country's] interests are otherwise, in any case it is up to the King himself.

[Al-Bunayan] The foreign media has said that the role of the Saudi Consultative Council is solely consultative. What is the status of the council authorities, and is true role?

[Bin-Jubayr] The Consultative Council is, of course, the King's advisor and partner in making law. The Consultative Council offers advice to the King, but in accordance with the basic code of government, the Consultative Council is also the Cabinet's partner in making laws. We submit the law, after debating and studying it, to the King, and the King, in turn, passes it on to the Cabinet. If both the Council and the Cabinet agree to the law, it is issued by the Cabinet, and if the two bodies differ over it, then the King takes action. So the Consultative Council is the Cabinet's partner in making laws.

[Al-Bunayan] What is the extent of the powers permitted the Council in carrying out its mission?

[Bin-Jubayr] The Council's powers are set out in its code, in Article 15. They provide for the Consultative Council to express its view on the public policies of the state that are submitted to it by the prime minister. Specifically, this means the following:

- Studying laws, decrees, treaties, international agreements, and concessions, and making appropriate recommendations.
- Interpreting laws.
- Debating the annual reports submitted by ministries and other government offices, and making appropriate recommendations regarding them.

Naturally there is nothing to prevent the Consultative Council from exercising other powers entrusted to it by the Custodian of the Holy Places.

[Al-Bunayan] I believe it is also within the Consultative Council's powers to propose new laws and amend existing laws. Does this mean that you must restrict currently existing laws to discuss them in the Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] Indeed. Current laws being enforced must be restricted for them to be studied in the Council. If we find that a law requires amending, we amend it, and if it needs to be struck down, we will strike it down and issue an alternative law. We will not hesitate to restrict laws and decrees now in force in the government, including what is now, what will be amended, and what will be issued. We are actually restricting all laws now in force in the country.

[Al-Bunayan] May the Council propose a new law?

[Bin-Jubayr] It may. Any ten members of the Consultative Council have the right to propose the creation of a new law or the amendment or even the striking down of an existing law. When the idea forms, and it is proved to be appropriate, it is submitted to the Custodian of the Holy Places to take action, to study it or forward it to the Cabinet. In any case, it is up to the King, but the initiative comes from the ten members who submit a law proposal to the Consultative Council for debate, and thence from the speaker of the Council to the King.

[Al-Bunayan] To the King or the cabinet?

[Bin-Jubayr] No, to the King, because the King oversees the Consultative Council.

[Al-Bunayan] In Islamic jurisprudence there is an old ambiguity as to whether consultation is mandatory or just desirable. What is your personal view? How do you expect the Council to handle it?

[Bin-Jubayr] I have looked over the opinions of Islamic scholars in this regard, whether consultation is mandatory or desirable, and what I find to be predominant is that consultation is desirable, not mandatory. There are many examples, both in the time of the prophet, peace be upon him, and in the time of the caliphs subsequently. It is incumbent upon the ruler to seek counsel, and to seek it from one or more than one person, and if they are in accord, then at that point he makes the decision that he deems to be in the interest of the government, the citizens, and the country. There is a very straightforward [Koranic] verse that says consultation is not mandatory. His words are, "For God is merciful to you even if you are harsh and hard-hearted, to use up those around you, then forgive them and seek their forgiveness, seek their counsel in the matter, and if you are resolved, then trust in God." The text here is clear, that the matter is up to the ruler, that he makes the decision, whether implementing advice offered to him, or otherwise.

[Al-Bunayan] What is the extent of a Council member's powers in representation and debate? Will members be granted special prerogatives, such as parliamentary immunity, for example?

[Bin-Jubayr] Members are free to voice their opinions, to debate, to have reservations about views opposed to theirs, and to cast their vote. It is also their right to participate in the specialized committees they wish to join according to their specialities and expertise. As to

representation, it is absolutely not likely in the Consultative Council, because the makeup of the Council firmly rules out the representation aspect. There is no member or group representing a Saudi province or particular sector of the people. The makeup of the Consultative Council defines objective bases for choosing a member, and they are experience and qualifications, and those who have these qualities are chosen. We thank God for the fact that our country has these excellent, rare, and abundant resources. To know the abundance you have to see the names of the members who were chosen. Some people might not believe that we found several thousand qualified and specialized people, and of course those who were chosen are names and resources that make citizens hold their heads high and fill them with confidence and pride. We actually sensed the satisfaction of all citizens, whose confidence in themselves was bolstered by the Consultative Council members. When a citizen feels that the selection has been made on objective bases, then he will have the hope and ambition to take part in the Consultative Council, and while this round may be too late for him, he can be in the coming rounds, because the qualifications by which selection was made, all of them are, thank God, in ample supply among many specialized and qualified people, in every kind of field and expertise. The Custodian of the Holy Places agreed to these standards, and to selection on the basis of these standards.

[Al-Bunayan] What will these prerogatives be?

[Bin-Jubayr] Every Muslim has his immunity, and there are many provisions in the basic code of government that specify citizens' rights. Consultative Council members are citizens just like anyone else. There is no immunity that protects members who commit infractions in the Consultative Council and express a view that does not serve the public good. These are things that would not be acceptable in a Consultative Council member and could lead to his being questioned, because any infraction or violation that does not serve the public good, or harms people will not be permitted or accepted from any Council member. Every Muslim has his immunity in the context of the Islamic *shari'ah*. For whoever goes beyond these limits—whoever it may be—there is no immunity for anyone violating the Islamic *shari'ah*. There is no immunity for anyone from the Islamic *shari'ah*.

We have no such thing as diplomatic immunity. Diplomatic immunity is granted only to diplomats in the countries in which they are representing their countries.

[Al-Bunayan] But in some countries, Consultative Council members or representatives have diplomatic immunity.

[Bin-Jubayr] Here, our actions are governed by the Islamic *shari'ah*. Any member of the Consultative Council to whom a dishonorable act is imputed will receive the punishment meted out by Islamic *shari'ah*, just like any other citizen.

[Al-Bunayan] Meaning that a Consultative Council member could go to prison.

[Bin-Jubayr] The infractions and violations imputed to a Council member will be punished only by professional disciplinary measures. Should a member commit a forbidden act, forbidden by the Islamic *shari'ah*, then the law is clear. It says that professional discipline is not enough. If there are moral accusations, or aggression upon persons, then a member is not excused from the filing of charges against him. A case would proceed like any other case before the judicial authorities. The fifth article of the Council's internal code stipulates that the execution of any previous punishment, the charge of guilt, discontinuance of remuneration, and loss of membership, do not prevent the filing of public or private charges against the member. If a member of the Consultative Council commits an act in violation of Islamic law, why should he be excused? Why shouldn't he be investigated and judged like any other citizen? He is a citizen, bound by the Islamic *shari'ah*, which is applied to him and all other citizens.

[Al-Bunayan] When would a Consultative Council member go to trial, or would he be stripped of his membership? Or may he resign voluntarily?

[Bin-Jubayr] A Consultative Council member has certain obligations. Should he fail them, he would be questioned. These obligations are total commitment to neutrality and objectivity in all his work in the Council; he must abstain from raising any subject linked to his personal interest in the Council, or any which infringe the public good. He must also regularly attend the Council and committee sessions. He must inform the Council speaker or committee head in writing if he must be absent from a Council or committee session. A member may not leave any Council or committee session before it is concluded, without the permission of the speaker or committee head, according to the regulations. All these are duties of which failure would lead to the member's being questioned.

[Al-Bunayan] When would he be stripped of his membership?

[Bin-Jubayr] When he is accused of a serious charge or of behavior inappropriate to the dignity of the Council and the member himself, to the dignity of the country and its citizens whom he serves and whose well-being he oversees in this Council. In these circumstances he could be interrogated and tried. If it is a serious and major infraction, then the committee interrogating him might recommend his firing, or stripping him of his membership. It is up to the King to decide whether to go along with the judging committee, or to take action on his own.

[Al-Bunayan] Who turns the Consultative Council member over to the court?

[Bin-Jubayr] The speaker of the Consultative Council. The Code gives the speaker the right to turn the member over for interrogation. After the charge has been leveled,



or condemnation conveyed, as regards the member, a court would be constituted from the Council at large, with the condition that the speaker and his deputy not be among its members.

[Al-Bunayan] May a member resign voluntarily without giving reasons?

[Bin-Jubayr] He may resign. He may or may not give his reasons and submit his request to resign to the King to decide whether or not to accept the resignation.

[Al-Bunayan] May a Council member oppose the government's laws and decisions?

[Bin-Jubayr] I want to know what you mean by this question.

[Al-Bunayan] I mean, he wants to oppose a government law or resolution because he has a point of view.

[Bin-Jubayr] He may do so, because the decisions made by the Consultative Council are by majority. It is not necessary for them to be unanimous, so any member may express his opinion and have reservations about the decision. And, as I said, resolutions are made by the majority; there is an absolute majority and a conditional majority. For instance, the majority required in the Consultative Council is that a third of the members be present; decisions are passed by half the members' votes. This means that if 40 members are in attendance, then a decision can be made by 30 members. The majority is conditional, with the decision having its power. Otherwise, if we said that the decision could be passed by a majority of those present, then it could be passed by 20 plus one. I believe that a resolution passed by 20 votes out of 60 would be a weak resolution. Therefore a specific number for the passage of a bill has been set in the Consultative Council.

[Al-Bunayan] By two-thirds?

[Bin-Jubayr] No, by half, because if 40 attend it has to be half of [all] Council members, not half of those present in the session.

[Al-Bunayan] When is it the King's right to dissolve the Consultative Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] That is for the King to decide. The King has the right to dissolve the Council, but these are speculative matters that the King assesses on the basis of how he sees the public good of the country and the citizens and how he views the way in which members are performing their duties. He may see it as being in the public interest to bring in members better than those then serving. The King may dissolve the Council at any time; it is up to him, and it is he who decides when and for what reasons the Consultative Council may be dissolved.

[Al-Bunayan] Do you expect the day will come when members of the Consultative Council will be chosen by general election?

[Bin-Jubayr] I would like to ask you, if these people chosen by the Custodian of the Holy Places had been chosen by election, would voters have been qualified enough to pick a group of such elite, qualified, specialized people?

[Al-Bunayan] Perhaps so.

[Bin-Jubayr] No, never. It is well known that voters choose only those people who toy with their emotions and who might have bought their votes. Voters do not distinguish between those who are capable and those who are unqualified, who could not carry out their true role in the Consultative Council. If the membership of the Consultative Council had been elected, it would not be this elite group of good minds and qualifications.

[Al-Bunayan] So, elections are not likely.

[Bin-Jubayr] This *thinking* is not likely, it does not exist anyway, the idea that the Consultative council's membership would come in by election, because the ruler's responsibility is a great and momentous one. Bearing the responsibility of administering the affairs of state and the good of the citizens is no easy or small responsibility. Among the interests that the ruler handles and oversees is the selection of advisors on whom he can depend and rely, after God, for counsel and advice.

[Al-Bunayan] Why does the Consultative Council itself not take up the preparation of its internal code, especially as Article 29 of its Code does not specify whose responsibility that is?

[Bin-Jubayr] The codes are created and published just as the basic code of government, the Code of the Consultative Council, and the Provincial Code were created, by royal decrees. It was prepared to be applied by the Consultative Council when it does its work. How can it work without codes? What are the rules by which the Council abides in doing its job before the publication of these codes? And how could debates take place and committees be formed? These are matters that must be settled when the Council takes up its work, because it will work within the guidelines of these codes, and the internal code is not better than the basic code of government. All the laws are made by royal decree, before the Council takes up its duties. And there is another thing: the code contains rules, rules than can be made only by the ruler, who oversees the Consultative Council. So it cannot be that it would decide matters having a far-reaching effect on the work, on the members, on jurisdiction, the budget, financial or disciplinary affairs, because these are all matters passed before the Council starts its work. The code, then, is enacted in the same way, the same manner in which the basic code of government was enacted, and the Code of the Consultative Council, and the Provincial Code. You may have noticed that the last article in every code stipulates that "this code may not be amended except in the same manner as it was enacted." So the text in the basic system of governing and the codes was concluded in the same manner.

[Al-Bunayan] I mean the internal code that specifies the manner of administrating sessions, debates, and voting procedures, disciplinary measures, and so on.

[Bin-Jubayr] The internal code, as is stipulated in the Code of the Consultative Council, is set by the Council, like the administrative and financial codes, some of the powers are set by the speaker, and some are delegated to the General Council Commission. This commission has 11-12 members, among them the speaker, his deputy, the committee heads, and it is responsible for setting the general foundations and special powers of the commission and whatever instructions it deems relevant to the Council.

[Al-Bunayan] Begging your pardon, you did not answer my question.

[Bin-Jubayr] Yes, the Consultative Council, as a council, when it pursues its work, will form specialized committees and propose committee names to the members. Whoever wishes to join a committee, or committees, will express his wish, and when the specialized committee is formed and its chairmen, their deputies, and its members are chosen, at that point the General Consultative Council Commission will be formed from the heads of the committees. So the Council's basic regulations are overseen by the Council itself, and the administrative and financial regulations and personnel affairs, these are pertinent to the speaker.

[Al-Bunayan] There have been many allusions in the provisions of the basic code of government and the Code of the Consultative Council to what is called the "code." Is what is meant by this something that exists, being used, or are there codes that will be prepared in the future? Will the Council have a role in preparing these codes?

[Bin-Jubayr] Yes. The text is comprehensive, whether the existing or the new code, the one being prepared, is meant. The text is valid, then, according to Arabic grammar, because the code decides, and the code includes the current code and the code that will be issued subsequently, and these codes will be prepared and discussed by the Consultative Council. We will reformulate them if a code requires amending, and if the code is new, we will formulate it and submit it to the Custodian of the Holy Places.

[Al-Bunayan] Might there be some open sessions of the Consultative Council? If so, what are the standards that would determine what would be public and what would not be? Would the media be allowed to cover the sessions?

[Bin-Jubayr] The intention with the Consultative Council sessions is that they not be public. This matter is settled. If there should be any reason calling for one of the sessions to be public, and it is thought that this would serve the public good, then there would be nothing to

prevent an open session, and journalists and the media, including television, would be permitted to attend and cover it.

[Al-Bunayan] Might live television directly show a debate of Council members with a minister?

[Bin-Jubayr] As I told you, the intention with the Consultative Council sessions is that they not be public, and that is settled. But that does not rule out that on some occasion, or a certain Council session if conditions are suitable, and if having an open session, with journalists present and television broadcasting it, serves the public good.

[Al-Bunayan] What are the criteria that would define whether a session would be open or not?

[Bin-Jubayr] This sort of criteria will be defined later on, when the Consultative Council begins its work.

[Al-Bunayan] When will it begin?

[Bin-Jubayr] Soon. I do not know exactly when. The Custodian of the Holy Places will officially inaugurate the Council. We are now preparing the opening festivities.

[Al-Bunayan] How will the Council sessions proceed? What are the ground rules for voting and debate?

[Bin-Jubayr] It will be much like similar councils, with debate, voting, and vote screening. Whether there is a majority, when a view will be expressed, voting, no expressing views during the voting—all this is there, in the code that was published.

[Al-Bunayan] In constitutional systems, there is a special court for dealing with constitutional differences and disputes, usually called the supreme constitutional court, that is, relating to the interpreting of the constitution or the basic law code, and implementing it. How will constitutional disputes be settled in the Kingdom's new system? Who, in your view, is authorized to rule in such disputes?

[Bin-Jubayr] I do not think there will be any constitutional dispute in the basic system of government, because the basis for the system is adherence to the arbitration of the Islamic *shari'ah*, and the fact that no law or laws can be passed unless they are in accordance with Islamic *shari'ah*, and do not conflict with anything in the Koran or the Sunnah. There are Islamic *shari'ah* experts in the Consultative Council, and they can assess whether or not a law under consideration in the Council is contrary to what is contained in the Islamic *shari'ah*. Therefore what are called constitutional disputes and conflicts are not likely to occur in the Consultative Council. Thus there is no need to create a Supreme Constitutional Court to look into these disputes, because the authority is almighty God's book, and the Sunnah of the prophet, God's peace and blessings be upon him. If

there are conflicting points of view, there are religious scholars and experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and they can decide as they see fit.

[Al-Bunayan] How do you view the role of the Constitutional Council?

[Bin-Jubayr] I am extremely optimistic that the Council will fulfill its role completely in accordance with the directives and aspirations of the Custodian of the Holy Places. We felt even more confident after the Custodian of the Holy Places named these diverse and qualified members. The reaction of the citizens was favorable when the King chose this elite group. They bode well, because their reputation, attainments, and gifts are outstanding and highly satisfying.

#### **Provincial Members Discuss Duties, Expectations**

93AE0595D Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic  
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[AL-MADINAH staffers Khalid al-Matrifi, Muhammad Rabi' Sulayman, et al., poll new Provincial Council members: "We Thank the Custodian of the Holy Places for his Confidence"]

[Text] Numerous Provincial Council members have expressed their thanks and appreciation to the Custodian of the Holy Places and His Highness the Interior Minister for their confidence in them in selecting them as members for these councils.

They reaffirmed that the provincial system aims to serve the citizens, to raise performance standards, and to improve the level of services.

They also expressed their pride in taking up this great patriotic duty in order to serve the faith, the King, and the country.

The Provincial Council members said that they would do their utmost to serve the provinces they represent, to reflect the citizens' hopes and aspirations by coming up with ideas and voicing opinions that would contribute to serving the nation and the citizen.

On to the members' impressions and views:

#### **A Great Honor for Us**

Shaykh 'Uthman Bin-Suay'id, Shaykh of the Bani-Kabir tribe and member of the Provincial Council of al-Bahah, said:

First of all, I am pleased to express my greatest thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his faithful crown prince, and his highness the second deputy [prime minister] for their efforts to serve this dear nation.

I also thank his highness the governor of al-Bahah Province and his highness his deputy, for having nominated me and my colleagues from this province to the Council. This is a great honor of which we are all proud,

because we are participating in offering ideas and opinions to our wise leadership to improve performance standards and enhance the level of services as one of the goals of establishing these councils set up by the Custodian of the Holy Places in his development plan for the rule of government in the Kingdom.

#### **Grand Patriotic Mission**

Shaykh Sa'd 'Abdallah al-Mulays, secretary general of the al-Bir Charitable Society in the region, and member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said:

"All I can do, hearing the news of my nomination to the al-Bahah Provincial Council, is to pray God sincerely to fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the Custodian of the Holy Places and his rightly-guided government, which always aims at providing the best services to every citizen and resident.

"I take pride in this precious trust, and I ask almighty God to make us all well thought of by our rightly-guided government. I wish progress and success to all my colleagues in this grand patriotic mission."

#### **Great Responsibility**

Ahmad 'Ali al-Shamrani, director of Riyadh Bank in al-Bahah, and member of the Provincial Council, said:

"The officials of this province have honored me by nominating me for this great patriotic task. As we accept this honor, we feel the great responsibility that has been entrusted to us, because we will represent all our brother citizens, the residents of this province, and take with us their hopes, aspirations, ideas, requests, and needs.

"This of course calls for massive efforts, care, and constant endeavor. I congratulate my colleagues, and I wish success to all in this mission we are honored to carry out."

#### **Fulfilling the Trust**

Shaykh Mastur Ahmad al-Humayti, retired justice clerk of al-Qilwah [town], and Member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said:

"I praise almighty God and thank him greatly for having given this country a wise leader who has worked to develop the country for the good of its citizens, and to achieve comfort and ease as a basic goal of its course and its creed, based on the Koran and the Sunnah.

"I offer my warm thanks to all the officials who bestowed their valued confidence upon me. I take pride in it and thank them, because they have thus given me a chance to have the honor of working to further serve our faith, the King, and the country.

"I pray to God to help us all to carry out this mission and serve our brother citizens and our wise leadership well."



### **Leader's Concern for His People**

Sa'id 'Abdallah Nahban, al-Qilwah businessman and Member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said:

"It was not so much a surprise to me as it was a great honor for me, as I will be representing my brother citizens in the al-Tihamah strip and the other parts of the province in this Council, which embodies our leadership's concern for its people. I thank God first of all, and all our loyal officials. I declare my pride and support for our wise leadership, and pray for God to grant this country the blessing of security and stability, for He is all-hearing.

### **Good for Citizens and Country**

Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Uways al-Ghamidi, retired employee and Member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said, "This honor and mission we have been granted, to me and my colleagues in this and the other provinces, is part of the concern of the Custodian of the Holy Places and his strong wish for codes of government and the provincial codes to achieve their goals and prepare the way for achieving the good of all citizens and the country. I pray to God to grant us all success and to protect our country and its loyal leaders."

### **Councils and Leaders' Aspirations for the Country**

We also met with Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sa'di, deputy director of the King Fahd Hospital in al-Bahah and member of the Provincial Council, who expressed his pride at being chosen as a member of the Provincial Council. He said, "This choice is a badge of pride for all of us. We thank the Custodian of the Holy Places and his rightly-guided government for their efforts to develop the country and move the wheel of progress forward, with the help of the citizens of this blessed country. We wish success for all and hope that these councils will achieve the hopes and aspirations of the country and its citizens in a palpable way to reflect well upon the Islamic community, our people, and our country, in accordance with the instructions of the Custodian of the Holy Places, his faithful Crown Prince, His Highness the Second Deputy, and our men of state.

### **Optimism and Welcome**

We met 'Uthman Bin-Hamid Bin-Hasin al-Ghamidi, a leader of the Bani-Kabir [tribe] and well-known businessman. He said, "From the time the Provincial Code was announced, I have felt the optimism and welcoming of my brother citizens, who constantly reaffirm that these decisions are the crowning of the government's concern for its citizens, and its determination to provide them with all services at all times and in every place. I felt that everyone was waiting for the establishment of these councils, which represent them and express their views, as provided for in the Provincial Code. How happy I was to learn of this great honor, of this mission in which I take pride. I pray to God to grant me and my

colleagues success in realizing the hopes and ambitions our brother citizens have placed in us."

### **A Great Mission**

'Abdallah Yahya al-Zahrani, a retired teacher from the city of al-Atawalah, said:

"There was nothing strange to us in the recent royal decrees of the Custodian of the Holy Places and his highness the minister of the interior, conveyed to their highnesses and excellencies the governors of the provinces, to choose members for the provincial councils. We all know that the principle of this government is based on consultation and service to citizens; finding out his problems and needs, and striving to provide security for all according to the instructions of our wise leaders, who enforce God's book and the Sunnah of His prophet.

"And so I express my pride in this precious trust, and pray to almighty God to grant us all success in carrying out this great mission for our country, our brothers, and our leadership, for he is all-hearing."

### **Embodiment of Truth**

Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Wanan, chairman of the al-Bahah Chamber of Commerce and member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said, "It is very difficult, as a citizen, to express to you my feelings at the moment I got news of my nomination to be one of the members of the Provincial Council. There are many reasons for that. This is a great honor for us all, to participate in these councils, which are the embodiment of palpable truth and the great role our rightly-guided government plays in the ongoing process of building and developing, in every possible way, our cities, villages, and agricultural settlements, by scientific, true, and well-studied means. Our best citizens helped to prepare this process, working side by side with those responsible for these services, and guided by the instructions of the Custodian of the Holy Places and his rightly-guided government, which always aims to achieve security, ease, and stability for the citizens of this blessed country."

### **Patriotic Duty**

Hasan Sa'id Muwala, a member of the al-Bahah Provincial Council, said, "It is a great honor to us all, having the opportunity to participate in the Provincial Council, to take part in a portion of our patriotic duty towards our brother citizens and our beloved country. I thank his highness the governor of the province and his highness the minister of the interior, and pray to God to safeguard this country's leadership, and to bless it with security and stability."

### **Our Duty to the Country**

Hasan Hamzah Marzuqi said, "I thank almighty God first of all, and then the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, who honored me with this mission and this choice. I hope to join with my brothers

and colleagues, the members of the Provincial Council, in doing our duty for the country and its citizens. I also pray to God that we may be well thought of by officials and by those who chose us for this task."

#### A Glance at His Life

He was born in Makkah, and earned a bachelor's degree in accounting from 'Ayn-Shams University and a master's degree in administration from the University of Southern California. In 1383 [1963], he was appointed to the Finance Ministry as deputy for Budget Management, then director of planning in the Ministry of Agriculture, and subsequently as director general for Public Planning Department in the Ministry of Planning, then director general of Religious Endowments in Makkah. He has attended many conferences and symposiums.

#### Raising Standard of Services

His Excellency Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah al-Shibi said, in an exclusive statement to AL-MADINAH: "I thank almighty God for this precious trust and this great responsibility. I pray to God for the good opinion of the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, may God protect him." Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shibi said that "my being chosen for the Makkah Provincial Council has multiplied my responsibility to serve this faithful country and its citizens. Of course the Provincial Code is a new opening for the blessed progress enjoyed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of the Custodian of the Holy Places, may God protect him."

Shaykh al-Shibi added that "the royal decrees for the application of the Provincial Code will realize the aspirations of all the citizens of this dear country."

Shaykh al-Shibi went on to say that "I pray to almighty God to grant us success in serving the faith, and the King, and the country; He is all-hearing. Of course, the aim of these councils is to raise the standard of work and the level of services offered by the state to the citizens, and to achieve comfort for every citizen. This is the desire of the Custodian of the Holy Places, may God protect him."

His Excellency Shaykh al-Shibi said, "On this occasion, I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, may God protect him, his faithful crown prince, his highness the second deputy prime minister, his Royal Highness the Minister of the Interior Prince Na'if Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, his royal highness the governor of Makkah Province, and his highness his deputy."

#### Facts About Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shibi

- Born in 1348 [1929] in Makkah, and educated there.
- Appointed administrator at the Holy Mosque, and

later to the Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts, as one of the gatekeepers of God's Holy Mosque.

- Now is senior gatekeeper of God's Holy Mosque.
- Has five sons, Talal, Hisham, Marwan, Ahmad, and Nizar, and one daughter. All his children have government jobs.

#### Completing the Building Process

Fu'ad Zayn al-Din Kutubi says, "My being chosen for the Makkah Provincial Council is an honor in which I take pride, and comes with the completion of the building process begun by the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, may God protect him. It is the crowning of our lives' work in service to this country, which has dedicated itself to the service of Islam and Muslims, and providing the best services to the citizens of this holy land."

#### A Glance at His Life

He graduated from the College of Islamic Shari'ah in Makkah in 1373 [1953], and worked in the Ministry of Education.

He joined the Ministry of Commerce and was promoted in that ministry, finally being appointed director general of the Ministry of Commerce branch in Makkah.

#### Untiring Work

'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Qadir Faqih said, "This is a great honor for a person to enjoy this trust. I pray to almighty God to grant me success in doing this work as well as possible, with my brothers and colleagues. Of course, working in the Provincial Council will require unceasing effort and untiring work for us to be able to do what we can with the help of the leadership of the Custodian of the Holy Places, may God preserve him. He has spared no effort in serving this holy land. It is a great opportunity. I express my thanks and gratitude to all the officials, and pray to God to give us success in what He wants and what pleases Him."

#### A Glance at His Life

He completed his schooling in Makkah and began his commercial career with his father in 1360 [1941]. He worked in the dyeing and silk trade, then in shortening and tea, and then went independent to work in the poultry trade.

#### An Assignment We Are Proud Of

Major General Faysal Muhammad al-Harithi said, "This is a good opportunity to express my happiness, thanks, and gratitude to the officials of our rightly-guided government, chiefly the Custodian of the Holy Places, who gave us their confidence. I also pray to God to grant us success in performing our duty as well as possible, so that we may be able to realize achievements serving the good of our faith, then the King and the country. It is an

assignment we are proud of, and we ask almighty God to grant us success in carrying out our responsibility."

#### A Glance at His Life

He graduated from the Police College in Makkah. He was appointed a police officer in the religious capital, and was promoted in military work, reaching the rank of colonel. He was transferred to the al-Jawf province, then returned to the Jeddah police with the rank of Brigadier General; subsequently he was appointed director of police in Makkah Province with the rank of major general.

Hamid Mutawa said, "My feelings are of responsibility, in the context of reasoning, on bases that make a citizen do his utmost and summon all his abilities to carry out his patriotic duty.

"I hope God will grant me success in bearing this responsibility and acting on it. I express my thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places for his trust, and I hope to be worthy of it, and capable in it."

#### Giving an Opinion

Engineer Sa'd Bin-'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Suwaylim, member of the Riyadh Provincial Council, said, "We truly must thank God first of all, and thank the Custodian of the Holy Places for his confidence. We hope to be worthy of it by doing the right thing by this country. We especially thank His Royal Highness Salman Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh Province, who has always given the finest service to the city of Riyadh and its people. I hope for God's help in doing my best in this assignment, in the service of our faith, the King, and the country."

Addressing the role expected of the Council members, Eng. Sa'd al-Suwaylim said, "I expect the Council to help in giving its opinion on the planning and its vision of the province's needs, in social, economic, and industrial terms. It will assist government agencies in viewing the development of the province properly."

Turning to what he expects from the private sector, as that is Eng. Sa'd's background, he said, "Actually, this is also an honor for the private sector from the Custodian of the Holy Places, may God protect him, and His Highness Prince Salman's appreciation of businessmen. I believe that the private sector, like any other sector, must have a role in the building process. It must be in the service of its faith, its King, and its country. Unquestionably it also has duties in these times. We seek help and success from God, and for him to spare us the Custodian of the Holy Places, that we may be successful in serving this country."

Eng. Sa'd al-Suwaylim was born in '73 [1953] in Riyadh, and holds an electrical engineering degree from the University of Arizona in the United States. He is a member of the Commercial Committee in the Riyadh Chamber [of Commerce].

Al-Qasim Provincial Council Member Salih Bin-Rashid Bin-Muhammad Rashid al-Harbi said, "This trust is a source of pride for us. We ask almighty God that we may be worthy of this precious royal trust placed in us by the government of the Custodian of the Holy Places. I will work side by side with my colleagues the members of the al-Qasim Provincial Council, according to the instructions of His Royal Highness Prince Faysal Bin-Bandar, Governor of al-Qasim Province and Council Speaker." He concluded his statement by asking almighty God to give health to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his faithful crown prince, and his highness the second deputy prime minister, and to protect the security, comfort, and stability of this country, for He is all-hearing."

Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Abdallah al-Mushayqih also expressed his thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, may God protect him, his faithful crown prince, and his highness the minister of the interior, for the confidence they had shown in choosing him to be a member of the al-Qasim Provincial Council. "I ask almighty God to grant me success, along with the rest of my colleagues, the members of the Provincial Council, so that what we do may benefit the al-Qasim Province, according to the instructions of His Highness, Governor of al-Qasim Prince Faysal Bin-Bandar Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, so that the Council may achieve the goals for which it was founded."

Riyadh member Mr. 'Adil Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Shaman al-Milayhi said, "Actually, there was nothing strange in this decision of our rightly-guided government, led by the Custodian of the Holy Places, may God protect him. Being included in the Council is a great honor and a badge of honor I wear right on my chest. But however I try to express this, words fail me, and so I am unable to thank the Custodian of the Holy Places, the ruler of this blessed land, for having chosen me. I pray to almighty God that I may do a good job, and fulfill this trust truly and sincerely. These wise decisions were made one after another, first and foremost for the good of our citizens, to bless us with ease and security, and I find it appropriate to offer my sincerest thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his faithful crown prince, the second deputy prime minister, and his royal highness the governor of Riyadh. I promise them that I will do my utmost to benefit my religion, my King, and my country.

Engineer Muhammad Bin-Shafi Bin-Nasir al-Qahtani, who was chosen as a member of the Riyadh Provincial Council, said:

First of all, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his faithful crown prince, the second deputy prime minister, and his highness the governor of Riyadh for choosing me as a member of the Riyadh Provincial Council. I pray to almighty God to grant us success, and that we may be useful to our rightly-guided government. In truth, this is a great honor from the ruler of this dear country, and it means a great deal to me. I will be, God willing, obedient



to whatever pleases God and our faith, and to the King and our country. I will spare no effort for my country and my King, in my soul and everything I have. We will always do the will of the Custodian of the Holy Places, at all times, and support him for the good of the country, and stand fast by the Islamic *shari'ah*. In closing, I thank His Royal Highness Prince Na'if Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz.

#### A glance at his life:

- Born in al-Kharj in 1364 [1944];
- Has a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Colorado in the United States;
- Former employee of Saudi Aramco, from 1965-1979;
- Has been deputy director of the Engineering Department in Sabic [Saudi Basic Industries Corp.] for the past two years;
- Married with five sons and three daughters.

Muhammad Bin-Sa'd Bin-Muhammad al-Bawaridi, member of the Riyadh Provincial Council, said, "Actually, I am proud of this royal confidence, of having been chosen. I pray to God that I will do my best, and thank His Royal Highness Prince Na'if Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz and His Royal Highness Prince Salman Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, and hope God will grant me success in serving my faith, my King, and my country."

#### A glance at his life:

- Born in the city of Shaqra';
- Earned a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from Munich University, West Germany, in 1970;
- Earned a master's degree in mechanical engineering from Loyola University, Los Angeles, in the United States;
- Appointed general manager of the al-Nasiriyah Power Station in Riyadh;
- Did consulting work, managing a consulting office specializing in electrical engineering and water processing;
- Superb consulting services for electrical connection in Riyadh and al-Qasim;
- Study and design in extending electrical services to al-Washm, Sudayr, and al-Dawadimi;
- Currently does consulting and supervisory work for the water processing station at al-Jubayl.

#### My Joy Cannot Be Described

Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Furaydi, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, expressed his "great thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his royal highness the minister of the interior, and His Royal Highness Fahd Bin-Sultan, governor of the Province of Tabuk, for their trust" in him, and for nominating him as a member of the Provincial Council.

He added that his joy at this trust and his nomination could not be described. He considered it "an honor for me and my family, and for the province of Tabuk, and a

badge of honor for us all. We will, God willing, be well thought of at this task, faithful to our religion, our King, and our country.

"I ask God to bless this country with security and stability through the leadership of the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness his faithful crown prince, and his highness the second deputy prime minister."

Ibrahim Salman al-Baz'i, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, expressed his "profound thanks and gratitude for the trust placed in him by the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for nominating me a member of the Provincial Council."

He said that "this nomination is a great honor for us all. We are all proud of it, as is every citizen in the province.

"I pray to God to grant me success in fulfilling this trust and being well thought of by the government of the Custodian of the Holy Places."

#### As Long As I Live

Hammad 'Awdah al-Juhani, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "I felt overwhelming joy and happiness when I heard the news of my nomination. All I can do is thank the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for their confidence in me. I pray to God to help me fulfill this trust, which I will be proud to fulfill as long as I live."

Sulayman Isma'il Badiyuwi, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "First I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for the trust they have placed in me, of which I am proud.

"I ask almighty God to grant me success in serving my faith, my King, and my country, and that I will do my best. I ask God to grant us the blessing of security, peace, and Islam through our leader, the Custodian of the Holy Places, and his faithful crown prince."

Shaykh Zafar Bin-Ahmad al-Taqiqi al-Huwayti, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "I was overwhelmed with joy and happiness at this nomination, which I consider a great honor. All I can do is thank the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for this great trust."

Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-'Ali al-'Ubaydi (Ret'd), member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, expressed "his great thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for their precious trust" in him.

'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abd-al-Salam Sahli, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "I was overwhelmed

when I heard the news of my selection as a member of the Tabuk Provincial Council. I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for their confidence in me."

He added that the Provincial Code was a historic model for serving the country.

'Abd-al-Karim Bin-Jiluwi Bin-Muhammad al-Humaydi, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, also expressed "his greatest thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for their trust in me."

'Abd-al-Latif al-Talq, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "First, I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk for their trust in nominating me to be a member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, and I pray to God to grant me success in fulfilling this trust."

'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Salman, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said that "my happiness in the trust of the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of Tabuk, cannot be described. I pray to God to preserve our wise leaders, and to grant me success in carrying out this patriotic duty."

'Atallah Bin-Rashid al-'Atawi, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said, "It is a great honor for me to enjoy the precious trust of the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of the Province. I offer them my deepest thanks and appreciation."

Muhammad Ibrahim al-Nasir also expressed his joy and happiness at this precious trust, expressing his thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the interior minister, and his highness the governor of Tabuk.

Muhammad Bin-Musa'id Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Qawfi, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, expressed his thanks and gratitude to the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the minister of the interior, and his highness the governor of the Province, and prayed to God to look favorably upon all officials.

Nahar Bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-Rumman, member of the Tabuk Provincial Council, said he was "proud of this trust," and thanked the Custodian of the Holy Places, his highness the interior minister, and his highness the governor of the Province."

#### Protocols Inside Council Chambers Described

93AE0595B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
18 Sep 93 p 8

[Text]

- A member of the Consultative Council may speak using the microphone in front of his seat only after inserting the magnetized card bearing his name and the number of his seat into the computerized device programmed with the members' names and the numbers of their seats. The member's name and the number of his seat will appear on a lighted display linked to the computer in front of the speaker, who may then permit the Council secretary to activate the member's microphone.
- The main Council chamber holds 456 light-blue velvet seats. The floor of the chamber is covered with rose-colored wall-to-wall carpeting.
- A huge ornamented plaque in a gold frame is hung over the speaker's podium, with the Saudi emblems in the middle and displaying a number of Koranic verses, among them "And your Lord's word came to pass, in truth and utterance." The Council speaker's secretary, Ibrahim al-Sulayman, told me that Council Speaker Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Jubayr asked to have this plaque hung there instead of a previous one that portrayed Islamic designs and embellishments on portions of sumptuous carpet, which is now displayed to the sides of the chamber.
- The main chamber is equipped with four side galleries for journalists and the various media, in addition to a special separate chamber for the media, where press conferences will be held. The Council also has an integrated media center to facilitate communications. The intention is to have a media professor from King Sa'ud University in Riyadh, Dr. Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, direct the Media and Journalism Affairs Department in the Consultative Council.
- The Council's dome is covered with highly original and tasteful Islamic designs and embellishments, with beautiful and attractive colors and lights.
- There are four buttons in front of each member's seat, entered into the Council's central computer and linked to the lit-up electronic board to the right of the speaker's podium, labeled Abstain, No, Yes, and Passed. Using these, the member may press the button during the voting process, with his vote being registered automatically in the computer.
- There are 43 side chambers around the Council's main chamber, for holding specialized committee meetings.
- Council Speaker Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Jubayr hung a colored picture of the door and drapes of the Kaaba on his Council desk. He has taken the room opposite his office as a praying area for the office employees, and his office manager Ibrahim al-Sulayman will do the call to prayer.
- When we went in to see the Council speaker, he said, "As a judge, I do not like lights, or to be seen, but the persistence of journalists forced me."

**Provincial Council Members Named**

93AE0595C Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic  
20 Sep 93 p 3

[Saudi Press Agency report from Jeddah: "Custodian of the Holy Places Ratifies Appointment of Provincial Council Members"]

[Text] Custodian of the Holy Places King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud has issued His Highness the Interior Minister Decree 284/8 dated Rabi'ah al-Thani 4, 1414 [Sept. 22, 1993], giving his gracious consent to the appointment of members of the Kingdom's provincial councils. The text of the decree follows:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. His Highness the Minister of the Interior in accordance with the provisions of paragraph H of the Sixteenth Article of the Law of the Provinces, set forth in Royal Decree A-92 dated Sha'ban 27, 1412 [March 6, 1991];

And after reviewing what you submitted to us, A.Sh./4449/5 dated Rabi'ah al-Thani 2, 1414 [Sept. 20, 1993];

Regarding the appointment of a number of citizens as members of the Kingdom's provincial councils;

We inform you of our consent to the appointment of the below-named persons as members of the provincial councils, for four-year renewable terms, as from the date of this decree. Please see that this is implemented.

**The Prime Minister****Members of the Provincial Council of Riyadh:**

1. Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim al-Sulayman 2. Sa'd Bin-Dha'ar Bin-'Uwaydan al-Dawsari 3. Engineer Sa'd Bin-'Abd-al-Muhsin Bin-'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Suwaylim 4. Sultan Bin-Muhammad Bin-Salih Bin-Sultan 5. 'Adil Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Shaman al-Milayhi 6. 'Abdallah Bin-Brahim Bin-Nasir Bin-'Umayqan 7. 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Rahmah 8. 'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah al-Haqil 9. 'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Sulayman al-Jabrin 10. 'Abdallah Bin-Yahya Bin-'Abdallah al-Mu'allimi 11. 'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasan al-Yamani 12. Dr. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Bin-Sa'd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Ruwayshid 13. Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Thunayan al-'Ubaykan 14. Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad Abu-Ma'ati 15. Muhammad Bin-Sa'd Bin-Muhammad al-Bawardi 16. Eng. Muhammad Bin-Shafi Bin-Nasir al-Qahtani 17. Major General (Ret'd) Muhammad Bin-Hamad Bin-A'ish al-Mutayri 18. Muhammad Bin-'Ali Bin-Husayn al-Makki 19. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Munir Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Husayan al-'Utaybi 20. Nasir Bin-Muhammad Bin-Brahim al-Subay'i

**Members of the Provincial Council of Makkah:**

1. Ibrahim Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Ibrahim Kamal 2. Ibrahim Bin-'Ali Bin-'Abdallah al-Ahmad Marzuq al-Zubaydi 3. Bassam Bin-Muhammad Bin-Sulayman al-Bassam 4.

Hasan Bin-Hamzah Bin-Muhammad Marzuqi 5. Hamid Bin-Hasan Bin-'Ali Mutawa' 6. Taha Bin-'Umran Bin-Isma'il Bin-Mubayrik 7. Dr. Talal Bin-'Abd-al-Karim Bakr Ahmad Bakr 8. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Abd-al-Qadir Bin-Muhammad Faqih 9. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad al-Hamdan 10. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-Qadir al-Shibi 11. 'Abdallah Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Qasim al-Sayyid al-Muhabi 12. 'Abd-al-'Ilah Bin-Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Wahid Maghribi 13. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Faysal Bin-Muhammad al-Fawzan al-Harithi 14. Fu'ad Zayn al-'Abidin Bin-'Abd-al-Hadi Kutubi 15. Dr. Muhammad Bin-'Ali Muhammad al-Habashi 16. Muhammad Muhammad Bin-'Abduh Bin-Muhammad al-Alma'i 17. Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Anqari 18. Munir Bin-Sultan Bin-Munir al-Hadabi 19. Dr. Nazih Bin-Hasan Yusuf Nasif 20. Yusuf Bin-Muhammad 'Ali Rida

**Members of the Provincial Council of al-Madinah:**

1. Ahmad Bin-'Abd-al-Hamid Ahmad 'Abbas 2. Hasan Bin-Ibrahim Bin-'Umar Zahid 3. Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Hamad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Sulayman al-Arifi 4. Hamzah Bin-Ahmad Bakri Salih 5. Hamzah Bin-Salih Bin-'Abdallah Fada'ili 6. Khalid Bin-Hamzah Bin-Ibrahim Ghawth 7. Sa'ud Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim al-Zaghibi 8. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Shahhat Bin-Muhammad Ahmad Basri 9. Rida Bin-'Abd-al-'Ilah Bin-Muhammad Murshid 10. Dr. Talal Bin-'Ali Bin-Hasan al-Sha'ir 11. 'Amir Bin-'Awwad al-Luwayhiq al-Mutayri 12. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khirayji 13. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Muhammad Sa'id Daftardar 14. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Sulayman Bin Hamid al-Ahmadi 15. 'Abdallah Bin-Ahmad Bin-Hamid Khatib 16. 'Adnan Bin-Habib Bin-Mahmud Ahmad 17. 'Ali Bin-Muhammad Bin-Madallah al-Dakhil 18. Captain (Ret'd) 'Ali Bin-Mu'izzi Bin-Sawdan al-'Anzi 19. Hindi Bin-'Awad Bin-Dakhilallah al-Juhani 20. Yusuf Bin-'Abd-al-Sattar Qasim al-Maymani

**Members of the Provincial Council of al-Qasim:**

1. Ibrahim Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah al-Rabadi 2. Ibrahim Bin-Musa Bin-Ahmad al-Zawayd 3. Hajjaj Bin-Thwayni Bin-'Ali al-Thunayan 4. Salim Bin-Zamil Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Zamil al-Salim 5. Salih Bin-Rashid Bin-Muhammad Bin-Rashid al-Harbi 6. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Mushayqih 7. 'Abdallah Bin-Yahya Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharaydih 8. Fahd Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Fahd al-Rushudi 9. Fahd Bin-Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-'Aqili 10. Mansur Bin-'Assaf Bin-Husayn al-'Assaf 11. Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Nasir al-Ra'uji al-Fahayd 12. Dr. Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Muqbil al-Shamikh 13. Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Umayr al-'Umayr 14. Matir Bin-'Awad Bin-Muhammad al-Adilah al-Mutayri 15. Muhammad Bin-Sulayman Bin-Ibrahim al-Saykhan

**Members of the Council of the Eastern Province:**

1. Turki Bin-Shayi' Bin-Muhammad al-Hajiri 2. Husayn Bin-Rifa'i al-Shab'an al-Mutayri 3. Husayn Bin-'Ali Bin-Husayn al-'Ali 4. Eng. Khalid Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Hamad al-Zamil 5. Khalid Bin-'Ali Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Turki 6. Salim Bin-'Ali Bin-Hadi Bin-Sabih al-Murri 7. Sulayman Bin-Nasir Bin-Mazid al-Khiliyuwi 8. 'Ayid



Bin-Salim Bin-Mubarak al-'Aradi 9. 'Abd-al-Hamid Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Ali al-Mubarak 10. 'Abd-al-Hamid Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Mutawwa' 11. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Sulayman Bin-Muhammad al-'Afa'liq 12. 'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Khatir 13. 'Isa Bin-'Ali Bin-Rashid al-Dawsari 14. Muhammad Bin-Hamad Bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-Mu'jil 15. Nasir Bin-Muhammad Bin-Nasir al-'Ajami

**Members of the Provincial Council of 'Asir:**

1. Ahmad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad Bin-Mata'in 2. Eng. Husayn Bin-'Ali Bin-Zahir al-Shihri 3. Hamdi Bin-'Ali Bin-Muhammad al-Maliki 4. Salih Bin-Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Khashil 5. Eng. 'Amir Bin-Sa'id Bin-Muhammad Bin-Burqan 6. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Rashid al-Hadithi 7. 'Abdallah Bin-Sa'id Bin-'Abd-al-Wahab Abu-Milhan 8. 'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim al-Yahya 9. 'Ali Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad al-Fasili 10. Fatis Bin-Sa'id Bin-'Ali Bin-Kudsah 11. Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad al-Na'mi 12. Muhammad Bin-Husayn Bin-Misfir Abu-Sabal 13. Muhammad Bin-Rashid Bin-Jarbu' al-Jarbu' 14. Eng. Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah bin-Fayiz al-Qarni 15. Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Yusuf al-Wabil

**Members of the Provincial Council of Tabuk:**

1. Ahmad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Salim al-Gharid 2. Ibrahim Bin-Sulayman Bin-'Abdallah al-Baz'i 3. Hammad Bin-'Awdah Bin-'Id al-Juhani 4. Sulayman Bin-Isma'il Bin-Mahmud Badiyuwi 5. Saqr Bin-Mahmud Bin-Ahmad Bin-Ahmad al-Ta'iqi al-Huwayti 6. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Ali al-'Ubaydi 7. 'Abd-al-Qadir Bin-'Abd-al-Salam Bin-Muhammad al-Suhali 8. 'Abd-al-Karim Bin-Jiluwi Bin-Muhammad al-Humaydi 9. 'Abd-al-Latif Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Tilq al-Fahd al-Tilq 10. 'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Sulayman Abanami 11. 'Atallah Bin-Rashid Bin-Sulayman al-Atawi 12. 'Ali Bin-Mas'ud Bin-Mushaghghab al-Mu'ayqali al-Balawi 13. Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad al-Nasir 14. Muhammad Bin-Musa'id Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Qawfi 15. Nahar Bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-'Ali al-Rumman

**Members of the Provincial Council of Ha'il:**

1. Bandar Bin-Mamduh Bin-'Ali al-'Ali 2. Jazza' Bin-Muhammad Bin-Lazzam al-'Anzi 3. Khalid Bin-Sa'd Bin-Sa'id al-Wakid 4. Khalid Bin-'Ali Bin-'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Sayf 5. Sulayman Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Sulayman al-Fayiz 6. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Ahmad Bin-'Abdallah al-'Arfij 7. Eng. 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Uqla Bin-al-'Uqla 8. 'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-Latif al-Jum'an al-Shamari 9. 'Ulayan Bin-Rashid Bin-Sunaydi al-Harbi 10. Mubarak Bin-Furayj Bin-Salamah al-Salamah 11. Muhammad Bin-'Ali Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad al-Rajih 12. Muhammad Bin-'Ali Bin-Fahd al-Dawud 13. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd)

Muhammad Bin-'Ali Bin-Jarallah al-Jarallah 14. Mulaffi Bin-'Ayid Bin-Batil al-'Ajuni 15. Yusuf Bin-Sulayman Bin-'Abdallah al-Yahya

**Members of the Northern Borders Provincial Council:**

1. Ibrahim Bin-'Ali Bin-Ibrahim al-Turki 2. Eng. Khalid Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Abd-al-Wahab al-Wahib 3. Khalid Bin-'Aqil Bin-Muhanna Bin-Jazza' al-'Anzi 4. Salim Bin-Ghazi al-Mansur Aba al-Rus 5. Sulayman Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad al-Suwaylim 6. Salal Bin-Khashan Bin-Hamad al-Mutlaq 7. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Fahd Bin-'Abdallah al-Zammam 8. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Amin Bin-Shahhatah al-'Ali 9. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Hammad al-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Ahaydib 10. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret'd) 'Aqil Bin-Dahla Bin-Qushay'an al-'Ayyashi 11. Fahd Bin-'Ubayd Bin-Bayiq Bin-Thunayan 12. Madhud Bin-Rafi' Bin-'Uqla al-Shamari 13. Mit'ib Bin-Mu'zil Bin-Siraj al-Ruwayli 14. Hayil Bin-Mahus al-Junaydi al-Shamari 15. Yasin Bin-Muhammad Bin-Musa al-'Alawi

**Members of the Provincial Council of Jizan:**

1. Sulayman Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Sulayman al-Bishri 2. Salih Bin-Sulayman Bin-'Ali al-'Id 3. Salih Bin-'Ali 'Abdallah Zaydan 4. 'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Mufrih al-Jadibi 5. 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali Bin-Ahmad Zu'ilah 6. 'Abduh Bin-Hasan Bin-'Abduh Hakami 7. 'Ali Muhammad Bin-Ahmad Yatim Madkhali 8. 'Ali Bin-Hamad Bin-Hadi 'Arishi 9. Qasim Bin-Ahmad Bin-Muhammad Zayl'i 10. Muhammad Bin-Ahmad Bin-'Isa 'Aqili 11. Muhammad Bin-Hasan Bin-Muhammad al-Hazmi 12. Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad al-Bassam 13. Muhammad Bin-'Abduh Bin-Jabir Madkhali 14. Muhammad Bin-'Umar Bin-Muhammad Nazir 15. Brigadier General (Ret'd) Yahya Bin-Yahya Ahmad Sharif

**Members of Provincial Council of Najran:**

1. Hamad Bin-Zafir Bin-Shas Al-Mansur 2. Hamad Bin-Husayn Bin-Hamad Bin-Muslim 3. Brig. Gen. (Ret'd) Sa'd Bin-Mastur Bin-'Ali Bin-Muftah al-Shahrani 4. Sulayman Bin-Salih Bin-Hamad al-Quway'i 5. Shadid Bin-Salim Bin-Muhammad Bin-Hamdan 6. Salih Bin-'Awad Bin-Jarbu' al-Say'ari 7. 'Abdallah Bin-'Ali Bin-Bani al-Ghamidi 8. 'Ulayan Bin-'Umar Bin-'Ulayan al-'Umar 9. Fahayd Bin-Salim Bin-Husayn al-Saqur 10. Mani' Bin-Rashid Bin-Fahayd al-Yami 11. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Muhammad Bin-Ghadayan Bin-Mithqal al-'Anzi 12. Mahdi Bin-'Ali Bin-Sarar al-Ghabari 13. Naji Bin-'Amir Bin-Mubarak al-Karbi 14. Yahya Bin-'Ali Bin-Hamad al-Hakami 15. Brig. Gen. (Ret'd) Yahya Bin-Nasir Bin Mit'ib al-Yami

**Members of the Provincial Council of al-Bahah:**

1. Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ibrahim al-Mus'ad 2. Ahmad Bin-'Abdallah Bin Wanan al-Ghamidi 3. Ahmad

Bin-'Ali Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shamrani 4. Bahayan Bin-Majdu' Bin-Muhsin Al-Muhsin al-Qarni 5. Hasan Bin-Sa'id Al-Mawala al-'Umari al-Zahrani 6. Sa'd Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Mulays al-Ghamidi 7. Sa'id Bin-'Abdallah Bin-Nahban al-Zahrani 8. Major (Ret'd) Dayfallah Bin-Gharman Bin-Fadl al-Shahri 9. 'Abdallah Bin-Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah al-Shu'aybi 10. 'Abdallah Bin-Yahya Bin-'Abd-al-Rahim al-Bashiri al-Zahrani 11. 'Uthman Bin-Ahmad Bin-Sa'id Bin-Suway'id al-Ghamidi 12. 'Uthman Bin-Hamid Bin-Hasin al-Ghamidi 13. Muhammad Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Muhammad al-Sa'di al-Ghamidi 14. Muhammad Bin-'Abdallah Bin-'Uways al-Ghamidi 15. Mastur Bin-Ahmad al-Haymti al-Zahrani

#### Members of the Provincial Council of al-Jawf:

1. Ahmad Bin-Hamdan Bin-Mubarak al-Dahiyah 2. Ahmad Bin-Khalifah Bin-Muslim al-'Atallah 3. Ahmad Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ahmad Shukr 4. Uwaysit Bin-Matil Bin-Suwaydan al-Jurayd 5. Hajjaj Bin-Salih Bin-Hajjaj al-Dayis 6. Khalaf Bin-Muslim Bin-Hamdan al-Shamari 7. Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Raja' al-Muwayshiri 8. Salih Bin-'Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Raziq al-Na'man 9. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Bin-Muhammad Bin-Fahd al-Tilas 10. 'Abd-al-Karim Bin-Ibrahim Bin-Muhammad al-Muhammid 11. 'Abd-al-Karim Bin-'Id Bin-Sawdan al-Mis'ir al-'Anzi 12. 'Adib al-Bayya' al-Dubay'an al-Sharari 13. 'Uqla Bin-Hamud al-'Uqla al-Murshid 14. Brig. Gen. (Ret'd) Masir Bin-Hamir Bin-Shibli al-Bil'asi 15. Yusuf Bin-Hamud al-Hamad al-Talib

#### Exports Through King Fahd, Yanbu' Ports for 1992/93

93LH0029A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
20 Aug 93 p 16

[Article by Muhammad Jamal 'Itabi: "Total of 26 Million Tons of Exports From King Fahd Industrial Port and Yanbu' Commercial Port"]

[Text] Jeddah—The period from 1 July 1992 to 20 June 1993 experienced a major upsurge in all kinds of Saudi exports. The King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu' and the Yanbu's Commercial Port shipped the lion's share of these exports.

A source at the Saudi Public Ports Authority has told AL-HAYAH that oil products exported during the said year amounted to 21.6 million tons; petrochemicals to 427,000 tons; liquefied natural gas to 3.6 million tons; sulfur to 104,000 tons; and other goods amounted to 14,000 tons.

The source pointed out that insofar as agricultural exports are concerned, a total of 310,000 tons of Saudi wheat were exported, thus bringing total exports to 26 million tons by weight.

The source asserted that imports amounted to 505,000 weight tons of industrial materials, crude corn oil, and other goods, plus 1.6 million weight tons of foodstuffs,

such as barley; construction materials, such as cement; and industrial equipment and vehicles.

The Saudi source also said that the King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu' and the Yanbu' Commercial Port have played a significant role in the Arab Peninsula's old and modern history. The importance of Yanbu's Port emanates from the fact that it is the number two port along the Red Sea coastline. History says that it was built in 1197 so it would be the sea outlet for the luminous Medina.

This port gained in importance when it became the port receiving pilgrim ships. In 1560, another 50-yard pier was built in Yanbu' Port to unload boats. Throughout centuries and to this day, this port has served pilgrims to the Ka'bah and to the prophet's mosque. It has also played a significant role in enhancing the province's economic activity.

#### Industrial Port

The King Fahd Industrial Port was built in Yanbu' to implement a national plan to transform Yanbu' Province into a major industrial province. The plan provided for developing 188 square km into a complete industrial complex that includes the main facilities for a giant port and final terminals to load tankers with crude oil and natural gas received from the eastern and western parts of the country.

The industrial complex includes a crude oil refinery, a refinery to treat natural gas and liquefied gas, petrochemical complexes, industrial facilities for non-hydrocarbon products, and numerous light industry units. The port complex is capable of loading all tankers, even the world's biggest tankers, which have a load capacity of one-half million tons.

This port went into operation in 1973. Its development coincided with the city's development, and it has been described as the industrial city's lifeline. In the first phase of port construction, the emphasis was put on receiving plant equipment and machinery and the enormous refineries imported to build the industrial city. The construction station section was the first to be built in the Yanbu' Industrial City, and this section handled 1.75 million tons of equipment and construction materials, including the crude oil pipeline and the piping for the natural gas and liquefied gas pipeline.

With the start of production, the port played a role in exporting products through its numerous outlets and piers. It is the outlet for exports produced by one of the world's biggest petrochemical complexes, and it ranks first among Saudi industrial ports in terms of exports volume.

The port includes a general goods and containers section that consists of seven piers with a total length of 1,420 meters and a draft of 14 meters. It serves roll-on-roll-off cargo, containers, heavy cargo, and general goods. The piers are equipped with three mobile cranes, each with a

capacity of 40 tons. It also has a container storage yard with an area of 275,000 square meters.

The unpackaged goods section consists of two piers with a total length of 500 meters and a draft of 15.5 meters. They were built to receive freighters carrying unpackaged goods which have a weight capacity of up to 60,000 tons. These piers are fitted with a sulfur-loading system that consists of three tanks and a belt to load ships. This section can also handle phosphate rocks, salt, and chemical fertilizer.

The port also has a specialized section that includes four piers to handle ships with a capacity of up to 80,000 tons. The outer piers have a 16-meter draft and the inner piers an 11.5-meter draft. This section serves tankers that transport naphtha, gasoline, and aircraft fuel, distilled oils, and fuel oils for domestic sale.

The port has, moreover, the natural liquefied gas section that handles cooled oil gas and naphtha derivatives designated for export. This section consists of two piers connected to a liquefied gas plant through a 1.85-km long tunnel. They handle liquefied gas tankers with a load capacity of up to 220,000 cubic meters.

The crude oil section is the main section where crude oil is loaded into tankers on the Red Sea shore from the east-west crude oil pipeline. This section consists of four piers capable of handling tankers with a load capacity of up to one-half million tons. This section has been enlarged, thus increasing its daily production capacity from 3.2 million barrels to 4.5 million barrels.

The export refinery section includes three piers with an 18.5-meter draft to export oil derivatives. These piers can handle tankers with a capacity of up to 150,000 tons.

#### **Yanbu' Commercial Port**

In 1957, the construction of two piers was started as a first nucleus for the modern commercial port. These piers were completed in 1960. Each is 380 meters long and has a 10-meter draft. A number of warehouses and storage yards were also built. Development and enlargement followed in successive phases with the addition of seven more piers and a number of warehouses and storage yards. This phase was completed in 1975. A government complex has also been built and it houses the departments connected with the port and with pilgrimage activities. The port can accommodate ships with a 10.4-meter draft.

#### **Navigational Services**

Both ports are served by a lighthouse built at the entrance of the southern navigational canal. It is one of the world's most sophisticated and highest lighthouses and it is operated by solar energy. This lighthouse, along with the port's Navigation Control Tower, helps captains of giant freighters and tankers to sail in safe channels and

to avoid the area's coral reefs. Moreover, the navigational routes are equipped with a complete network of navigational markers, electronic transmission equipment, and radar control.

The two ports have tugboats, anchorage and pilot boats, and specialized maritime pilots to board ships outside the area of both ports and to lead them to the piers designated for them, after these pilots ascertain that the ships meet safety requirements. Pilots then lead ships out of port and into international waters when they depart.

#### **King Khalid Eye Hospital Details 10-Year History**

93WE0575B Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic  
6 Aug 93 p 2

[Article: "King Khalid Eye Hospital Celebrates 10th Anniversary"]

[Text] Riyadh—The King Khalid Specialized Eye Hospital will celebrate tomorrow the 10th anniversary of the day when King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, custodian of the two holy mosques, inaugurated it.

In the past decade, the hospital has made long strides toward establishing its name not only among the world's major eye hospitals and departments but also as a medical institution with responsibilities and a role that is expanding day after day.

Hamad al-Shammari, the [hospital's] acting general director, has said, "Since the hospital started operating, its role has not been confined to diagnosing and treating difficult eye diseases. Rather, medical research and training have occupied a major place among the hospital's interests. The hospital performs now the role of consultant to all of the kingdom's medical authorities and institutions and to numerous other circles on all matters pertaining to eye medicine and surgery.

"This responsibility and this confidence provided a strong motive for the early success that the hospital accomplished. Afterward, the efforts of the hospital officials focused on preserving and developing what had been accomplished while devoting attention to whatever pertains to eye medicine in all parts of the world. The hospital held varied scientific conferences and symposiums with the participation of internationally renowned specialists in the field of eye care. Moreover, the hospital participated actively in foreign scientific conferences and symposiums."

"In that short period, the hospital was able—thanks to God and to the directives of the custodian of the two holy mosques and his loyal crown prince, may God keep them—to expand and strengthen specialized medical care to the point that it has become a medical authority comparable to the world-renowned specialized medical centers. It is now sought by numerous patients from inside and outside the country because it performs the most complex surgeries and provides the latest forms of



treatment with excellence and with a high degree of success that matches that of the western world's most advanced eye centers and hospitals."

Al-Shammari added: "The King Khalid Specialized Eye Hospital is truly a complete medical town, which has an area of 2.5 square km. It encompasses the hospital itself and the housing complex and its annexes, including a mosque, recreation centers, parks, and varied services. The hospital has a capacity of 263 beds and 12 sophisticated operation theaters that are supplied with the latest equipment and fitted for microsurgery. To deal with the increasing number of patients, the outpatient clinic has been enlarged. The most significant expansion has been introduced to the glaucoma clinic, the retina clinic, and the sight-correction clinic. Consequently, the outpatient clinic has more than 50 rooms for patient examination now. Moreover, the hospital's blood bank, founded in 1405 of the Hegira [1984], is fitted with the latest equipment and it has kept pace with the development undergone by all of the hospital services. To obtain corneas, the eye hospital cooperates with four international banks in the United States, namely the International Tissue Bank of Baltimore, the Eye Bank of Texas, the Eye Bank of Central Florida, and the Eye Bank of Arizona. The hospital also supplies a number of the kingdom's banks with the corneas they need.

"The hospital administration, operation, and management personnel is comprised of more than 1,300 employees, including specialized physicians, nurses, technicians, administrators, maintenance engineers, and other support services."

"The hospital provides medical care, including outpatient services, in accordance with the highest standards. Moreover, it adheres to the standards established by the Joint U.S. Commission for the Licensing of Health-Care Organizations. It does this by securing qualified health professionals, including specialized eye doctors, assisting doctors, nurses, nursing auxiliaries, pharmacists, laboratory technicians, and others who supply the hospital's medical labor in shifts that cover the 24 hours of the day and the seven days of the week throughout the year."

"Since it was inaugurated on 19 Safar 1404 of the Hegira [November 1983], the hospital has seen 590,000 eye patients, has bedded more than 60,000 patients, and has performed more than 84,000 surgeries, 85 percent of which have been major and complex surgeries, with success matching the highest international standards. God has blessed many of the patients with the blessing of sight, and praise be to God. More than 1.5 million laboratory tests, more than 85,000 X-ray tests have been performed, and over 3.09 million prescriptions have been issued."

"During this period, dozens of qualified Saudi citizens joined the hospital to work and train in the fields of eye medicine, nursing, medical optic technology, and specialized administration. Consequently, this hospital has become world-class training center for Saudi cadres.

Numerous physicians, nurses, technicians, and administrators graduate from this hospital annually and work at the Ministry of Health hospitals and other health facilities."

"A most prominent training program is the ophthalmology fellowship program, which is conducted in partnership with the King Sa'ud Medical College. To date, five groups, totaling 43 Saudi male and female physicians, graduated from this program from 1409 to 1414 of the Hegira [1988-1993]."

"Currently, the program has 33 male and female physicians enrolled for the fellowship studies, which last four years. Upon completing their studies, graduates get a fellowship diploma from King Sa'ud University for Ophthalmology and Optical Surgery, which is equal professionally to the British Fellowship Diploma and to the U.S. [Medical] Board Diploma in the same specialization. Upon graduation, these physicians fulfill their commitment to work in the kingdom's various provinces so as to contribute to developing eye health care and the treatment of eye diseases in these provinces. In November 1993, eight Saudi male and female doctors will sit for the fellowship examination in ophthalmology. We expect them to pass, God willing, and to join their already graduated colleagues who work in medical facilities in various parts of the kingdom. Ten male and female physicians accepted by the program will join this program in October 1993."

"The hospital has also played a pioneer, important, and ceaseless role in the area of medical education through participation by hospital employees in international symposiums and through symposiums, which have been organized by the hospital itself and have gained domestic, regional, and international reputation. These symposiums have enabled the hospital to stay in touch with the latest developments in eye medicine, thus preserving the international standard it enjoys."

"The hospital's activity has become tangible in all domestic and international medical circles. The hospital is also making tangible efforts to disseminate health awareness and sophisticated medical services for eye patients through seminars, pamphlets, and the various read, heard, and seen means of communication; to enhance public [health] awareness among citizens and residents; and to elevate the performance standard of physicians and of all types of workers in the field of eye medicine."

"As for research to enhance knowledge and information in the area of eye medicine, the hospital conducted in the past decade numerous laboratory and bed tests, focusing on developing solutions to health problems in the area of eye diseases and eye medicine. In 1404 of the Hegira (1984), the hospital conducted the biggest and most comprehensive field survey of eye diseases in the kingdom and the Middle East. During the survey, patients were either given the necessary treatment or referred to the hospital at government expense. Disease

proliferation and the natural history of changeables subject to study were also observed and explained. This health survey produced numerous general recommendations on the treatment of eye diseases and there has been significant development in diagnosis and treatment as a result of the recommendations. Moreover, the hospital has carried out several campaigns to treat trachoma in some of the kingdom's provinces, including the Eastern Province.

"In 1411 of the Hegira (1991), the hospital conducted a field health survey in the Eastern Province to follow-up on trachoma in the province and on what has been done regarding the recommendations made by the comprehensive health survey conducted several years ago. Moreover, the hospital has conducted field studies on eye diseases in other parts of the kingdom.

"In view of the outstanding role performed by the King Khalid Specialized Eye Hospital in eye-disease control, it has been selected by the WHO as a center collaborating with the WHO program for the prevention of blindness. This is a practical proof of the good reputation, which the hospital enjoys internationally and that it gained in the initial years of its work. Moreover, the hospital has, God be thanked, successfully met the requirements of the Joint U.S. Commission for Licensing Health-Care Organizations for three successive times, each time for three years."

"To keep up pace with all new developments in medical equipment and assisting machinery, the hospital constantly acquires the latest equipment and updates the equipment it possesses in order to utilize sophisticated technology in this field to provide advanced curative services in the area of eye disease."

"In 1412 of the Hegira [1991], the hospital announced a new method for dissecting eye tissue through the use of microwave ovens. This method was the result of research that lasted two years at the dissection section of the hospital laboratory. The objective of the method is to speed up the processes of determining diseases in eye tissues, keeping in mind that in the old conventional method a period of 96-120 hours was required before tumors or other diseases could be diagnosed by laboratory tests, depending on the size of the tissue and the interaction of certain chemicals, called stabilizing elements. But with the use of microwave ovens, tissue is completely preserved within a maximum time of three minutes, and this is for the most complex cases. Moreover, the tissue is fully examined within 24 hours and then the laboratory report is issued. It is worth noting that this method of diagnosis had never before been used in the field of medicine anywhere else in the world."

"To provide the best services to the hospital employees, the mosque attached to the housing complex has been doubled in size and a special place of prayer has been built for women. Telephone services have also been developed. Work has been going on for the past 10 years

to renew and modernize the hospital and the housing complex so as to preserve their standard and their polished appearance."

"Moreover, improvements have been made on the parking facilities. Trees and plants with a more aesthetic appearance have been planted in the green spaces within the hospital complex. A children's playroom supplied with toys has been built near the main hospital entrance."

"The accomplishments the King Khalid Specialized Eye Hospital has made and the international reputation it has gained within one decade couldn't have been achieved if it weren't for success granted by God and for the constant support and special care given by the custodian of the two noble mosques and by his loyal crown prince, may God keep them both. This hospital has thus become one of numerous monuments that attest to the development and progress of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

## SYRIA

### Slovakia Abrogates Arms Deal

93AE0573Z London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
5 Sep 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by the Military Editor]

[Text] London—Slovakia recently decided to abrogate an important arms deal to supply Syria with T-72 main battle tanks. The tanks were originally Soviet but were produced by Slovak factories under a license that dates back to the days of the former Soviet Union. Jan Ilgo, a plant manager at ZTS-Martin, the biggest arms factory in Slovakia, revealed that the deal with Syria was abrogated last July. He said that the decision came from the Slovak side and took immediate effect.

Ilgo declined to give any reasons for the abrogation of the deal with Damascus, but he stressed that the "abrogation was not due to any "financial or legal breach of the contract provisions by Syria." The Syrians, he added, have met all their obligations and regularly paid the money they owed.

The Slovak official also declined to disclose any details regarding the number of tanks provided for in the deal and whether any had been delivered to the Syrian army before Slovakia decided to abrogate the deal. But Western defense sources point out that originally Syria wanted to obtain 300 T-72 tanks from Slovakia, the figure which most likely was supposed to be involved in the deal between the two sides had it been implemented.

It is recalled that the question of Syria obtaining tanks from Slovakia has been surrounded by ambiguity and conflicting information since it surfaced in the early nineties. It is not quite clear so far whether the deal the Slovak side is talking about its abrogation the Slovak side is talking about and which Damascus is supposed to

have concluded in 1991 with the then Czechoslovak Federal Republic. For in May of that year the Czechoslovak Government announced its intention then to supply Syria with 300 T-72 tanks in a deal estimated at \$400 million. But strong American pressures were then put on Prague which led to halting the deal. Following the general elections that were held in Czechoslovakia in 1992, in which Vladimir Meciar won the seat as head of the Slovak Government, and the subsequent agreement between the Slovak and the Czech sides to separate, the Slovak side often stressed that the government intended to step up its efforts in arms sales and exports, particularly since the official separation between the two republics early this year. This is due to the fact that the Slovak industrial base to a large extent depends on arms production in former Czechoslovakia, since most of the military industry factories are located on its territory. Consequently this has led to the revival of the opportunity to conclude the supposed tank deal with Damascus. On the other hand, it is likely that this may be a new deal and that negotiations will be conducted between Bratislava and Damascus this year, particularly since several sources, during the past two years, have been talking about the former Czechoslovak Government having actually delivered T-72 tanks to Syria ordered under a previous deal. Ships carrying these tanks were on several occasions intercepted and stopped in German, Danish, and Dutch ports before they were allowed to continue their trip to Syrian ports.

The T-72 tanks are currently the most important and the most modern in the Syrian armored forces. They have about 1,500 different types, some called T-74 and others the improved T-72, to indicate improvements made to the original Soviet model, the production of which goes back to the seventies. As for the rest of the Syrian armored forces, which at present include more than 4,600 tanks, there are 1,200 T-62 and about 2,000 of the older T-54/55. It is the latter that the Syrian army wishes to replace gradually with T-72 tanks within a plan aimed at modernizing its armored units.

Slovak sources are trying to bestow a "non-political" character on the decision to abrogate the deal with Syria. Therefore, they talk about "financial and production considerations due to the difficulties Slovak factories are facing in their relations with the Czech companies to which they were linked in the production process in the past, which led to the Czech companies' failing to meet their obligations and continue producing the tanks that were ordered. However, Western defense sources rule out such an interpretation. On the other hand, these sources agree that the abrogation decision "was the result of political pressures put on Slovakia by the United States and other Western countries aimed at forcing it not to go ahead with supplying Syria with the tanks it wishes to obtain." Apparently this is part of a "comprehensive U.S. and Western policy aimed at restricting as much as possible the armament drive by certain Middle Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Iran."

The Western defense sources do not at present preclude the possibility of the Czech Government's following the example of its Slovak counterpart and abrogating a deal Prague was intending to conclude with Iran provide it with long-range radar surveillance and warning system of the "Tamara" type. Reports of Tehran's interest in obtaining these systems and Prague's approval have created a major uproar in the United States, particularly since the Czech side describes the system as "the world's most up-to-date type," and that it is capable of detecting the U.S. Stealth plane which ordinary radars cannot detect and track. The same sources say that for some time "Washington has been putting strong pressure on Prague in order to prevent it from going ahead with supplying Iran with these systems. This is an indication that the Czech Government will most likely succumb to these pressures and cancel the deal it signed with the Iranian Government."

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Muhammad on YSP Leaders, Relations, Cooperation

93LH0027A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
23 Aug 93 p 8

[Interview with Salim Salih Muhammad, presidential council member and assistant general secretary of YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party], by 'Abdallah Hammudah in Sanaa; date not given: "I Call on Salih, al-Bid, al-Ahmar To Resign From Their Parties; Presidential Council Experiment Unsuccessful; President, Vice President Should Be Elected"—first four paragraphs are AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction]

[Text] The wind was unusually calm for a summer day in Sanaa, and the temperature rose, affecting the city's residents in their homes unequipped for such a hot climate. There was a stifling atmosphere, appropriate perhaps for the long state of waiting and expectation that, having crossed the borders of political events to reach various other fields, has become one of the most important features of life in Yemen.

Sanaa's weather that day was more like Aden's. That was the day when I met Salim Salih Muhammad, a member of the Presidential Council and assistant general secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), in his un-air-conditioned home near al-'Arud Square. The difference between conditions in this home and those in his air-conditioned home in Aden was clear. It seemed as if this southerner had brought Aden's weather to Sanaa and had taken some of Sanaa's weather to Aden—at least in his home.

The circumstances were full of changes in the area of public life after the election of the new House of Representatives and the debate over proposed constitutional changes and other Yemeni issues. There were also changes in the personal area for Salim Salih himself, since the changes in the top government leadership will



leave their effect on his seat on the Presidential Council. Nevertheless, he was happy about the arrival of his first grandson, Salim, a gift from his son Badr, and the return of his son Salah, who has finished his studies abroad and married. He expressed his wish for a recuperation period to serve as "a fighter's furlough."

Taking place amid these public and private circumstances, this interview with a member of Yemen's Presidential Council, one of the main players on the scene, dealt with political conditions, differences within the ranks of the YSP, and even predictions about his possible political future.

[Hammudah] People noticed that you did not participate in the recent round of Central Committee meetings. Some interpreted this as support for the hardliners' position on unification of the YSP and the General People's Conference. However, that conflicts with your attendance at the meeting to sign the document of "coalition and coordination (between the two parties) with a view toward unification." How can one reconcile the two positions or measure the correctness or incorrectness of each?

[Muhammad] A new phenomenon, that of democracy, has entered our lives. Its entry has not been limited to the political system or Yemeni society, but has reached from the parties to the family, and every individual has come to understand it differently.

For us in the YSP, there was an old mechanism and system of ideas on which relations among us as colleagues and comrades were based, as well as our relations with others. Because we were a party in power, this mechanism took the form of discussions in conventions, sessions of the Central Committee, and meetings of the Political Bureau. The new thing in our lives is that this system is no longer what governs our activity or our relations.

[Hammudah] Are you referring to the mechanism of "democratic centralism?"

[Muhammad] Yes, this is the mechanism that existed. Now, however, we are discussing the issue of implementing democracy, but the full system to govern our activity and relations—and thus to define our powers, from the general secretary and assistant general secretary, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and all party organizations down to the grass roots—does not exist.

For the last three years, the party has been discussing the new mechanism for an internal democratic system. We are now presenting our ideas. Our new relations are subject to this kind of effort, which must have a clear line in our daily practices.

The issue of my not attending the Central Committee session is related to this. We are trying as much as possible to support each other in respecting what we are trying to propose.

#### Avoiding Confrontation

[Hammudah] Does this mean that you did not attend in order to help the Central Committee?

[Muhammad] Yes, it was to help it and other brothers. If you link this matter with the matter of the position on unification, my opinion on unification is clear. It is that I am for unification based on principles—meaning that we should provide all the factors that will guarantee the success of the process. Therefore I was eager to attend the signing session with the general secretary, so that we could lead to the creation of healthy conditions regarding the welfare of the country and major issues, even at the expense of the cause of the party or the group or other particular arrangements.

As for the recent round of Central Committee meetings, I was head of the team charged with preparing for the session. We brought up all the subjects. I sent the general secretary a letter about the need to hold a meeting of the Political Bureau quickly, so as to avoid past conditions and allow matters to move normally.

But since matters went this way, I avoided getting into meaningless wrangling that could complicate matters. We are eager to support the existing coalition (between the YSP, the General People's Congress, and the Grouping for Reform) and for it to propose its ideas without any partisanship, hegemony, or imposition of the main positions of individuals through the use of the old way of influencing the nature of the decision.

[Hammudah] Does that mean that your nonattendance at the Central Committee meetings was aimed at avoiding any disagreements on issues and at letting them pass on for completion at a later date—if, as you think, full agreement is impossible at present?

[Muhammad] The Central Committee discussed a large group of issues, not one issue: evaluating the elections and their results, and the manner in which the party should participate in the country's affairs—whether through its representatives who participate in the government, its parliamentary group, or relations in the framework of the ruling coalition.

We also wanted to reward those who had worked well and to say of those who had erred and offended that they had done so. This was done carefully and quickly. The treatments did not take place in the way we hoped they would. We hope this will happen when the party secretaries in the governorates are appointed, so as to shape a new relationship between the party and its masses, and between the party, mass organizations, and the political parties—especially the General People's Congress and the Grouping for Reform—because there are mutual working relations that aim at emerging from the current political and economic predicament. This is a mature and responsible feeling and position.

### New Circumstances

[Hammudah] Is the position related to the party's rebuilding itself in light of the new circumstances?

[Muhammad] This is another issue, and we must deal with it in the general convention. The party views its internal situation, how to adapt to the new circumstances, and the change from a ruling, class-based party to a mass party that relies on the ballot box to come to power after Yemeni unification—it views these things on the basis of the democratic option as a method of political practice and of how such a party can contribute and play its role in political life.

We respect any view on this subject, but we are expressing the viewpoint that will bring about a shift and that directs attention to the position of the party's leadership structure, the relation between the party and its representatives in the parliamentary bloc, their conditions, and the issue of the internal system and the program.

We hoped that the party would approve this on the authority of the Central Committee by the time the fourth general convention is held. But the discussions of the Political Bureau and the session of the Central Committee having arrived at this conclusion, I respect the opinion of the majority, and we hope it will be carried out—God willing!

[Hammudah] Do you think it would be better to discuss these issues in the party's general convention, or to present them as a proposal to the convention for it to amend and revise, but not for it to start from scratch?

[Muhammad] I favor the view that holds that the Central Committee and the Political Committee are bodies capable of presenting sound proposals to the general convention. Any convention that begins without much extensive preparation will make decisions that may be hasty and defective for various reasons connected with the nature of the work of conventions.

I therefore favor the view that gives these bodies the right to present draft resolutions after thorough study in the framework of the organization, with the participation of the grass roots, cadres, and leaders, so that we can become acquainted with the nature of the thinking of all the members and all the organizations and the forms of activity in them. Our experience shows a difference between the experience of the party organization in Aden and the experience of the organization in Ma'rib or in al-Jawf or al-Bayda', or between the party organization in Ta'izz and the organization in al-Hudaydah. Also, some districts have special characteristics. Now that unification has come, we must respect these conditions and think seriously about them, if we want this party to endure and continue its historic role.

[Hammudah] Now that the Secretariat as currently constituted has been formed, headed by Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man, do you think its role in preparing for the

holding of the party convention could fill in some of the deficiencies that have drawn criticism, especially regarding the Political Bureau?

[Muhammad] First, the choice of Dr. Yasin to head the Secretariat should be considered natural. He is free from official duties (he was speaker of the House of Representatives in the transition period) and is a figure who can play a role in helping the party deal with many of the deficiencies that came to the surface during the past period. However, the Secretariat has clear duties and powers. It can play a definite role in periods when the Political Bureau is not in session. Also, the position and role of the general secretary and the assistant general secretary still exist. We think that the Secretariat is not the body charged with preparing for the convention. A preparation committee will be formed. One was formed in the past and drew up many documents. It could be formed again by decision of the Political Bureau.

### Wide-ranging Discussions

[Hammudah] If the issues you have discussed are to be raised before the convention, it is important that the associated documents be prepared for presentation. Will this be the job of the preparation committee?

[Muhammad] In the past, the preparation committee drew up the draft internal ordinance. The issue took up a large amount of public discussion through the information media and party press and through our internal and external contacts with all personalities and parties, as well as in the context of the party. There are volumes. I can say that the program is ready.

[Hammudah] But it has not been approved in the Central Committee.

[Muhammad] It is ready to be approved in the convention, along with other documents. There remains the draft of the political report—a document that needs to be completed during this period—and then the convention can start.

[Hammudah] Responding to what has been said about your opposition to the unification of the YSP and the People's Convention, you said that you want unification to take place on a sound basis. However, you are also said to have opposed the unification of the two halves of Yemen. Was your position on unification to support it, but after providing for certain elements and arrangements? There was rapid movement toward unification, which led to drawbacks during the transition period. Do you now support the achievement of unity, despite these negatives?

[Muhammad] The achievement of Yemeni unity was a great and magnificent thing by all measures. This is the first time that I am hearing that I was opposed to unification. I was chairman of the political organization committee, and this committee played a large role in bringing together points of view. This does not mean that there weren't observations or views whose consequences

became evident in the transition period and whose other consequences may become evident in the future.

Any such action needs to be studied and restudied. All the consequences need to be examined. No individual can make such a decision by himself; the others must participate. As you see, "nations have grown up." They now have significant opinions. The information media clearly discusses all subjects and raises many observations about them—including the issue of strict centralization and local government. Some people even raise the issue of confederation, rather than unification. However, the goal has been realized—thank God! Our concern is to preserve this great goal in our lives.

This does not mean that this question should become confused with the question of unifying the two parties. I think they are two completely different questions. Unification is a great national goal; the question of unification between the two parties is an internal question that concerns each organization separately and all its members. It is not a great question like the question of unifying the country, where there were two different political systems. On the question of unifying the two parties, I have explained my view that we should learn and that we should not hurry or make a decision because of our being in power. You know about Egypt's experience in this regard and other experiences on the part of Sudan and Libya. But there is an experience that we embarked on as individuals, and we have paid the price for it. We regard this from the position of concern that any action needs study. All the subjective and objective foundations and factors must be provided.

#### **Danger of Totalitarianism**

[Hammudah] Some see the process of building the party structure as directed toward the party's preserving its own identity. Some members of the People's Conference say that it will rebuild itself from the base up, as its current structure was built from the top down. If the two structures in the two organizations are in fact built from the base up, will it facilitate the unification process in the future, or will it perpetuate their remaining separate entities?

[Muhammad] I have another view. I am among those who support the view that President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, General Secretary 'Ali Salim al-Bid, Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin Husayn al-Ahmar, and some other figures should leave or withdraw from their parties and form a national appeal body, leaving the parties their right to act.

Some may have opposed this idea, thinking it impractical, aimed at evading certain issues. In the circumstances of a country like Yemen, however, I think that if these figures who achieved unification and democracy and have a long nationalist history replete with sacrifice and heroism remain, it will enrich politics in a way that is healthy and natural, without any arbitrary imposition of anyone's will, neither creating obstacles for politics, nor making politics subordinate to the government. In such circumstances, the parties will assume their natural

form, extent, and role without having to rely on the government or operating on the basis that this party or this leader is in the government. At the same time, the situation will be very natural. We shall have laid a sound cornerstone for the organizational structure of any party.

Some say that the General People's Congress is the organization of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, and that this is despotism, because there are colleagues competing with him and real movement. The matter is not subject to the president's wish or role. While it is true that he has a large historic role and it was he who built up the Congress, the Congress now exists as an established organization. We cannot ignore that fact.

Or there are those who say that the YSP consists of certain coalitions or something of that kind. My view is if this takes place—and it is in process of happening in the context of the constitutional changes—it will lead to a kind of normal situation and coexistence in political life, with every party testing itself and its abilities.

[Hammudah] If the parties are rebuilding themselves, why do they need to merge? They could enter a coalition to form a government—as is now taking place—and they could differ on some issues. In other words, they could form a coalition while differing on some issues according to the requirements of the national interest.

[Muhammad] If there are no differences between party programs—for example, between those of the People's Congress and the YSP—and there is a desire for unification on the part of the two parties for the sake of the public interest, this is also something natural.

[Hammudah] This is also possible...

[Muhammad] (Interrupting) But I am not enthusiastic about it, because it would be considered a kind of imposition of a view; however, it is a matter that can be discussed.

[Hammudah] The point is that there is fear that merger of the two parties will lead to the formation of a big party that will bring the totalitarian regime back to Yemen again.

[Muhammad] That is one of the fears that the others are raising. There is also fear about how democracy will be handled in the context of the one party or in society. We have to dispel these fears by replying to some of the questions that have been raised in this regard. This is not something forbidden. We can debate with each other and talk about the circumstances that developed after the elections and the new experience in our lives—such as the coalition between three parties that were completely incompatible, but then came to agree. This is something new in Yemen. We must look at it with respect and watch over it. We must study its characteristics: How was it born? What factors have brought it to this situation? I look at the matter on the basis of respect for all points of view, without arbitrariness, partisanship, or imposing one view as the correct view.



**Leadership Posts**

[Hammudah] Before we leave the point of party building—some have interpreted Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man's assumption of leadership of the Secretariat as a step toward his assuming other top party posts. Is this talk true?

[Muhammad] I hope from all my heart that every colleague or brother will take his natural place and participate in bearing responsibility either in the context of the party, the party-to-be, or in the government in accordance with the principles on which we have agreed—party democracy, and democracy in the community. We have to train ourselves to accept such a situation.

Dr. Yasin is a dear colleague and brother. I personally am one of those who nominated him for this position, and I will also nominate him for a future position.

[Hammudah] Regarding issues to be raised at the party's fourth convention scheduled for this October or November, what is the position on creating a new office such as party chairman, in addition to the offices of general secretary, assistant general secretary, and head of the Secretariat? Is this the formula on the table?

[Muhammad] As we see it, three options have been raised regarding the new structure, such as a party chairmanship and an office of general secretary. We are also proposing two forms for the Central Committee. One is the original Central Committee; the other is an advisory Central Committee. There are several ways of envisioning the new internal system. The whole goal is to define a new mechanism that suits the new reality, because the party has expanded and is also participating in the government. We don't know where we will be in the future; we might be in the opposition. So we must create the mechanism that suits the new reality. Furthermore, we must dispel the idea that has been raised, that there is a number-one man or a number-two man. Such a thing does not exist among us; rather, there are organs, and these organs make their decisions by majority vote. Whatever an individual's view and position, he must accept the view of the majority, though he keeps his right to defend his own point of view. These bodies are operating and have their role.

**Party and State**

[Hammudah] There is a very important point: when a party participates in the government, some of its leaders fill very important offices in the state. Some say that party decisions fetter their role in the area of state government. They assert that the YSP is suffering from this problem. What is your opinion?

[Muhammad] Of course we have suffered a great deal because of it. However, after the results of the elections, I can say that the party is what brought us to share in state power and that we have to respect the view of our party and its organs. We must make efforts so that there

is agreement between the party organs and the party leaders who fill government offices.

[Hammudah] But this could fetter the movement of the prime minister or some other government minister, or even the vice president or a member of the Presidential Council.

[Muhammad] In my view, the leadership ability of a prime minister, deputy prime minister, Presidential Council member, minister, or any person who fills a government office is embodied in his ability to bring up the issues that face him and make the party a helping factor in dealing with them. However, sometimes a person in power feels that he is a big shot—as they say, "Where there is no wisdom, authority corrupts." The person abandons his base and acts by himself. Now that elections have become the rule, we need these people. We have to maintain our relations with them, and these relations must be clear and explicit, because in the end elections are what will decide the fate of this party (the YSP).

[Hammudah] Could one say that the elections in one way or another solved the political problem in Yemen either at the leadership level or at the level of party decisions?

[Muhammad] I think this subject—as elections—took place—thank God—and you followed them—better that had been expected in comparison with conditions existing in Yemen. I personally did not expect them to take place in this way. The people accepted them as a great operation and responded magnificently—the parties, too. I praise them, regardless of differences, considerations, or other paths. The matter now depends on maintaining this excellent and critical outlook so as to bring about all the desired conditions.

We make a mistake if we think that elections are an end in themselves. They are only a means to achieve the ends we want. This depends on cooperation between parties and on our not falling victim again to what we used to call "division between two"; for the ruling coalition includes three parties. The old wrangling would return on that basis, and we should fall into the old trap. This depends on the leadership role, whether in the policy of the parties, or in the political leadership and the top posts of the government.

**Realistic View**

[Hammudah] What has been proposed regarding the head of state includes abolishing the Presidential Council and creating an office of president and one of vice president. What is your personal opinion regarding your possibly filling another post? Following the withdrawal of the view favoring creation of a Consultative Council, there were predictions that nominated you for the presidency. Will you be content with your party office, or are there possibilities that you will fill another position at the party or the political level?

[Muhammad] My personal inclination is to recognize reality. The Presidential Council in this form in a country like Yemen was an experiment we transferred from others. We wanted to create rapprochement between the two halves of the country through it. Practically, however, there is a president who holds the reins of the government, and a vice president. That is what prevails now. Whenever a crisis or upheaval occurs, we usually begin with a group, on the basis that its members represent [various] intellectual or political directions, and after a time we reach the same result. So we have to be realistic and turn our attention to building a state. My inclination is that the president should be a president, and the vice president a vice president. We are in process of discussing these issues. There are [various] points of view about them, and we must participate in bringing this about. Everyone will bear responsibilities for these things within the limits of the regulations proposed for the time period and the position of each party on the proposed changes.

As for my position, I really long for nothing but for conditions to remain normal and for there to be security and stability. You have noted the tour I made with the president. Our Yemen has many regions. Although I am a native Yemeni, I have heard about some places in the country that I have not visited because the roads are difficult—beautiful places nonetheless—and I have visited areas in Europe and other countries—and they are green and beautiful. It is true that Yemen needs services to be provided, roads to be extended, and attention to some tourist areas in order to become a promising country; and this requires stability and security, so that people can live their lives as citizens and travel about without intimidation or fear.

[Hammudah] What are the implications of this for your personal position?

[Muhammad] On the personal side, I don't intend to bring up anything regarding what my situation will be, but rather what the situation of my country will be. The main issues are the most important thing. Offices become peripheral matters when the national situation is exposed to dangers. We have a proverb that goes, "When he is born, we shall name him." So let's wait and see what the new structure brings. I won't anticipate what the developments will bring.

[Hammudah] Am I to understand from this that your personal position is that you welcome the process of development toward stability of the state system and that you are not interested in having a role in the government during the coming period?

[Muhammad] I am not thinking about it. Any thinking by any person to the effect that the development of the state should be conditioned on the role in which he himself will be is wrong thinking.

Our history, as you know, is that we came as young students and joined the national movement. It taught us: it was our real school, and we set out on this basis. We

fought British imperialism. After it was gone, things developed. One didn't expect to be a minister or to fill any position. I think that if a person reaches such a state, he cannot bear responsibility for any great action; for a person sometimes must sacrifice for the sake of a great action.

[Hammudah] Does this mean that you will concentrate on party activity in the coming period?

[Muhammad] That is not at issue now after the elections. One needs a recuperation period, or, as they call it in military terminology, a soldier's furlough, to order one's circumstances in a way that accords with the requirements of the coming period.

#### Failure of Coordination

[Hammudah] Some parties, such as the Party of Truth, the Nasirist organizations, and other parties, have felt that the YSP let them down during the elections because of lack of an understanding with them about coordination in the districts and by not paying attention to their situation in the formation of the government. Does this feeling have a justification, and why?

[Muhammad] In the context of evaluating the elections, the Central Committee at its latest session went into a discussion of the relation between us and some of the parties, as well as the relation during the election period. Of course, as they say, "Each party rejoices in what is theirs." We have made long and exhausting efforts in dialogue with our Nasirist brothers.

We desired coordination, but unfortunately it did not occur. Time and the figures will prove that failure to do so led to our losing many districts, because our Nasirist brothers would not accept these arrangements. Let's leave it to time, for they lost and we lost. The situation with the Party of Truth is different. There was coordination, but their presence in some governorates is qualitative or formal, not a mass presence. I do not know whence the viewpoint arose that holds the YSP responsible for that; for we did our duty and undertook our large role in relation to the other parties.

#### Limits of Constitutional Changes

[Hammudah] Let us return to the subject of constitutional changes. The reason for the lengthy discussion of them is said to derive from the fact that jurists presented them without raising them for discussion before the political parties and organizations.

[Muhammad] The proposal for constitutional changes has been on the table for a long time—before the election platforms. The party discussed them in a committee that included Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man and Engineer Haydar al-'Attas from the party, and, from the People's Convention, 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani (the assistant general secretary) and Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Aryani.

The present constitution does not fully carry out what we seek. However, if the changes reach half of the constitution, we will say: "We are for the current constitution. Let the current constitution remain, because in the end it is not subject to the desire of this party or that; rather, it is a social contract for all groups of the society." We struggled a great deal for it and made sacrifices. Praise be to God that we arrived at it by popular plebiscite. The reforms include very essential questions on which everyone agrees. If they are expanded, and every party puts everything it has on the table and tries to realize its political platform through the constitution—we reject that.

#### Cooperation Relations

[Hammudah] Would you like to add anything else?

[Muhammad] Regarding the internal situation, we must not be overly dazzled by everything that has been achieved and imagine it to be the end of the process. It is

just the beginning on a new road, and this road requires great efforts, especially on the economic question and just distribution.

When we raise the issue of local government, we want to end this extreme centralization in our lives, which was and still is for some as if it were the thinking of Imam Yahya. We hope we succeed, but the internal question is related to the economic situation, which weighs heavily on us. I think that it—the economic situation—will never improve until we create new relations with our Arab brothers. I personally call for the establishment of a new system. I have dealt with it in a number of articles, and your newspaper has dealt with it in one way or another. It could arise on the debris of the previous system. Yemen should acknowledge its brothers and their experiences and work with them. Our brothers also must respect what exists in Yemen.

At the same time, relations must be normalized. For whatever happens, the Yemeni people cannot live alone—just as any other people cannot live alone. We hope steps will be taken along this road because of the benefit it will bring to the nation.



## BANGLADESH

### U.S. Losing Support for Action Against Iraq

BK0208092393 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali  
28 Jul 93 p 2

[Editorial: "Missile Attack on Iraq"]

[Text] U.S. fighters launched an attack on an Iraqi missile base last Friday. Earlier, the United States had blamed Iraq for firing missiles on two of its planes flying over the no fly zone. But Iraq has refuted the allegation, terming it fabricated. On an earlier occasion, several Iraqi civilians including an eminent singer were killed in a U.S. missile attack on Baghdad following American allegations that Iraq had plotted to assassinate former President George Bush. President Clinton has expressed regrets for this loss of civilian lives. However, the logic behind this attack has been questioned not only in the East but also in the West. During the Gulf War, the entire world rallied round President Bush in his stand against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; but now international support for the recent U.S. actions against Iraq is gradually diminishing because of various reasons.

Meanwhile, the United Nations has imposed sanctions against Iraq for the stubbornness of its leadership following the Gulf War. A recent survey conducted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization has shown that severe famine exists in Iraq. Up to last March, over 250,000 people have died of famine and malnutrition. Among the dead, 83,000 were children below the age of five. Though the UN has eased sanctions on oil exports from Iraq somewhat, the country is still not in a position to buy essential food and medicines. Everyone admits that the common people of Iraq, particularly the children, are not responsible for the stubbornness of their leadership. Despite the end of the Gulf war a long time back, innocent civilians are still suffering due to the effects of the war. The backbone of Iraq has been broken due to the Gulf war. Observers are of the opinion that the country is not in a position to launch a war again. For this reason, recent reports regarding efforts being made to locate Iraq's hidden nuclear and chemical weapons are not understandable to many.

Observers are of the opinion that the effects of continuing to pressure Iraq will be counterproductive. In this connection, many cite the instance of the Treaty of Versailles signed after the First World War. Historians are of the opinion that owing to the undue pressure exerted on the defeated forces, the dishonored Germans found an excuse to start the Second World War. For this reason, many people believe that if a good attitude is shown toward Iraq, it would help in changing the aggressive mentality of its leaders and create an atmosphere for the introduction of a democratic process. It would also be in the interests of Baghdad to accept the decision of the UN commission on its boundary dispute with Kuwait. This, perhaps, is the only way for the establishment of permanent peace and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf region.

### Tight Security Enforced as Opposition Strike Grips Dhaka

BK1508050993 Hong Kong AFP in English  
0410 GMT 15 Aug 93

[Text] Dhaka, Aug 15 (AFP)—Paramilitary and police were out in force Sunday in the Bangladesh capital of Dhaka amid fears of violence during an opposition called nationwide six-hour general strike.

Hundreds of paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles, riot police and Ansar militias were posted across the city and many patrolled in trucks and buses, but there were no immediate reports of violence.

The main opposition Awami League (AL) of Sheikh Hasina Wajed called for the stoppage to press their four-point demand, including declaring August 15 a national day of mourning to mark the death of her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Rahman and most of his family were killed in a bloody military coup in 1975.

The AL is also demanding the trial of those responsible for the killings by repealing the Indemnity Ordinance which protects them from being taken to court. Two of the coup leaders now head factions of the right-wing Freedom Party and two are diplomats.

Rahman led Bangladesh to its independence from Pakistan in 1971.

Meanwhile, the government banned demonstrations and carrying of weapons or explosives in parts of Dhaka where AL-backed groups and rivals had called for rallies Sunday fearing a the law and order situation.

"Any attempt to to disrupt law and order at any place of the city will be dealt with severely," the authorities warned.

Security forces guarded the central Suhrawardy Park and the Dainik Bangla crossing in downtown Dhaka, where rivals also called rallies.

"We have taken stringent measures," a police officer posted near the volatile Dhaka University campus told AFP.

Small groups of AL activists marched in several parts of the city, witnesses said.

Shops and private offices, banks and schools were shut Sunday, a normal working day in Moslem Bangladesh, while newspapers reported many government officials stayed overnight in their offices.

A large number of commuters walked to work and, with the exception of pedicabs, Dhaka streets were absent of transport.

Two state-owned Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation buses, with few passengers, moved through Dhaka streets under police escorts.

Residents in southeastern Chittagong port city and in southern Khulna district said by telephone the strike was also enforced there from 0600 (0001 GMT).

Wajed called in a statement on Bangladeshis to convert the mourning into a "source of strength for establishing democracy as well as for carrying the fruits of independence to the toiling masses."

Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, whose family is reportedly celebrating her 49th birthday on Sunday, told the outgoing British High Commissioner Sir Colin Imray during a meeting Saturday that a section of the opposition by calling frequent strikes were creating hindering her efforts to establish democracy on a strong footing. [sentence as received]

#### **Amnesty International Questions Arrest, Detention Policies**

*BK0208070593 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali 28 Jul 93 p 1*

[Article by Shahjahan Sardar]

[Text] Amnesty International has expressed concern over the increase in the number of prisoners arrested under the Special Powers Act [promulgated in 1974, which gives sweeping powers to the government to arrest and detain people without trial for a minimum period of 120 days on a charge of opposing state interests]. Most of these people have been arrested on political grounds. In letters sent to the government and political leaders, Amnesty International has described it as a violation of human rights. The Bangladesh High Court has declared many such detentions to be illegal.

Amnesty International has also voiced its concern over the torture of such prisoners by law enforcement agencies prior to trial. In this regard, it has reminded the government of the relevant provisions of international law. It has also emphasized the need for educating the law enforcement agencies and pointed out that unnecessary baton use is also a violation of the law. The organization has said that to ensure human rights, all prisoners should be provided with adequate medical facilities.

It has asked the government to strictly ensure that legal grounds exist for every detention. Amnesty International has also asked the government to review the cases of all prisoners detained under the Special Powers Act and unconditionally release those who are not facing criminal charges. Speedy trials should be arranged for those facing specific allegations. The Bangladesh Government has been informed that in accordance with the provisions of international law, a person under arrest must be informed within 15 days from the date of his arrest of the specific charge against him. Amnesty International has also asked the government to curb misuse of the Special Powers Act.

#### **Minister Reveals Earnings Through Worker Remittances**

*BK1208031293 Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network in English 0130 GMT 12 Aug 93*

[Text] Bangladesh earned 2,685 crore taka as remittances from wage earners during the last fiscal year. An estimated 237,779 Bangladeshi workers went abroad with permission from the government during the same period. This information was given at the meeting of the parliamentary standing committee on the Ministry of Labor and Manpower yesterday. Labor and Manpower Minister Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan presided over the meeting. The number of Bangladeshi workers who went abroad with jobs during the last fiscal year was 28 percent higher than that of the 1991-92 fiscal year. The volume of foreign exchange earned by them during the period under review was 10 percent higher than that of the previous year.

#### **Columnist Reviews Problems Facing Private Sector**

*BK1008154993 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali 4 Aug 93 p 2*

[From the "Chaturanga" column by Shureed]

[Text] Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, while presenting the budget for the current fiscal year in the parliament last June, said that the economic reform measures of the government aim to introduce a market economy. It is to be seen how far it will be possible to salvage the economy, which has been ruined by remaining under the control of the public sector for the last 22 years. The domestic industries need facilities, tariff exemptions, and patronage of the government and financial institutions for to compete with the products of foreign countries.

The daily SANGBAD recently reported that even though there is domestic production of fluorescent lamps, those made in India have captured the local market. These lamps of Indian origin are inferior in quality but cheaper than those manufactured in Bangladesh. Since the pre-independence period, a public sector enterprise named Eastern Tubes has been producing fluorescent lighting. In 1987 the private sector firms Taj Tubes and Bright Tubes also went into production. These companies, equipped with modern machinery and technology, are producing quality lamps. Though the annual demand for this item in Bangladesh is a little over seven million, each of these companies is not allowed to produce more than one million units.

Recently the ban on importing fluorescent lamps was lifted by the government. At present, the lamps produced locally are unable to compete with the imported ones. The lamps produced by the private sector are superior in quality to those imported or smuggled from India. The cost of imported fluorescent lamps, however, is cheaper as the government has not imposed any duty on it. On

the other hand, the local companies producing this item have to pay import taxes on the raw materials. They also have to pay the value added tax, hence their production costs rise. The mere introduction of a market economy is not sufficient to boost the economy. Government should give protection to locally manufactured goods.

There is no doubt that the market economy is the best system, but the government should give adequate facilities and patronage to the domestic industries, particularly those in the private sector. The local entrepreneurs feel discouraged due to mismanagement in the banking sector. Besides, they have to face hurdles at every step owing to bureaucratic controls. This is the main impediment to the growth of private sector industries in the country. It may be mentioned that almost 80 percent of the economic activity in the country is under bureaucratic control.

Even developed countries adopt protectionist policies. Countries like Canada, the United States, and Italy have imposed quotas on the importation of readymade garments from Bangladesh. There is nothing wrong with a free market economy, but the government must provide the necessary incentives to make the domestic products competitive in the world market. Apart from fluorescent lamps, many other locally produced goods like sugar, textiles, and cosmetics are also unable to compete with those produced in India.

The number of people living below the poverty line in Bangladesh has increased alarmingly. In 1972 about 67 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. This figure rose to 73 percent in 1980. Now almost 90 percent of the population live below the poverty line. During the last 22 years, the areas of the economy of the country totally under the control of the public sector have been shattered. Mismanagement, corruption, and systematized loss have become rampant in the public sector enterprises. This sector of the economy incurs an annual loss of Taka 20 billion, but the bureaucrats could not be less concerned. Whatever success has been achieved in Bangladesh is due to the private sector, but the private entrepreneurs are becoming discouraged due to excessive bureaucratic controls.

#### **Editorial Says Child Labor Not for Economic Exploitation**

*BK2908110993 Dhaka in English 23 Aug 93 p 5*

[Editorial: "Child Labour in the United States and Bangladesh"]

[Text] The current furore and alarm over the U.S. threat to ban exports of Bangladeshi garments unless the producers stop employing child labour can be appreciated only by those who realise that the garments industry is the only one which has been earning foreign exchange in recent years.

We understand the idealism underlying the U.S. threat; certainly no one would want the industrialists to fatten

on cheap child labour. But is this really a case of economic exploitation for profit?

There are, we believe, a number of relevant factors which need to be taken carefully into account by U.S. legislators before they enforce their threat. Bangladesh, like most countries in the Least Developed Group, is saddled with a large population, with more than three-fourths of them living under the poverty line. Unemployment is a staggering problem which is responsible for the related problem of increasing crime and violence.

The choice before children under fifteen—the age-limit imposed by the United States—is between working for comparatively low wages and surviving physically and starving or drifting into beggary and crime.

There are we know several hundred thousand children, male and female, who are in "domestic service" and who like their counterparts in the garments industry face the stark choice of either slowly languishing to disease and death or working, sometimes for no wages at all except three meals a day. These children are younger than those in the garments industry. You would sometimes come across, a child of eight attached to somebody's household as a domestic. This looks cruel, but if the government banned the employment of children in domestic service the majority of them would surely starve.

These facts need to be explained to the West.

Besides, it should also be made clear to people in the United States and Europe that climatic conditions in tropical and sub-tropical areas mean earlier maturity. A child of 15 in the West is at least three to five years younger than a child of the same age in Bangladesh both physically and mentally.

### **IRAN**

#### **Kurds Said Being Treated Based on Regime's Needs**

*93LA0165A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
22 Jul 93 p 17*

[Article by Joseph Samahah: "The Kurds and the Double-Faced Policy"]

[Text] Iran persecutes its Kurds and chases them into Iraqi territories. Yet it supports Turkey's Kurds and allows them to stay in its territory and to infiltrate into their country in order to launch operations there. It also flirts with Iraqi Kurds and does not object to the talks between them and those loyal to it within the Iraqi opposition.

Turkey warns Iran and accuses it of supporting the Kurdish Turks while Ankara gives itself the right to resort to a military solution deep into the Iraqi territory, with the help of some Iraqi Kurds against Turkish Kurds. In the last few months this help was in the form of a temporary cease-fire and a slight improvement in



the Turkish attitude toward the "Kurdish issue." But the cease-fire has failed and the Turkish stand reverted to its earlier language that talks about "terrorism" and the "artificially separatist secessionist project," or about the economic and social problems in the southeastern area. [sentence as published] Thus there is no national problem and no special status for the Kurds. With some justice and honesty a solution can be reached.

The two countries agree on using the Kurdish card against Baghdad provided that the matter will not go out of control and will backfire and show that they do have a "Kurdish problem," something that Iranian fundamentalism and Turkish chauvinism can only deny.

In the midst of these developments the Iraqi Kurds appear to be wary of their Iranian brothers and their negative attitude toward their Turkish brothers, and defend the protection they have gained, wagering that the "suspension of Iraqi unity" will continue.

The Western attitude toward this problem is a reflection of the confusion that prevailed in Europe over the "nationalist issue" in Central and Eastern Europe, which found expression in astonishing fluctuation in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, where there has been a switch from a national ethnic concept to that of a cultural one.

This confusion, however, does not eliminate the fact that the decisive element in adopting a stand is the basis of each capital calculating its own strategic interests. It is quite clear in the Iranian-Kurdish case that the situation is primarily shaped by the adversary's identity. As long as there is anger against Baghdad the inclination is to support Iraqi Kurds and ensure safe zones for them. And as long as there is fear of Iran's stand the flip side would be sympathy for Iranian Kurds, without bringing up their case and showing enthusiasm for it. And as long as the alliance with Turkey continues, the flip side of it will be "condemnation" of the Kurdish terror against it, and contentment with whatever it may kindly do in this regard, and ignore the irony of Turkey, which persecutes its Kurds, taking a back seat in order to protect the Iraqi Kurds. It is clear in this regard that there is no "unified policy" toward the "Kurdish issue," but rather there are different policies each of which forms the "other side" of the policy pursued toward the capital concerned.

There isn't a modicum of honesty in this. But when was honesty an important element in defining cold interests? But the lack of honesty here has serious implications for the Kurds when each Kurdish group views its deliverance depending on the other groups continuing to suffer from persecution and oppression. This ugly self-destruction is what Kurdish leaders, such as Jalal-Talabani, are trying to develop into a "subtle political technique."

The Kurdish leaders have great responsibility. Wherever they may be, they must consider the overall picture when defining their demands. What can be added is that these leaders hold an extremely important card: that is the degree of concessions that the Iraqi Kurds agree upon,

both in the government and in the opposition. Some may say that what is being practiced has nothing to do with these agreements. Maybe this is true, but the Kurdish brothers possess what could be the basis of their demands in Iraq, although it lacks enforcement in a united country of their own. What they possess also constitutes an Arab recognition of their distinguished character that can be put before the Turks and Iranians.

### **Economy, Foreign Investment, Industry Analyzed**

93LA0133A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
24 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Salim Mashkur]

[Text] In a meeting with an Iranian diplomat who is close to political decisionmaking loci, a conversation transpired on regional relations and domestic developments, including Yemeni elections. Some of those present tried to ascertain the potential for Tehran's moving toward several capitals in the region to form an axis in its regional relations to balance other axes. However, an Iranian diplomat responded: In all candor, we are preoccupied with the domestic economic situation, and we cannot expend our energies in the game of balances in the Gulf arena or in any other arena.

Under normal conditions, the Iranian diplomat's response would not be used by others as an argument, especially if it concerned sensitive subjects related to his country's foreign relations. However, there is much evidence to corroborate what he said, and anyone who monitors Iranian affairs would not have to go to great lengths to find it. Iran's main current problem is its economy. The hardships of making a living have become the daily concern of Iranians. They no longer pay attention to political promises and slogans, except with respect to the effect of these promises and slogans on their living situation.

In the early eighties, anyone on a public bus who protested the poor living conditions would face a majority of the other passengers defending the government by citing the economic blockade and the war into which Iran had been thrust to justify the bad situation. Now, ten years later, the situation has changed completely. Someone complaining in a public place now enjoys the backing of a majority of those who listen to him. Buses and public assemblies have become an arena for the collective expression of displeasure with the ongoing decline in the standard of living. Moreover, revolutionary slogans, which most Iranians once accepted ardently, no longer attract interest and are occasionally derided by the very segments that adopted them in the past. The people have begun to ask God to lament the passing of the war years, because prices have doubled a number of times since the war ended. Moreover, the situation has prompted people to compare pre-revolution consumer prices to current consumer prices, and to recall the general pre-revolution living standard, which allowed a majority of Iranians to join

the now shrunk and almost extinct middle class. One can learn many details of life under the shah from the recollections that now form the center of discussion whenever Iranians get together over reddish Iranian tea.

Previously, the middle-class official or worker could support his family by holding a single job. The Iranian Peykan car was distributed to officials at inexpensive prices paid in easy installments. Today, the worker is hard-pressed. He must hold one or two additional jobs during non-office hours to meet his family's expenses. People work from early in the morning until late at night. Everyone is in a state of nervous tension, which frequently causes heated verbal arguments and even violent physical confrontations among a people not known to go beyond verbal sparring in their disputes and conflicts.

Complaints over the standard of living are no longer limited to ordinary Iranian citizens. Not a short time ago, they began to appear on the pages of newspapers and magazines, and in the remarks of officials themselves, chief among whom is President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The economic problem and citizens' concerns with subsistence have also become a topic of discussion and debate among the various political currents, each one of which blames the other for causing the problem.

This became clearer during the contest between the two traditional currents, the hardline current and the moderate current (as perceived from abroad), during parliamentary elections about a year ago. The hardliners argued that the economic decline and price increases worsened under the moderates, who controlled many affairs in the country following the war, and that the living situation was much better before then. The moderates responded that the current hardships stem solely from the economic policies followed during the war years, when the hardliners were in almost complete control.

The Iranian press has also made the economy a main concern. Each page now presents proposals and solutions consistent with the ideas of the current which the newspaper represents.

For example, RESALAT, the mouthpiece for the moderate Bazar [merchants] wing, which advocates a free economy, has continuously advanced proposals regarding the sale of state organizations to the private sector for suitable prices, the elimination of taxes except the one-fifth tax and the alms tax, and the more modest creation of economic freedoms. However, SALAM, the mouthpiece of the hardline current, whose most prominent figure is Mohtashemi, attacked these proposals and the government's current economic policy. In a recent issue, SALAM attacked the "policy of economic balance" adopted by President Rafsanjani's government, citing it as a cause of the inflation being experienced in Iran. In another issue, SALAM carried an article about this policy under the headline, "Policy of Balance or Failure?" In this article, it focused on the manifestations

of poverty and the Iranian citizen's difficult life due to inflation, the economic crisis, and the lack of monetary liquidity.

#### Winston and Coca Cola

In addition to shedding light on the living hardships of citizens, the press is also evaluating economic measures now being or slated to be taken. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI two months ago attacked the granting of permission to the Winston Company to distribute its cigarettes in Iran under the name Bistun, and the granting of permission to Coca Cola Company to re-enter Iran (the Iranian television program Reportage devoted numerous segments to this company's roots, its owners' identity, its true objectives, and its role in U.S. policy in many countries, including Iran before the revolution).

The newspapers have also criticized the banking system. The monthly ASR-E JADID magazine published an article entitled "Points of Weakness and Strength in the Banking System in the Country," in which it said, "Although eight years have passed since the Noninterest Banking System Law went into effect, the banking system has so far been unable to regulate its position to harmonize with the country's needs and the circumstances of the economy."

Several months ago, the editor-in-chief of the magazine GOZAREH (report), Abolqasem Kulyaf, opined in an editorial that Iran cannot be classified as a Third World country, because "it possesses all of the features and fulfills all of the criteria of an advanced country." Nonetheless, he acknowledges that his country, unlike India and China, does not enjoy any special status among Third World countries. He attributed this to "Iran's lack of an economic development model, inasmuch as the first five-year plan, now coming to an end, predicted that oil would sell for \$17 per barrel, whereas it has been sold for between \$10 and \$17 per barrel throughout most of this period. Also, the plan was formulated without adherence to any special development strategy."

Kulyaf asks, "Why are inflation and unstable prices continuing years after the end of the imposed war?" He concludes his article by counseling the need for Iran to develop an appropriate economic development model.

#### Problems of the Economy

Kulyaf's editorial perhaps points to several causes of Iran's critical economic situation. Iran is a rich, large country. It has precious metals and gas resources in addition to oil, its main income source. It also possesses fertile land, abundant water, and specialized human cadres. Nonetheless, its economic problem is worsening, which means that it must be attributed to mismanagement, bad planning, and the lack of a clear economic program. In this regard, the Iranians—who are well-known for their mastery of the political joke, which has become an important means of release from their daily concerns—relate that an Iranian economic delegation

described Iran's abundant raw materials to Japanese officials in Tokyo. The Japanese were dazzled. They said: If you give us your country and its resources, we will bring it to Japan's level within one year. The members of the Iranian delegation laughed and told the Japanese: And if you give us your country, we will bring it to Iran's level within six months!

This joke has deep significance. It points clearly to a key cause of Iran's current economic weakness. This cause has also become the crux of other problems and crises. Several factors comprise this cause. They include mismanagement, bad planning, and, above all, the lack of a defined, clearly delineated economic system, which is Iran's primary economic problem.

Since the shah's regime was toppled in February 1979, the government's identity has changed on all levels. The economy has emerged as a major problem. This happens whenever a regime employs ideology to administer a country. The government in Iran became religious according to Khomeyni's interpretation, and the economy and other matters inevitably became subservient to it.

However, the economic problem highlighted the large gap between the abundant economic theories in Iran and Iran's real problems requiring solutions. The clerics' economic theories and ideas could not serve as an integrated economic system for managing a huge country with about 40 million people, Iran's population when the regime was established. The clerics' many theories, aside from their partialness, are based on economic provisions of Islamic jurisprudence dating back to the beginning of Islam. Or, they are based on modern economic experiences and ideas untested by practical application.

The clerics, despite their great number in Iran, were unable to arrive at a theory to underpin the economy. What has happened since February 1979 is experimentation with theories and techniques for each separate case. These resulting remedies have clashed with the clerics' positions deriving from canonical law and their independent judgments. For example, the Islamic government appropriated much land owned by feudal lords, big landholders, and historically influential persons in Iran. It distributed the land to peasants to be farmed. However, these measures were not carried out on a constitutional basis, because constitutional law experts—who are responsible for applying the laws legislated by the Consultative Council based on the criteria and provisions of Islamic jurisprudence—had differences of opinion regarding the issue of ownership and its legitimacy.

In rejecting the Agricultural Reform Law (known as Article 7), they based themselves on the principle of the right to private ownership, saying, "The people control their property." However, supporters of the law, most of whom are also clerics, argue that a measure that is in the supreme interest of an Islamic state can be adopted even if it contradicts a well-established provision of Islamic

jurisprudence. They believe that independent jurisprudential judgment is needed in society and the state. Their reasoning is that religious jurisprudence has been absent from administration and government for a long period during which the world witnessed many lifestyle changes. Consequently, flexibility, development, and the activation of the jurisprudential legislative process are needed to keep pace with the needs of the era.

However, unresolved disputes over many similar issues have persisted, despite important developments, e.g., the formation of a "Committee to Identify the Interest" in 1989. Its task was to render a judgment on laws over which the Consultative Council and the Constitution Protection Council differ. In past months, the Guide of the Revolution, 'Ali Khamene'i, formed a new committee whose task it is "to modernize Islamic jurisprudence to meet the need of the state and society."

The second problem afflicting Iran's economy is its almost total reliance on oil revenues. In past years, oil price fluctuations have frequently required the elimination and amendment of numerous budget items and the elimination of important projects.

### The Banking System

The banking system is faring no better than other sectors in the economy. Iranian experts admit that the banking system, an important part of the economy's structure, is still unable to meet the economy's needs. Numerous attempts have been made since 1979 to transform it into an Islamic banking system. The implementation of an Islamic banking system was announced in 1984. However, this system really did not differ much from the former interest-based system. All it did was replace some banking transaction terms. For example, "profit" replaced "interest," which nonetheless continued to be a banking system mechanism as in the past. Also, the banking system continues to be out of step with the country's economy. This was stated sometime ago by the monthly ASR-E JADID magazine in an article entitled "Points of Weakness and Strength in the Banking System in the Country." The article states, "Although eight years have passed since the Non-Interest Banking System Law went into effect, the banking system has so far been unable to regulate its position to harmonize with the country's needs and the circumstances of the economy."

### The Industrial Structure

The industrial sector has deteriorated substantially over the past 13 years. Iranian industry is based on assembly, and it was linked with foreign companies and factories in the previous era. Links with parent companies were interrupted by the economic blockade, the measures applied after the revolution, and the war. This interruption has paralyzed Iranian factories, most of which were mobilized during the eight-year war to fulfill the requirements of the war fronts. These factories now require modernization of their worn out equipment. The reestablishment of links with foreign companies is being



debated among officials, who differ over this issue. Numerous companies were expropriated from their owners, who included leading financial and political personalities during the shah's era. Ownership of these factories was transferred to economic and social organizations established after the revolution, e.g., the Organization of the Oppressed, which supervises most of the factories, and the Organization of the Families of Martyrs. Some factories were also given to small organizations engaged in limited activity under the control of an individual, e.g., the al-Hadi Organization, which is controlled by Hadi Ghaffari, known for his wealth and role in the revolution. These organizations all operate outside of the scope of financial laws. This greatly damages the economy, because some of these factories realize large profits from the commodities they produce for daily consumption, e.g., food, clothes, and textiles.

The industrial structure was further weakened by the inexperience of most of the new directors that assumed responsibility for supervising the factories after the revolution. Some of these directors have also engaged in large-scale embezzlement. During the last years of the war, many of these factories came to a virtual standstill due to the unavailability of raw materials or spare parts for equipment and machinery. Others were targeted for destruction in Iraq's aerial bombardments.

#### **Crisis of Human Cadres**

Another factor that has damaged Iran's domestic situation following the revolution, especially its economic situation, is the exodus of hundreds of thousands (according to official statements) of engineers, experts, and capital owners. Some of them went abroad to continue their studies during the revolution's victory and then refrained from returning to Iran because of reports about the security and economic situation there. Experts estimate that the capital invested in Europe by wealthy Iranians would suffice to remedy the crisis and lift the Iranian economy if it were invested in Iran. However, none of these Iranians has yet dared to invest in Iran out of fear of a repetition of the nationalization that extended to most companies and factories at the beginning of the republican era.

The Iranian Government has made major efforts over the past three years to convince Iranian businessmen, engineers, physicians, and experts residing abroad to return to Iran. However, for many reasons, these efforts have so far failed. The main reason is the current, undecided domestic debate between political currents over the return of skilled expatriates. Some who follow the hard line strongly reject the return of these expatriates, because they believe that it would represent the return of people from the shah's era, given that many businessmen had financial and political influence during the shah's era and were intimates of the shah's court. Some hardliners promote slogans that describe the call for the return of these expatriates as a betrayal of the Islamic revolution's goals.

However, the Iranian president responded to these opponents by saying—in a Friday sermon in Tehran three months ago—that opponents of the return of skilled Iranians from abroad make a living from hypocrisy, falsehood, and unrealistic revolutionary slogans. Accordingly, Iran's finance minister visited New York last autumn and met with a large concentration of Iranians residing in America to convince them to return to support their country's economy. Some domestic newspapers strongly attacked the minister, forcing President Rafsanjani to respond to them strongly.

One defender of the return of expatriates is 'Ata'ollah Mohajerani, the deputy president for legal and parliamentary affairs. In an article written by him in ETTELA'AT, he defended the dual citizenship of Iranians and the return of expatriates. He said that most of the million expatriates are constructive elements who can serve their country. He added that only a small percentage of them would pose a danger to the country if they returned, and such persons are basically not thinking about returning. Mohajerani then asked: How can we forget the tens of thousands of Iranian physicians, engineers, writers, and intellectuals living outside the homeland, while we import physicians from India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan to treat our citizens? How can we invite foreign investors and foreign companies to invest their money in free industrial and commercial zones, while disregarding the capital of expatriate Iranians? He then added that concern with the affairs of expatriate Iranians indicates the regime's strength and confidence in the revolution. He added: Therefore, we see enemies attempting to prevent expatriates from returning by inflating their fears and inspiring in them fear of dangers that await them.

It seems that the factors mentioned above have combined to make the expatriates very fearful of having to face hardships if they were to return. An additional factor is that objections and threats regarding such a return have been made in Iran by such personalities as Shaykh Khalkhali. His record is filled with the toughness and mercilessness for which he became known during his leadership of an antinarcotics campaign in the early part of the revolution and his supervision of the revolutionary courts that expropriated much property pertaining to the royal era.

However, this does not mean that some expatriates have not returned. Some feudal lords and property owners who do not have cases pending against them have returned. Special courts have returned their property, land, and real estate to them, which provoked attacks and much criticism on the part of the newspapers and political personalities.

#### **Crisis Begets Crises**

Naturally, the effect of the economic crisis is not limited to the living conditions of citizens. It extends to other levels of life in society, including state policy. Anything resulting from the economic crisis in turn causes other

negative effects. For example, the economic deterioration caused unemployment to rise, especially after the war with Iraq ended in 1988 and more than 0.5 million combatants returned from the fronts to discover that they had no jobs in the productive or service sectors, and that the years which they had spent on the fronts were of no avail when they applied for jobs. It is known that the social diseases caused by unemployment are not limited to illegal acts, or, at the least, unproductive acts. They also include murder and robbery, as the newspapers report daily.

Also, the difficulty of importing and supplying agricultural inputs and the government's inability to provide services to the countryside due to the economic straits have generated a sharp rise in rural-urban migration. Many migrants have resorted to unproductive occupations, e.g., selling cigarettes, which "employs" more than 0.5 million youths, and washing car windshields, which is a form of indirect begging or hidden unemployment. Others have joined the growing ranks of the unemployed. At the same time, agricultural land has shrunk. Thus, 10 years after the revolution, Iran now imports five million of its total annual requirement of six million tons of wheat. Iran is also one of the largest importers of meat and cheese, despite enjoying the basic components of agricultural and livestock wealth, which could abundantly fulfill its domestic needs.

### **Sixteen New Electric Power Plants Under Construction**

*94AS0001A Tehran HAMSHAHERI in Persian  
11 Aug 93 pp 1, 14*

[Text] Economic Service. By the end of the year 1376 [20 March 1998] the power plants under construction by the Ministry of Energy's Tavanir Company and the regional electrical power companies will go into operation and will add close to 10,000 megawatts [MW] to the nation's electrical power production capability.

Our correspondent reports that of the units under construction, 13 units will go into operation by the end of the current year [20 March 1994], 26 units in the year 1373 [21 March 1994-20 March 1995], 16 units in the year 1374 [21 March 1995-20 March 1996], four units in the year 1375 [21 March 1996-20 March 1997] and one unit in the year 1376 [21 March 1997-20 March 1998].

The names of the power plants, their nominal capacity, and the date of their start-up are as follows:

Units 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Ramin Power Plant of Ahvaz, each with a capacity of 315 MW, are under construction, and one will go into operation this summer, one in summer 1373 [1994], and two units in the spring of 1374 [1995] and 1375 [1996].

Two 250-MW units at the Martyr Raja'i Power Plant will go into operation this summer and winter and six compound cycle units at this power plant, each with a

capacity of 123 MW, will gradually go into operation between this summer and next fall.

Unit 6 at the Gilan compound cycle power plant's gas division with a capacity of 137 MW will be put into operation this summer, and six units in this power plant's steam division, each with a capacity of 148 MW, will be put into operation in 1374 [21 March 1995-20 March 1996].

Three compound cycle units at the new Montazer-e Qa'em Power Plant, each with a capacity of 116 MW, will go into operation by the fall of this year. One other 116-MW unit will also go into operation in the spring of this year.

Four 250-MW units at the western steam power plant will gradually go into operation between winter this year and summer 1374 [1995].

Units 1 and 2 at the Kazerun compound cycle power plant, each with a capacity of 128 MW, will go into operation in the first half of next year [21 March-22 September 1994] and units 3 and 4 of this power plant, each with a capacity of 123 MW, will go into operation in the second half of next year [23 September 1994-20 March 1995].

Two 32-MW units at the Bistun steam power plant, six 123-MW units at the Fars compound cycle power plant, two 123-MW units at Mashhad's Shari'ati Power Plant, and two 37-MW units at the Zahedan gas power plant will go into operation next year.

Three compound cycle units at the Qom power plant, each with a capacity of 128 MW, will go into operation by fall of this year. Unit 1 at this plant went into operation this spring.

Four 65-MW units at the Iranshahr power plant will gradually go into operation between fall 1373 [1994] and spring 1375 [1996], and two 37-MW units at the Urmia power plant will go into operation by the middle of the year 1374 [23 September 1995].

At the project to develop the Martyr Montazeri Power Plant of Esfahan, four 200-MW units will come on-line between fall 1373 [1994] and spring 1375 [1996].

Six 123-MW units at the Nishabur compound cycle power plant will be put into operation by fall of 1374 [1995], and two 550-MW units at the Arak power plant will be put into operation by fall of the years 1375 [1996] and 1376 [1997].

### **Reducing Blackouts**

On the other hand, IRNA reports that for the first time in recent years, the number of summer blackouts has reached a minimum. The official in charge of the Tavanir Company says that this has been possible despite an 18.2-percent growth in electrical power consumption in the first three months of the current year [21 March-21 June 1993].

Planning to make up shortages in electrical energy started at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, and since it takes three to four years to create and make use of a new power plant in the electrical power industry, the investments made showed their effects late last year.

According to the minister of energy, under the new economic conditions the amount of infrastructure investment in this sector is now more than Rls1,500 billion per year, which amounts to Rls30,000 per person nationally.

Yet the country must invest Rls40,000 per person just to power one 100-watt bulb in each home. Likewise, it takes three to four years to create a new power plant in the electrical power industry.

Investment in the electrical power industry under the First Five-Year Plan progressed in such a way that after the installations damaged in the war were reopened, by the end of the year 1371 [20 March 1993], a total of 2,584 MW of electrical power was added to previous production capacity, while the percentages of blackouts decreased from 4.8 percent in the year 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] to 0.6 percent in the year 1371 [21 March 1992-20 March 1993] and to about zero in recent months.

#### **Production Problems of Plastic Producers Detailed**

*94AS0001B Tehran HAMSHAHRI in Persian  
11 Aug 93 p 14*

[Text] Economic Service. Numerous production problems have made producers too frightened to expand their activities. The tax laws are antiproduction and they prevent investment.

Instead of thinking about quality and more production, producers think mostly about money.

In an interview with our correspondent, one of the participants at the Second Plastic Exports Specialist Exhibition discussed the above and added: Taxes are now calculated based on the number of machines at each plant, even though the machines might not be in continuous operation. Due to the heavy taxes on machines and the high expenses, not only is it difficult to develop the work, but we also have even sold some existing machines.

This producer added: Our products in the large government plants are used to produce goods such as vehicles and household implements, but because of the problems that exist, there is no direct relationship between us, and middlemen conduct these transactions. This causes the final cost of production to rise and there is no profit for the two sides.

Another participant in this exhibition discussed the manufacture of machines that inject plastic. In an interview with our correspondent he said: The technical capability to build plastic injection machinery exists in the country, and it is completely competitive with foreign products in terms of quality and price, but currently imports of second-hand machines from abroad, which are done without any problem, has stagnated the market for domestic producers.

He said: Another major problem in industries, especially in the small units, is the shortage of investment and cash. To get a fast monetary and profit return, the banks mostly tend to provide commercial loans.

#### **Four Tehran Areas To Receive City Gas**

*94AS0001C Tehran HAMSHAHRI in Persian  
11 Aug 93 p 14*

[Text] The old urban makeup, the heavy population, and the heavy vehicle traffic are among the main problems in implementing Tehran's gas delivery project.

Economic Service. With the operation of 360 km of urban gas networks and the installation of 3,000 service lines, by early next year regions, 9, 11, 17, and 18 of the city of Tehran will be covered by urban gas service.

Engineer Afzali, acting executive officer for the Tehran Region 10 Gas Delivery Project, told the above to our correspondent. He said: This project began in the month of Aban last year [23 October-21 November 1992], and should be completed in 18 months according to the project schedule. So far most of the pipe laying and installation of this project has been completed and it is expected that in the near future the task of installing markers and injecting gas into parts of the network will begin.

He said: This project is being carried out at a cost of more than 10 billion rials under the supervision of the deputy director for production and infrastructure services of the Foundation for the Oppressed and War Veteran's Housing Development Organization. It is six months ahead of schedule in the network-laying phase, and it is two months behind schedule in the phase for installing markers, injecting gas, and building pressure relay stations.

He said that the old urban makeup, the heavy population, and the heavy vehicle traffic in these regions are among the main problems in implementing Tehran's gas delivery project in the aforementioned areas.

In conclusion he said: It is hoped that with the cooperation of the regional municipalities, the implementation of these projects and street surface repair will proceed more quickly.



**Ilam Province Mining Activities Detailed***93LA0231B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM  
in Persian 5 Aug 93 p 5*

[Text] By the end of the current year [20 March 1994] from all the active mines in the province of Ilam more than 400,000 tons of nonmetallic ores will have been extracted and marketed by 250 mine workers.

Bayat, general manager of the province of Ilam Office of Mines and Metals, made the above statement. He said: Among the active mines in the province there are 250 gypsum mines where 211,250 tons of gypsum are extracted annually and sent for use in the war-stricken areas under reconstruction and to other cities in the province and neighbor provinces.

He said: In the first three months of the current year [21 March-21 June] alone, more than 100,000 tons of mine materials including lime, salt, variegated stone, facade stone and sulphur was extracted. In addition to domestic consumption in the province, these materials were shipped to cement factories, gypsum factories, and rock-cutting factories in neighbor provinces.

He discussed the potentials of the mines and the high reserves some of them have, as well as the desirable quality of the ores in the province. He said: The gypsum stone in the Hazer Mil area of Dehloran is unparalleled in Iran and the Middle East for its desirability and its assay ratings.

He discussed the projects being carried out by the province's Office of Mines and Metals. He said: A geological map of the province has been prepared on a scale of 1/250,000. It was begun by geological engineers in the province to identify places to extract decorative facade stone. It will be put to use in the near future.

Bayat discussed the province's favorable position for the export of mined materials. He said: This year for the first time 800 tons of high-quality gypsum was exported to the nations of the Persian Gulf on an experimental basis, and if the foreign side agrees, 30,000 tons of gypsum could be exported annually to these nations.

He said: Exploration has already begun for dolomite, which has many uses in the steel industries, and if the officials in charge agree, mining operations will begin.

He discussed the effective role of the private sector in making the best of existing mines, and transferring them to this sector. He said: This year three mines have been transferred to the private sector and by the end of this year [20 March 1994] 10 more mines in various parts of the province will have been transferred to the private sector.

He said the main problems standing in the way of the development and utilization of the mines in the province of Ilam are the lack of suitable roads, the shortage of

semiskilled manpower and the lack of heavy and semi-heavy machinery. He added: With the development of the shipping network and the elimination of the existing obstacles, many of the mines in the province, which have been abandoned will go into operation.

The deprived border province of Ilam with its various ethnic communities does not have metal mines, but because it has mineral substances such as gypsum, lime, sulphur, phosphate and decorative stones, as well as huge reserves of natural tar, it is in an outstanding position.

It is clear that if proper and logical use is made with genuine criteria of the existing mines, effective steps will be taken to develop the economy and make it prosper, and also to alleviate the deprivation in this area.

**Rising Caspian Waters Destroying Coastal Trees***93LA0232C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
12 Aug 93 p 5*

[Text] Thousands of tree saplings, mostly common alder, are being destroyed along the Caspian coast.

These trees, spread across the coasts of Astara, Anzali, Rudsar, Kolachay, and Chaboksar, are being destroyed as a result of the rising and penetration of sea water.

Before drying up and becoming useless as a result of salt water, these trees were a good source of lumber, but no special caretaker existed to make use of them in time.

**Technical Cooperatives Established for Various Disciplines***93LA0247A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 93 p 3*

[Text] Tabriz—KEYHAN Correspondent. For the first time in the country, technical cooperatives for specialists in engineering, legal, and financial affairs are being formed by the Ministry of Cooperatives to consult on technical matters, engineering projects, legal and financial affairs and to provide various scientific and engineering systems.

This was announced by Engineer Shafe'i, who had gone to Tabriz to take part in a seminar on development and Azarbaijan. He said: More than 8 million people are covered by the services of cooperatives throughout the country.

He added: To support the nation's cultural and academic activities, more than 70 billion rials[Rls] from Note 3 of the National Budget have been allocated in the form of bank means and for investment in cultural affairs with 70 percent deductions in commissions and without security deposits, which will be given to cooperatives for publishers, writers, translators, and the press.

The minister of cooperatives added: Likewise in Note 52 of the National Budget Rls700 billion was set aside for development and investment in various educational and training affairs with 50-percent commission discounts, to be transferred to applicants in view of the designation of needs and priorities in the various sectors.

### Vahed Company's Projects Detailed

93LA0247B Tehran KEYHAN in Persian  
23 Aug 93 p 15

[Text] The Computer Center and the Health Care and Treatment Center of the Vahed Company have gone into operation, the passenger parking facility in south Tehran will open in the next month, the Vahed Company Construction and Manufacturing Plant will go into operation in the next two months, and Phase 2 of the electrical bus project will go into operation in Ordibehesht 1373 [21 April-21 May 1994].

Engineer Tarfe', executive director of the Vahed Bus Company, gave an interview in which he announced the above yesterday during ceremonies inspecting this company's six projects under construction and ready to go into operation, which were attended by Karbaschi, mayor of Tehran. In explaining the projects he said: The bus company's computer center is in a 500-square-meter hall and cost 70 million rials[Rls]. In this center various Vahed Company Systems, including bus maintenance and repair, planning, design, construction accounting, and project control are mechanized.

Concerning the resources at the Tehran Bus Health Care and Treatment Center, he added: This center was built with 2,500 meters of usable floor space on four floors, and includes various medical departments. When its equipment is installed in the next month or two, it will be turned over to the personnel.

Engineer Tarfe' then discussed the passenger parking in the south. He said: This parking facility, which is located on the southern side of the passenger terminal, was built by the Terminals Organization and has an area of 27,000 square meters. From this passenger parking, three bus lines travel back and forth to Emam Hoseyn Square, Emam Khomeyni Square, and Enqelab Square, and it will be ready to open in the next month.

The executive director of the Vahed Company then discussed operations to build Phase 2 of the electrical bus line. He announced: The site of the construction of Phase 2 of the electrical bus line is at the end of 17 Shahrivar Street, which has been called the Southern Depot. Along the Southern Depot's route to Emam Hoseyn Square, meaning over a distance of 6.3 km, a special electrical bus line is being laid, and it will go into operation in Ordibehesht 1373 [21 April-21 May 1994].

He added: The Vahed Company Construction and Manufacturing Plant is also under construction and it will go into operation in the next two months. This plant has bays with an area of 5,000 square meters and is located in Bus Region 6 in Jennatabad. So far Rls300 million credits has been spent to complete it. After the completion of these bays, in one part of the plant all the Vahed Company's buses will be rebuilt and in another part a plant is being built that can produce 500 kinds of parts made from cast iron, aluminum, steel profiles and sheet metal.

In conclusion Engineer Tarfe' discussed converting the buses to use gas fuel. He said: In Tehran we consume 300,000 liters of gasoil per day for buses, and when we change the fuel we will save on consumption of imported gasoil, and certainly air pollution in Tehran will be reduced.

### System of Coupon Distribution To Continue

93LA0247C Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
31 Aug 93 p 15

[Text] Economics Division. Mr. Entezari, the official in charge of the Ministry of Commerce Economic Mobilization Staff, gave an exclusive interview to the monthly publication PAYAM-E BAZARGANI concerning Phase 10 ration coupon distribution and the changes that have been made in this area.

In this interview Mr. Entezari said: The nation's current economic conditions require that the policies of rationed distribution of goods continue. Perhaps it would be enough that these coupons the people have continue another six to seven months. The new coupons will be distributed beginning in Farvardin next year [21 March-20 April 1994], and this will ultimately continue another year and a half.

Mr. Entezari discussed the number of rationed items in Phase 10. He added: What is clear is that we need a permanent system of rationing goods, and those goods that have been rationed in special and emergency situations should gradually be taken out of the rationing system, because this gradual removal of subsidies will help the vulnerable classes in a way. If the payment of subsidies continues we will not be successful in our overall systems and the smoke from that will eventually get into the eyes of these people.

In view of the fact that the nation's economic adjustment is being implemented gradually, and that we will get desirable results in the Second Five-Year Plan or in the middle of it, the subsidy process also will certainly be gradual. If we look at the measures enacted by the Economic Council, we will see that the elimination of coupons is being done gradually. For example, in the past, rationing for sugar and sugar cubes was announced 12 times in one year, but now the announcement of this coupon takes place six times a year. The number of times announcements have been made for oil coupons has decreased somewhat. Likewise the number of announcements for meat or cheese has gradually decreased, and some goods such as chicken and eggs have gradually been removed from the coupon system. This year, however, we will have no special program for detergent powder and soap, while the same goods such as sugar and sugar cubes, oil, rice, cheese and meat will probably continue to be rationed.

Mr. Entezari discussed ration coupon violations by banks and coupon distributors, and the way the Economic Mobilization Staff deals with these violations. He said: We had violations in Phase 9 that we dealt with

quickly because our system of supervision and control identified violations very quickly and they were investigated by the Economic Mobilization Staff General Legal Office.

We also investigated violations with goods. Last year, because of the problems that developed with detergent powder and soap we were forced to audit all the factories producing soap and detergent powder and the companies distributing these goods. It was observed that during the last five years the factories producing soap and detergent powder sold at the unregulated price something on the order of 150,000 tons of soap and detergent powder, amounting to five rationing cycles in terms of goods, when these goods should have been marketed at the rationed price, thereby making about 100 billion rials in excess profits. We are trying to get this money back.

He added: We have recently obtained a measure enacted by the Economic Council saying that guild units, including government and cooperative guilds, distributing companies and producing factories that are involved with goods and basic goods must pay 1.5 times the unregulated price if they have deficits or shortfalls for any reason. The guidelines for this measure have been prepared and sent to the provinces.

#### **Eighty-Five Percent of Delijan Dam Completed**

93LA0247D Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
6 Sep 93 p 19

[Text] Arak—Central News Unit. More than 75 percent of the physical construction of the 15 Khordad Dam of Delijan has been completed.

The executive officer for the 15 Khordad Dam of Delijan, in announcing the above, said: When it goes into operation this dam, which is being built with the goal of procuring potable and drinking water for the municipality of Qom and to irrigate part of the agricultural lands in the municipality of Delijan, will be able to send one and one-half cubic meters per second of purified water to Qom, one and one-half meters of water per second for agricultural irrigation will also go into 8,000 hectares of land below the dam.

He added: To build the 15 Khordad Dam of Delijan, a total of more than 3 million cubic meters of earth will be poured, of which more than 50 percent has now been completed.

#### **Construction of Gonbad Industrial City Started**

93LA0247E Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
6 Sep 93 p 19

[Text] Gonbad—IRNA. Construction has begun today, Monday, on the Gonbad Industrial City on a 100-hectare site.

The aforementioned industrial city is one of 15 approved in the province of Mazandaran. It will contain 150 industrial units including food, chemical, steel and non-steel, electrical and electronics industries.

Engineer Turang, manager of the Mazandaran Industrial Cities Company, said in this regard: So far construction has begun on eight industrial cities in Mazandaran, including the Gonbad Industrial City.

He added: So far in the Gonbad Industrial City 30 units have registered and contracts to assign land have also been signed with five units.

#### **Underpass Bridge in Mashhad Becomes Operational**

93LA0240P Tehran SALAM in Persian 6 Sep 93 p 15

[Text] Mashhad—IRNA. The large Zibashahr underpass bridge and Esteqlal Square on the route of the Asia'i Beltline Road in Mashhad has become operational.

This project was built with two 60-meter overpass bridges and two 20-meter underpasses on the route of the Asia'i Road, and eight 4-meter bridges for pedestrians on an 8-hectare site.

To build this bridge 1.2 billion rials[Rls] was spent. This project was built to improve traffic on the route of the Asia'i Road (CENTO) and to provide access to summer residences along this route.

On the same occasion, the underpass bridge for the pedestrian path in Mashhad's Mellat Park, built with Rls500 million credit, also went into operation.

This project has 2,430 meters of foundation and seven bridges with 28,000 square meters, on which has been built a small market and an art exhibition area.

The ceremonies opening these projects were attended by Engineer Mofidi, governor-general of Khorasan, and the managers of province executive organizations.



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